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With few exceptions, science studies has neglected potential insights that could be gained 
by studying sociology, a discipline that has played an important role in its own 
development. This thesis addresses the specificities of  sociology from the perspective of  
constructivist science studies and explores the tensions that arise as a result of  this 
encounter. The theoretical framework is based on actor-network theory (the work of  
Bruno Latour in particular), and supplemented with the work of  Pierre Bourdieu (his 
theory of  sociology in particular) to examine issues specific to sociology. Via a document 
and interview-based study of  sociology in Latvia set against the background of  Soviet 
science, the thesis argues that an open-ended and normatively saturated conception of  
knowledge hampers the stability of  the discipline. I suggest, however, that these qualities 
matter vitally to the long-term development of  sociology as a form of  knowledge.  
Applied to sociology,  a science studies understanding of  science illustrates what happens 
when the intimate connection between political representation and scientific 
representation is not concealed, and hybridity is acknowledged. 
 





In the introduction to the book Sociology Responds to Fascism Stephen Turner and Dirk 
Kasler suggest that sociology has often been conceived as an oppositional science. 
Among the episodes tasked to illustrate this characteristic of  sociology is the suppression 
of  sociological scholarship under fascist rule (Turner and Kasler 1992). While medical 
researchers could be persuaded to commit acts of  torture and abuse in the name of  
ideology, sociology was immune to such co-option because of  the hostility the Nazi 
regime had towards sociological research. Such characterisations of  sociology are often 
supplemented by an assumption that good sociology is perpetually at odds with 
reactionary regimes. Bad sociology, on the other hand, is one that legitimatises the 
interests and philosophies of  those in power. In other words, the framing of  sociology as 
an oppositional science contains an explicit assumption as to what constitutes good 
examples of  the discipline and a particular understanding of  the relationship between 
knowledge and power that sociology should exemplify. 
The question of  the relationship between knowledge and power in the context of  social 
formations has a long history, but it is still plagued by a series of  ambiguities that 
continually fuel debates across the social sciences and humanities. The question that 
animates this thesis is whether and how power extends to the management of  knowledge 
production in the sciences. By this I do not just mean censorship but the ability to 
intervene and actively mould the content of  scientific knowledge and the ethos of  entire 
scientific disciplines. Thus, while “knowledge is power” suggests that knowledge can be 
empowering, I am intrigued by a different kind of  connection – the ability of  power to (i) 
determine what counts as knowledge and (ii) distribute the rights to say that it does. Some 
clarification is in order, however. 
The idea that there is a social component to the production and distribution of  
knowledge is an old one (Berger and Luckmann 1991; Fuller 2006b), but the influence of  
external factors on scientific knowledge has traditionally been treated as something akin 
to interference and has generally been regarded as detrimental to the progress of  science 
and organised inquiry more generally. This was especially true of  analytical philosophy of  
science, though the proponents of  this approach were not alone in holding such views. 
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The sociologist of  science Robert K. Merton looked upon science as a particular kind of  
tradition and explored the relationship between science and ambient cultural and political 
conditions, but the overall aim was the articulation of  a binding ethos that was specific to 
the scientific tradition (Merton 1968; Panofsky 2010). It is certainly possible to identify 
episodes in the history of  science where a group of  scientists transgressed scientific 
norms, but these stand out precisely because we have a point of  reference that specifies 
what a conscientious scientist ought to have done in similar circumstances.  
Such norms, however, did not develop in a vacuum, and Merton was equally sensitive to 
the conditions that had to be satisfied for science to flourish. Although Merton refrained 
from making strong claims as to the relationship between science and the democratic 
social order (Kalleberg 2010: 183), he believed that the scientific ethos could express and 
realise itself  better in democratic societies. 
The persistent development of  science occurs only in societies of  a certain order, 
subject to a peculiar complex of  tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints. 
(Merton 1968: 592) 
 
The political apparatus designed to put democratic values into practice may thus vary, 
but universalistic standards are maintained. To the extent that a society is democratic, it 
provides scope for the exercise of  universalistic criteria in science.  
(Merton 1968: 611) 
This move and overall framing of  the issue is telling from a sociology of  knowledge 
point of  view. Stephen Turner (2007a; 2008), David Hollinger (1995) and Ronald Giere 
(1994) have suggested that the normative approach to science in the middle of  the 
twentieth century should, at least in part, be understood in the context of  broader 
debates pertaining to the cultural significance of  science in general and the fate of  
science in totalitarian societies, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, in particular. 
That is to say, Merton's claim that there is a kind of  elective affinity between the 
democratic tradition and the scientific ethos (Kalleberg 2010) has to be viewed in relation 
to the concerns of  Merton and his contemporaries regarding the future of  democratic 
culture in general and the freedom of  scientific inquiry in particular. 
Bland as most of  their formulations might seem from afar, to these intellectuals it 
mattered enormously to be "objective," to look upon factual realities "without 
prejudice," to "actually test with experience" one's opinions, and to report "honestly" 
the results of  one's inquiries. These men and women saw a world filled with "prejudice" 
and with efforts to "impose certain opinions by force." Against these evils one must 
affirm "free inquiry" and "open-mindedness" in order that our society might be 
organized realistically on the basis of  the conditions life actually presents. If  this was 
what scientists did, then the idea of  imitating scientists, of  following a "scientific 
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approach", was a capital idea.  
(Hollinger 1995: 444) 
Such anxieties also touched upon the imposition of  forms of  organisation and planning 
that were alien to the scientific way of  life. Unsurprisingly, the fate of  science in 
totalitarian societies was a source of  great concern. While liberal audiences had to be 
persuaded that science works best as a self-regulating tradition animated by a critical 
ethos (Turner 2007a; 2008), totalitarian societies were more complicated. In totalitarian 
societies 
[t]he norms of  the scientific ethos must be sacrificed, in so far as they demand a 
repudiation of  the politically imposed criteria of  scientific validity or of  scientific worth. 
(Merton 1968: 595) 
The above quote suggests that Merton believed that unlike democratic societies, where 
new scientific contributions were evaluated in terms of  their logical consistency and the 
fit between data, hypotheses and theoretical frameworks, totalitarian societies impose 'the 
hitherto irrelevant criteria of  the race or political creed of  the theorist' (Merton 1968: 
596). What is more, Merton was not alone in this. For example, Ronald Giere (1994: 4-5) 
has suggested that Hans Reichenbach's distinction between the context of  discovery and 
the context of  justification (Reichenbach 1938) was introduced precisely to make the 
point that the identities of  scientists should have no bearing on the validity and 
evaluation of  their scientific contributions. 
The concerns over external interference were coupled by the appreciation that scientific 
expertise possesses rhetorical force which can justify and legitimise political decisions, 
thus creating a self-sustaining vicious circle.  
Partly as a result of  scientific advance, therefore, the population at large has become ripe 
for new mysticisms clothed in apparently scientific jargon. This promotes the success of  
propaganda generally. The borrowed authority of  science becomes a powerful prestige 
symbol for unscientific doctrines.  
(Merton 1968: 602) 
By exerting control over the production of  knowledge, enforcing conformity and 
excising the possibility of  ideologically troubling or subversive research, political 
institutions and regimes could rationalise their decisions by relying on the impersonal 
authority that science possesses. However, such a move hinges on the prestige that 
scientific knowledge enjoys, which in turn is based on the belief  that good science is 
uncontaminated by the world of  politics and, therefore, is rightly considered the 
canonical example of  knowledge. In other words, the predicate “scientific” imparts a 
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particular kind of  authority and power because it is believed to be devoid of  ideology 
(Ezrahi 1990; 2003). Scientific knowledge is a source of  power, but it is a power that 
derives from the belief  that science is a self-regulating enterprise whose products are 
impervious to ambient influences and political interests, which are believed to have a 
corrosive effect on the integrity of  the scientific enterprise (Kalleberg 2010: 194). 
Science as Culture 
Merton's way of  talking about science, however, has been the subject of  intense debate 
ever since, and there has been a gradual move away from his seemingly agnostic but 
ultimately deferential attitude towards science (Fuller 2006b; Guggenheim and Nowotny 
2003). First of  all, while Merton approached science as a kind of  tradition, it was 
tradition that reflected, encouraged and cherished the spirit of  critical inquiry that had 
come to be associated with science.  
Most institutions demand unqualified faith; but the institution of  science makes 
scepticism a virtue. Every institution involves, in this sense, a sacred area, which is 
resistant to profane examination in terms of  scientific observation and logic. The 
institution of  science itself  involves emotional adherence to certain values. But whether 
it be the sacred sphere of  political convictions or religious faith or economic rights, the 
scientific investigator does not conduct himself  in the prescribed uncritical and 
ritualistic fashion. 
(Merton 1968: 602) 
In other words, Merton believed that scientists inhabited a culture whose norms were 
congruent with the popular idea of  science as disinterested inquiry. A number of  
developments in the 1960s – chief  among them being Thomas Kuhn's work – redefined 
the terms of  the debate. Kuhn's account of  everyday science (or normal science) viewed 
it as a form of  material culture and craft but defined the interests of  scientists internally 
and focused on consensus and routine (Kuhn 1996). Science may well be a self-regulating 
culture, but the critical spirit evident in Merton's norms was subdued, though not 
explicitly excised. 
[B]ecause Kuhn made it clear that normal science was typical and revolutionary science 
aberrant, he was widely read as promoting normal science as a new model of  rationality, 
with revolutionary science implicitly standing for irrationality.  
(Fuller 2006b: 23) 
The removal of  the critical element from the science-as-culture approach was very much 
in evidence in the work of  the Strong Programme in the sociology of  scientific 
knowledge. The proponents of  the latter, however, went further than Kuhn and made 
the boundary between science and the broader social context porous and malleable. By 
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doing so, they attempted to move away from treating external factors as negative or 
corrosive influences and proposed to give them a constitutive role in the production and 
development of  scientific knowledge and ideas (e.g. Bloor 1991). This can be regarded as 
a challenge to Reichenbach's claim that the context of  discovery and the context of  
justification had to be distinguished (Reichenbach 1938: 381-382).  The compound effect 
of  Reichenbach's views was that a theory of  science should (i) aim at a rational 
reconstruction of  knowledge that focuses on the relation between facts and theories and 
(ii) ignore the identity of  the scientist, because her psychological idiosyncrasies and the 
specificities of  the context in which she made her discovery have no bearing on the 
validity of  her contributions to the scientific enterprise. The Strong Programme, 
however, challenged this view and aimed to show that both the identity of  the scientist 
and the context in which she operated have been pertinent factors in determining the 
reach and impact of  scientific contributions.   
Sociology and Science Studies: An Awkward Encounter 
This thesis follows in the footsteps of  the approach inaugurated by the Strong 
Programme and is situated at the intersection between theoretical sociology and science 
studies. The focus of  this thesis is the specificity of  sociology, the difficulties inherent in 
understanding this discipline from a science studies perspective, and the various attempts 
to articulate the goals of  sociology as a form of  knowledge. The impetus comes from the 
view that '[d]espite its sensitivity to the social contexts of  scientific knowledge 
production, STS has difficulty applying this awareness reflexively' (Fuller and Collier 
2003: xviii), and I want to suggest that the peculiarities of  sociology as a science can 
illustrate this quite well. For example, in their article on the present state of  science 
studies Guggenheim and Nowotny (2003) argue that the field works with an implicit 
understanding of  what deserves the attention of  science studies scholars. This is based 
on a very traditional version of  what constitutes science, and the focus is usually on 
uncontroversial sites of  knowledge production. In general, this means that, while 
conventional accounts have been challenged and the boundary between science and 
society is figured as porous and open-ended, researchers still look to the canonical fields 
(e.g. physics) and settings (e.g. laboratories and universities) for insights. More particularly, 
science is generally assumed to mean natural science. 
The word “science” in science studies still seems largely to mean physics, although the 
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weight is shifting in the direction of  the life sciences. This statement does not imply that 
other fields and subjects are not studied, but that whatever is within the scope of  STS is 
still held against some kind of  standard image of  science which is definitely not geology 
or psychology. We claim that science studies in their actual practices carry a hidden 
assumption of  what science is. 
(Guggenheim and Nowotny 2003: 237) 
While the above remark was made more than a decade ago, it suggests a possible reason 
why a discipline like sociology has not been a prominent object of  study.  In particular, 
Guggenheim and Nowotny believe that science studies has generally focused its attention 
on disciplines like physics and showed little interest in the social sciences and humanities. 
They suggest that a contributing factor to this trend is the difference in prestige attached 
to the sciences themselves and the reputation the comes with studying them 
(Guggenheim and Nowotny 2003: 238). In other words, studying a well-established and 
authoritative field like physics attracts more attention and respect. I have little cause to 
disagree with their diagnosis, but I wish to propose a slightly different reason for why the 
social sciences in general (with the notable exception of  economics) and sociology in 
particular have been less prominent than the natural sciences. A concisely summarised 
hint is provided by Steven Shapin. 
The homage is paid from the weak to the strong: students in sociology, anthropology, 
and psychology commonly experience total immersion in “methods” courses, and while 
chemists learn how to use mass spectrometers and Bunsen burners, they are rarely 
exposed to courses in “scientific method.” The strongest present-day redoubts of  belief  
in the existence, coherence, and power of  the scientific method are found in the 
departments of  human, not of  natural, science. 
(Shapin 2008a: 435) 
Shapin is fully cognisant of  the disparities in status and reputation, but the above quote 
suggests an interesting consequence that I wish to explore in this thesis. Namely, 
sociology has attracted little attention from science studies scholars precisely because it 
has manifested a greater interest and uncertainty in what constitutes a science. 
Furthermore, sociology has (i) a pronounced sensitivity to the way ambient sociopolitical 
conditions affect knowledge production and (ii) attempted to reflexively apply these 
insights to itself. Sociology is, therefore, a distinctive discipline that recognises and is 
open about the influence of  context on the production and diffusion of  knowledge, not 
unlike science studies itself. 
However, the emphasis on context has been problematised in science studies (Asdal 
2012), and a different kind of  approach to the production of  scientific knowledge has 
been put forward that focuses on the processes through which science and society 
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emerge as distinct categories; in other words, context is viewed as the effect, rather than 
the cause of  interactions between science and society. Among the most prominent 
schools of  thought to inaugurate this development is actor-network theory, and it is the 
work of  theorists working in this tradition that serves as a sparring partner of  sorts for 
the arguments put forward in this thesis. The choice to focus on, and work with, actor-
network theory is based on a number of  different considerations. The most prominent 
among these is the status of  actor-network theory as one of  the main structuring 
positions in the theoretical landscape of  science studies and the role of  Bruno Latour as 
a key spokesperson for the field.  
This thesis proceeds on the assumption (elaborated upon in Chapter 3) that, while actor-
network theory is an internally varied approach to the study of  science and technology, it 
is based on background assumptions that are better suited to the study of  the natural 
sciences and biomedicine. This, as I will argue, is due, in part, to the emphasis on the 
stability of  the social and material realities that the sciences engender, and a normative 
indifference to the kind of  alliances that make such realities possible. My contention is 
that sociology is, and has been, tricky to study because its weaknesses and heterogeneity 
are ill-suited to actor-network theory and have the potential of  revealing unarticulated 
background assumptions that shape actor-network accounts of  successful science.  
During the course of  this thesis I also draw upon the work of  Pierre Bourdieu and Steve 
Fuller to produce a constructivist framework that would be sensitive to the idiosyncrasies 
of  sociology. These attempts notwithstanding, a supplementary claim put forward in this 
thesis is that, while a constructivist perspective can highlight characteristics that hamper 
the institutional credibility of  sociology, some of  these characteristics are actually 
believed to be an integral part of  the sociological enterprise and the long-term 
development of  sociology as a form of  knowledge, and  positively resonate with recent 
developments in actor-network methodology. This leads us to a further reason for 
studying sociology. 
The problem of  reflexivity has a long-standing presence in science studies. The context 
for, and target of, these discussions has usually been the attempt to study science 
scientifically and the resulting consequences for a sociological account of  science (e.g. 
Ashmore 1989; Woolgar 1988). My project, however, concerns the peculiar relationship 
between science studies and cognate disciplines, such as sociology. A secondary aim of  
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this thesis is to explore what happens when the analytical tools of  science studies are 
turned against a discipline that has played a significant role in its development. 
Furthermore, even though the problem of  reflexivity still applies, I believe that the 
encounter between constructivist science studies and sociology, and the insights 
generated from it, are qualitatively different because some of  the “weaknesses” of  
sociology are also present in science studies. In addition, while a description of  the 
methods I employed and the resulting limitations to my study are explored in detail in 
Chapter 5, the difficulties of  approaching sociology from a constructivist perspective 
permeate the entire thesis and are an integral part of  Chapters 3 and 4.  
The Strange Case of  Soviet and Latvian Sociology 
Two rather unusual examples serve as illustrations of  the issues I will discuss in this 
thesis. While both seem to inhabit a similar historical space, they each serve their own 
purpose and highlight different aspects of  the overall argument.  
The thesis began as an attempt to explore the heritage of  Soviet science policy and 
attitudes towards sociology in present day Latvia. As the focus of  the research shifted, so 
did the significance of  the Soviet variant of  sociology. The discussion in Chapter 3 is 
necessarily limited and expository by design, and its main purpose is to explore the fate 
of  sociology as staged in Euro-American publications. My approach is inspired by the 
work of  Shlapentokh, Shiraev and Carroll (2008) who analysed how the perception of  
the Soviet Union in Euro-American scholarship changed and evolved from the Russian 
Revolution of  1917 until the dissolution of  the USSR. My analysis, however, focuses only 
on sociology. The reasons for studying Soviet sociology derive from the reactions it 
provoked among people working outside the Soviet Union. In particular, I will argue that 
outside commentary allows for a definition-by-implication as to what the authors 
believed constituted good sociology, and the kind of  relationship with government 
institutions that this implied. In other words, diagnoses of  Soviet sociology, its ailments 
and strengths are equally revealing of  the authors' beliefs regarding the nature and goals 
of  sociology as a discipline. These are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, and set the stage 
for my main case study – sociology in Latvia.  
Sociology in Latvia has a number of  features that make it an interesting case, and the 
reasons for choosing to study it are outlined at length in Chapter 6. The main reason for 
choosing sociology in Latvia is that its emphasis on applied research makes it suitable for 
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a contrast between the respective theories of  Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, and the 
interplay between autonomy and heteronomy more generally.  The bulk of  my analysis is 
based on interviews with sociologists working in Latvia1. In particular, I explore their 
understandings of  sociology as a discipline and the nature and import of  the knowledge 
it provides. This is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The purpose of  this case study is to 
examine the arguments and background assumptions of  sociologists working in Latvia 
from a constructivist point of  view and illustrate the differences and points of  friction 
between divergent understandings of  science, as well as similarities in spirit concerning 
the normative embeddedness of  knowledge. 
Structure of  the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter 1 I look at early attempts by social 
scientists to study Western science empirically and the philosophical issues that these 
attempts gave rise to. In particular, I focus on the rise of  the Strong Programme in the 
sociology of  scientific knowledge and its internal splintering that lead to a gradual shift 
away from a purely sociological explanation of  science.  
In Chapter 2 I look at an attempt to resolve some of  the issues I raised in Chapter 1 and 
focus on different forms of  what Sergio Sismondo has called heterogeneous 
constructivism. My main example is actor-network theory, which is supplemented by the 
work of  Isabelle Stengers and various contemporary elaborations on actor-network 
theory (performativity of  method and ontological politics). In this chapter I argue that 
heterogeneous constructivism (i) allows for intricate narratives that illustrate the 
epistemic and ontological contingency of  the worlds that the sciences produce and (ii) 
provides a diverse repertoire of  methodological approaches to the study of  science and 
the practices that constitute it. However, it lacks the vocabulary and grounds for a 
critique of  the corrosion and misappropriation of  science by commercial and political 
interests.  
In Chapter 3 I look at an example of  science that scholars working in a Euro-American 
context find problematic – sociology in the Soviet Union. My point of  departure is Loren 
Graham's work on the history of  science in the Soviet Union. Specifically, I consider the 
claims that science is (i) not immune to forms of  epistemic stress and (ii) can and does 
collapse under conditions of  excessive external interference. I try to show that in the case 
                                                 
1 The interviews were conducted in Latvian. 
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of  Soviet sociology such interference did not have a straightforwardly crippling effect. 
Rather, it was conducive to the emergence of  a particular brand of  sociology that 
observers found problematic. I also argue that reconstructions of  Soviet sociology betray 
epistemic commitments that hinge on highly specific interpretations of  the function and 
political stance of  sociology, rather than purely instrumental concerns. I continue by 
suggesting that the specificities of  Soviet sociology that commentators found 
problematic rest on assumptions about the intellectual conditions in which science should 
operate and the relationship between science and politics that this implies. Such 
assumptions, however, are ill at ease with the entanglements between science and politics 
as envisaged by constructivist science studies. I suggest that this may be because the 
specificity of  the social sciences has been given limited attention. 
In Chapter 4 I address the specificity of  sociology from a constructivist perspective by 
contrasting the respective approaches of  Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu. I 
complement their take on sociology with the ideas of  Steve Fuller and work in the 
history of  sociology. The purpose of  this chapter is to (i) outline the theoretical 
framework that will frame my data analysis and (ii) suggest a number of  complications 
that can affect science studies' accounts of  sociology. 
Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to the main case study. In this chapter I provide a 
historical overview of  sociology in Latvia and a general outline of  the contemporary 
context in which my informants studied and worked. The second part of  this chapter is 
devoted to a description of  the methods I used when studying sociology in Latvia, as well 
as the background assumptions that informed my approach and caused difficulties in my 
conversations with sociologists working in Latvia; I also mention a number of  limitations 
that resulted from this. While the section on methodology is located at the end of  
Chapter 5, it complements and draws upon the arguments put forward in Chapters 3 and 
4. That is to say, there are methodological nuances that were specific to my case study, 
but some of  the complications derive from more general issues concerning the 
relationship between sociology and science studies already outlined in the previous 
chapters. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are distinct yet complementary. The basis of  the discussion in Chapter 
6 are the answers to the first section of  my interview guide, which mainly dealt with the 
nature of  sociology as a science (and whether it is one) and the specificity of  the 
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experience and expertise possessed by sociologists (as opposed to the lay public). In this 
chapter I illustrate (i) the perceived complexities that are involved in positioning 
sociology as a science and (ii) the various argumentative strategies employed by 
sociologists to articulate their position. Chapter 7 deals with the public and political life 
of  sociological knowledge and seeks to ascertain my respondents' views vis-à-vis the 
political potential of  sociological knowledge and the mediums through which it can best 
effect change. The responses are interpreted in light of  the theoretical insights gained in 
the previous chapters and discussed in relation to the arguments pertaining to the 
disciplinary specificity of  sociology. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I argue that my conversations with sociologists working in Latvia 
and analysis of  the sociological literature illustrate similarities with science studies 
attempts to reframe our understanding of  science as a matter of  both studying and being 
in the world. I suggest that the specificity of  sociology is that, in its own way, the 
approach to knowledge advocated by contemporary science studies has been an integral 
part of  it, albeit in a highly dynamic and volatile form. What is more, the peculiarity of  
sociology and its disciplinary and institutional frailty serves as an illustration of  what 
happens when the intimate connection between political representation and scientific 
representation is not concealed, and hybridity is acknowledged.
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1. Studying Science, Part I: Breaking the Spell 
 
The last few hundred years have seen a marked increase in the power, influence, respect 
and resources (both financial and cognitive) that science commands. From a sprawling 
enterprise practised by a few geographically disparate individuals it has gradually 
developed into a well-funded, highly organised and institutionally dominant form of  
inquiry. One could argue that its authority has recently been partially eroded (Collins and 
Evans 2002; 2007; Bijker et al. 2009; Lyotard 1984), but it is clear that science still retains 
a dominant role in Western intellectual ecosystems (Shapin 2008a).  However, as much 
work in science studies has illustrated, there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
scientific knowledge does not only improve and expand our ability to interact with and 
mould our environments. It has functioned as a source of  political authority (Ezrahi 
1990; 2003) and provided state institutions with a vast repertoire of  disciplinary, 
regulatory and predictive techniques (Desrosieres 1998; 2003; Foucault 1991; 1998; 
Wagner 2003b). That is to say, scientific knowledge has actively participated in political 
matters by validating and expanding the range of  instruments that are deployed for the 
purposes of  statecraft. The exact nature of  the relationship between science and ambient 
sociopolitical conditions and values is less clear. It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that various intersecting strands of  thought and research have attempted to address this 
issue (Turner 2008). However, this has proved to be complicated to do largely because of  
the status of  science as the standard of  rationality against which all other epistemic 
traditions should be measured.  
Early 20th century philosophers of  science assumed that there was something unique 
about science as a form of  knowledge and took it upon themselves to articulate the 
principles that govern it. The distinguished theorist Karl Mannheim explored the 
sociological dimension of  knowledge, yet even he did not think that this should be done 
for natural science and mathematics (Mannheim 1952). Gradually, however, these views 
came to be challenged. The work of  Thomas Kuhn, the sociology of  scientific 
knowledge, feminism and science studies more generally raised the possibility that our 
understanding of  science, and the way it operates and develops, may be mistaken. These 
authors hinted (often in no uncertain terms) that science and extra-scientific interests may 
be intertwined in ways that are more subtle and complex than we previously imagined. 
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They raised the possibility that (i) science is not a self-regulating enterprise and (ii) the 
content of  scientific knowledge may be shaped by ambient sociopolitical conditions and 
non-evidential community factors. In short, it was suggested that science operates and 
develops according to a logic that exceeds and even contravenes its public image. In this 
chapter I will explore the approach put forward by the Strong Programme in the 
sociology of  scientific knowledge and highlight a number of  difficulties and objections 
that were raised once it was proposed. 
SSK and the Imperialism of  the Social 
Collin and Budtz Pedersen (2013) argue that science studies grew out of  a broader desire 
in Western countries to reach a better accommodation between science and society 
(Turner 2008). One of  its main academic expressions was the Strong Programme in the 
sociology of  scientific knowledge2. SSK sought to study science as one would any other 
social institution (Barnes 1974; 1977; Bloor 1974; 1991; 1996; Barnes and Bloor 1982). 
The argument was that the status of  science as the canonical example of  knowledge had 
previously interfered with the ability of  humanities scholars and social scientists to 
approach it dispassionately. Philosophy of  science had attempted to provide rational 
reconstructions of  science that straddled the line between normative theories of  science 
or descriptive illustrations of  what the particular author believed be an example of  good 
scientific practice. Sociology of  science, on other other hand, had limited itself  to the 
organisational dimensions of  science and exempted cognitive norms from sociological 
explanations (e.g. Merton 1968; Panofsky 2010; Turner 2008).  
SSK scholars went further and challenged the claim that science was a distinctive and 
purely cognitive endeavour. They argued that it was an inherently social activity whose 
nature and internal logic could be uncovered through rigorous empirical study. The 
findings, they suggested, shed doubts on the privileged epistemic status that science 
enjoyed and, by extension, questioned the existence of  a fundamental qualitative 
difference between science and other knowledge systems, and even other forms of  social 
activity that humans have engaged in. Science, in other words, was a form of  culture just 
like any other and not immune to external influences or impervious to extant belief  
structures. It had its own ontological commitments, habitual schemes of  interpretation, 
complex rites of  validation (e.g. peer review) and even forms of  social organisation that 
                                                 
2 Hereafter – SSK 
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distributed authority among its members (e.g. the hierarchy in a laboratory). Concurrently, 
why should it not be studied in a similar way to other cultural practices? Indeed, David 
Bloor (1991) was adamant that this is the way one should proceed.  
In his book Knowledge and Social Imagery Bloor argued that there was something peculiar 
about the fact that knowledge (especially scientific knowledge) had not been subjected to 
sociological analyses. Sociology had certainly studied bundles of  practices that may have 
looked like science, but upon closer inspection it became clear that sociology had been 
content to explain scientific misadventures. This, of  course, was no accident, as the 
sociological approach to science worked with an implicit arationality assumption. That is 
to say, sociologists only commented upon the content of  scientific theories if  it could not 
be explained in terms of  its rational merits (Laudan 1978: 202; Merton 1968: 516). 
Consequently, the content of  institutionalised and widely disseminated forms of  
scientific knowledge had escaped sociological scrutiny. What we had instead was a 
sociology of  error – only distortion and epistemic inadequacy required the skills of  the 
social scientist. The reasons for the success of  good science were presumed to be internal 
to it and provided us with a point of  reference when explaining the misadventures of  
scientists whose work we did not see fit to include in our epistemic canon. Success did 
not require any kind of  explanation that made it intelligible in terms that are irrelevant, or 
even alien, to the rational discourse of  science. This, according to Bloor (1991) and 
Barnes (1974), was unacceptable – widely accepted forms of  scientific knowledge could 
also be analysed sociologically. Indeed, SSK was opposed to the belief  that good science 
required no explanation. In fact, claims to the contrary should be treated as a pernicious 
form of  mysticism that is adverse to the spirit of  science. Furthermore, SSK scholars did 
not believe that science was flawed – far from it. What they tried to suggest was that their 
framework simply allowed for a more thorough and, most importantly, empirical 
understanding of  the way science operated. Consequently, it was not so much the 
credibility of  science that SSK sought to undermine. Rather, it was the image of  science 
perpetuated in popular and academic (e.g. philosophy of  science) discourse that required 
correction (Collins and Pinch 1993; Labinger and Collins 2001). This is where the 
symmetry thesis comes in.  
The symmetry thesis states that the same principles should be employed, and the same 
causal mechanisms invoked, when explaining both successful theories and misadventures. 
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In other words, scholars should be impartial with regard to truth and falsity when 
explaining the success or failure of  a particular scientific line of  thought. At the time it 
was proposed, the symmetry thesis attracted a great deal of  academic flak, especially 
from philosophers of  science (Collin 2011; Fuller 2002; Laudan 1981; Kim 1994). A 
cynical reading of  the dispute would suggest that philosophers were simply indignant 
about another discipline invading its turf  (Abbott 2001a). However, that would miss the 
point, as the conflict was over the nature of  science. A good illustration of  this is the 
exchange between David Bloor (1981) and Larry Laudan (1981; 1982b). 
Philosophy of  Science vs. SSK 
The philosopher Larry Laudan (1981) argued that the SSK position, while insightful, had 
a number of  flaws. Firstly, it caricatured philosophy of  science. Laudan argued that no 
philosopher would seriously entertain the possibility that the gradual acceptance of  
beliefs deemed rational and true required no explanation. However, such an explanation 
did not necessarily have to be sociological in nature. This, I believe, was one of  the first 
tripping points in the debate. Laudan seemed to be implying that SSK was implicitly 
advocating a sociological monopoly over, or at least the analytical primacy of  sociology 
in, the explanation of  scientific practices. Bloor (1981), on the other hand, argued that a 
sociological account of  science was just one among many different ways of  studying 
science. Laudan’s uneasiness does not strike me as unfounded, however – especially in the 
case of  David Bloor (see also Collins 1981b; 1982). Bloor’s work (1974; 1998) posits 
society as the vehicle for scientific ideas, and sociology (or anthropology) would seem to 
be the discipline of  choice for explanations vis-à-vis the social realm. Thus, there is 
something slightly disingenuous about the way SSK is practised and the views its 
practitioners profess when addressing objections raised by outsiders (Collin 2011; Fuller 
2000b; see also Collins 1981a; 1981b and the response by Laudan 1982a). 
The second point of  conflict follows on nicely from the first one – Bloor and Laudan did 
not agree on which aspects of  scientific practice could be the subject of  a sociological 
explanation. A good example of  this is the problem of  theory choice in a situation where 
many theories are equally supported by the data (i.e. the underdetermination thesis). This 
was a topic of  considerable debate in philosophy of  science, and one of  the main 
objections raised against it was that the proponents of  the underdetermination thesis 
exaggerated how often such a situation actually arose in science (e.g. Hacking 1983). 
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However, even if  we accept that the problem of  underdetermination does not present 
itself  often, the way such hypothetical disputes can be and are resolved is still a valid 
question. Laudan contended that, while it was true that scientists are socialised into a 
certain culture, (a) there are good reasons for choosing one theory over another and (b) 
these are not necessarily social in character. He used the example of  simplicity, but he 
would probably concede that there are others like accuracy, consistency, scope and 
fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977; Longino 1983; 1990).  
Bloor's reply was essentially twofold. Firstly, he disputed whether rigid adherence to such 
criteria as simplicity had always been prudent. Sometimes the more complicated theory is 
more accurate and has greater scope. Secondly, the criteria guiding theory choice may be 
an instance of  social factors that are internal to science. The choice in favour of  the least 
intricate of  the available alternatives may well be done rationally (i.e. subject to respectful 
negotiations, reasoned argument and careful interpretation of  the available data), but this 
is a thoroughly social form of  rationality amenable to sociological explanation. This leads 
us nicely to the most fundamental difference between David Bloor (the sociologist) and 
Larry Laudan (the philosopher). 
In his critique of  SSK Laudan suggested that the symmetry thesis can be read in three 
ways – as a thesis of  (i) epistemic, (ii) rational and (iii) pragmatic symmetry (1981: 186-
194). Because of  his commitment to the radical inaccessibility of  truth (i.e. we know that 
some theories are false, but we do not know if  our current best theories are true) Laudan 
was quite comfortable with epistemic symmetry. That is to say, we can easily be impartial 
when analysing, for example, a conflict between two theories (one of  which turned out to 
be false) and refrain from invoking the veracity and ultimate acceptance of  the victor. 
The protagonists had no knowledge of  this, much like we have no knowledge of  which 
of  our best theories will eventually have to be discarded, so it would be unfair to judge 
them from our privileged vantage point. Laudan was much more concerned with rational 
symmetry and, by extension, suspicious of  the judgemental relativism implicit in SSK 
(e.g. Laudan 1981; 1982a) He contended that evaluative appraisals of  a belief  are relevant 
to its explanation. An agent reasons by combining her background knowledge, sensory 
information and ultimate goals. In relation to this matrix (however specific) there are 
reasons for adopting some beliefs and dropping others. To put it simply, some beliefs are 
the result of  a process of  reflection (with all the inferential mechanisms this entails) and 
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others are not. Our attempts to explain beliefs should reflect this difference – sometimes 
the reasoning involved and the reasons offered are simply insufficient to ground beliefs 
or warrant conclusions. Granted, we may occasionally be deluded into giving reasons for 
our actions or beliefs, which are, in fact, not the “real” reasons (e.g. false consciousness), 
but we must presuppose or allow for a distinction between beliefs which are held 
rationally and beliefs which are not. What is more, it should not be assumed that 
rationality is something non-social. On the contrary, rational beliefs can have social 
origins, but SSK should allow for a difference between social belief-governing policies 
which are rational and those that are not. It is at this point that the starkest difference 
between SSK and philosophy of  science reveals itself. 
David Bloor, much like Laudan, believes in rationality. In other words, Bloor believes in 
reasoned, rule-governed and contextually sensitive judgement. However, the rationality 
that Bloor posits is more akin to a concession that humans can and do reason, and are 
thus capable of  constructing arguments and responding to sensory cues in appropriate 
ways. Bloor is perfectly happy to accept that humans have innate cognitive competences 
and are capable of  reflection and complex inferential thinking. They are a clever bunch 
that possesses a “natural” rationality (Barnes 1976). However, in the case of  science and 
all other forms of  collective activity with a pronounced epistemic dimension, natural 
rationality is supplemented by a normative form of  rationality (Barnes 1976; Bloor 1981; 
Barnes and Bloor 1982) that evaluates reasons, evidence and beliefs in terms of  how well 
they meet the criteria of  a given system. In other words, they are judged by collective 
standards of  rationality. This is something the philosopher refuses to accept, for it 
implies that alien epistemic traditions might be perfectly coherent (allowing for some 
degree of  internal inconsistency characteristic of  all belief  systems [Barnes 1974]), yet 
differ considerably from Western standards of  empirical adequacy and scientific rigour 
(Winch 1964; 2008). In such a scenario accepting (i.e. deeming rational) the standards and 
rules of  inference adhered to in one society, and disparaging and refusing to acknowledge 
those of  another, is simply a form of  endorsement (Bloor 1981: 209; Feyerabend 1987). 
There are no good reasons outside of  a tradition. Consequently, SSK is committed to a 
form of  epistemic relativism that allows for the possibility of  internal coherence, yet 
questions the possibility of  meaningful (both to the outsider and insider) objections and 
contextually invariant standards of  rationality. This point has proven rather hard to 
swallow for philosophers (Barnes and Bloor 1982; Kim 1994) but has acquired 
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considerable currency in science studies more generally. The situation is rather different 
in the case of  pragmatic symmetry.  
Laudan (1981: 193) argued that SSK theorists were committed to the belief  that the 
success (or failure) of  a theory at predicting and explaining the world was an irrelevant 
factor when explaining its success (or failure) in being taken up in the wider scientific 
community. Simply put, pragmatic considerations should not enter into our narratives. 
Now, I am unaware of  any passage where SSK scholars state this explicitly, but their 
emphasis on social factors (e.g. interests, academic rank, institutional affiliation) renders 
their work uniquely susceptible to this sort of  accusation. In fact, the move towards 
explaining scientific success in terms of  political, disciplinary and economic interests was 
treated with considerable unease. For example, as Fuller (2002) and Kim (1994: 400-401) 
point out, invoking the causal role of  social factors is analytically insufficient to account 
for why a particular theoretical move or innovation was accepted by contemporaries. Yes, 
it may well be true that some theories will have considerably more appeal in specific 
social contexts, or that there are disturbing homologies between political and scientific 
world views. What is more, this may have an impact on the way scientific debates 
proceed. But this in itself  is not enough to explain why and how a particular scientific 
community reaches consensus over a controversial issue. The mechanisms through which 
disputes are settled and consensus achieved are given a one-sided (though intricate e.g. 
Collins 1975; 1981a) treatment by SSK scholars, and leave the reader slightly perplexed. It 
almost seems like you have to assume that the presence of  particular social factors 
determines the nature of  the debate, and that it is only these social factors that influence 
the decisions that participants make. The standards of  reasoning characteristic of  the 
scientific community, and how SSK case studies make sense in relation to them, are not 
important. Consequently, one could be forgiven for imputing to SSK accounts a kind of  
mysticism – not unlike the one featured in their critique of  philosophy of  science. You 
get the impression that the material world and the extant practices and belief  structure 
are weak in their ability to alter the course of  a debate and resist the mobilising power of  
social interests. 
Indeed, one of  the core principles underlying much SSK work is an open-textured 
approach to scientific concepts – finitism (Bloor 1996; 1997). It is based on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s arguments pertaining to the application of  rules (Wittgenstein 2001) and 
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basically boils down to the claim that prior applications of  a rule do not uniquely 
determine future applications. This suggests that future applications of  rules are open-
ended, rather than determined in advance. SSK theorists generalise this argument to 
scientific practices and argue that the extension of  meanings (of  scientific terms, classes) 
and rules of  inference to new instances is not determined in advance. Furthermore, there 
are no logical constraints that would prevent scientists from systematically redefining the 
meanings they attach to classes of  entities and phenomena, or the rules that govern how 
this happens. Prior instances do not prescribe a definite course of  action. This is where 
the social comes in. If  philosophers of  science emphasised the logical compulsion 
inherent in deductive rules of  inference, SSK theorists argue that it is non-evidential 
community factors that facilitate consensus and stimulate the feeling of  compulsion. 
There are at least two problems with such a rendering of  Wittgenstein’s argument. Firstly, 
it is radically indeterministic. Both Tyfield (2008) and Mermin (1998) argue that, even if  
we accept the general thesis that past instances do not prescribe a definite course of  
action vis-à-vis future instances, they most certainly limit the available options. Future 
instances are, at best, underdetermined, rather than indeterminate. An integral aspect to 
Wittgenstein's argument is that the relevant community agrees of  how a rule is to be 
applied3. David Bloor suggests that there can be no appeal to a logical connection 
between conventional applications of  a rule and the new one, but it does not follow that 
the new interpretation can get away without making sense in relation to previous 
applications. Now, SSK theorists might accede, but then go on to say that it is social 
factors that determine whether or not the interpretation is consistent with previous 
applications.  
This brings us to the second point – SSK theorists have a reified concept of  the social. 
The social (in the form of  interests, norms and beliefs) is doing an awful lot of  work for 
them and is fairly stable in its ability to guide scientific activity. Extant beliefs, standards, 
and the ways in which the material world resists our attempts to describe it and interact 
with it, on the other hand, seem extremely pliable. SSK theorists have been emphatic in 
arguing that they are not idealists (e.g. Bloor 1996), but it is not clear what role, if  any, the 
material world plays in their narratives describing scientific practice (Collin 2011). Indeed, 
it was gradually recognised that much SSK work was merely the inversion of  
                                                 
3 It should be noted that there is considerable debate as to whether this agreement can be explained 
sociologically (see Pickering 1992 and Collin 2011). 
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technological determinism and scientific exceptionalism in favour of  social determinism 
(Feyerabend 2010; Haraway 1991; 1997; Latour 1993b; 2004a; 2005). In other words, it 
was argued that explaining the success of  particular scientific theories by placing 
explanatory stress on their social acceptability, ideological pandering and the interests of  
individual scientists (or even entire disciplines) simply reified the social and imbued it 
with the power and stability previously attributed to the scientific method and its inherent 
superiority over other knowledge systems. SSK was accused of  constructing narratives 
that muffled the material world and its ability to resist whatever descriptions politically-
minded scientists conjured up in an attempt to further their agenda. The call was for a 
genuinely symmetrical approach that recognised the need to integrate and mesh the 
causal and agential powers of  the social with those of  the realm represented by scientists 
and engineers (Haraway 1988; 1991; 1997; Latour 1981; 1991; 1993b). The kernel of  the 
debate can be illustrated by looking at two books that have become classics in the field of  
science studies. 
The Two Realms 
The people we now call “philosophers” are basically the natural philosophers on the 
losing side of  the battles that we now call “scientific”. 
(Fuller 2003:74) 
In their study of  the emergence and development of  experimental practices, and the 
birth of  The Royal Society science studies scholars Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer 
explore the conflict between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle (Shapin 1984; Shapin 
and Schaffer 1985). The authors draw our attention to something peculiar about the way 
we perceive these two men. Both Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle held strong views 
on both political and epistemic matters. They both had a political philosophy and a 
philosophy of  science. However, the prevailing wisdom in academic circles seems to be 
that Thomas Hobbes was one of  the most exceptional political philosophers in the 
Western tradition, whereas Robert Boyle plays an important role in narratives about the 
rise and development of  European science. Hobbes' views on science and Boyle's views 
on politics are somehow left out of  the picture. How so? 
To answer this questions Shapin and Schaffer look at the intimate relationship between 
the nascent form of  experimental science and politics, which was an integral part of  the 
disagreements between Hobbes and Boyle. The debate was animated by questions 
pertaining to the legitimacy of  different ways of  practising science, but it was equally 
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concerned with the management of  disagreement and the delegation of  authority as to 
the resolution of  such disagreement. According to Shapin (1994), gentlemanly culture 
provided a managed space of  the requisite sort for the resolution of  disputes regarding 
knowledge claims (1994: ch. 3). There were a number of  rules that regulated how one 
was to conduct himself  in the presence of  others. This allowed for 'dissent without 
disaster' (1994: 103) - a peaceful resolution of  conflicts over contradictory knowledge 
claims. This involved a complex cultural repertoire of  strategies that allowed the group to 
manage and modify knowledge claims without explicitly negating the claims of  any 
particular individual. The Royal Society was an example of  this. The practices that were 
instituted to deal with discrepant knowledge claims, and scientific culture as a whole, were 
the result of  relocating gentlemanly culture to a philosophical setting. Scientific 
knowledge and practices were part of  a particular culture, which was inhabited and 
reproduced by a certain type of  person. Indeed, knowledge was part of  a moral order.  
An important consequence of  the dispute between Hobbes and Boyle was the creation 
of  two distinct realms (i.e. society and nature) over which their respective rulers had the 
authority to speak. The nature of  the exchanges between Hobbes and Boyle, however, 
preceded this. This is why Shapin and Schaffer paint a picture of  science as inextricably 
intertwined with questions of  power and political organisation. When Hobbes and Boyle 
were exchanging views, throwing insults and attracting followers, there was no clear 
separation between the two realms.  
Shapin and Schaffer suggest that discussions pertaining to the validity of  experimental 
practices and the attendant social rituals were shot through with concerns regarding the 
organisation of  scientific practice. However, these disputes also addressed the issue of  
who should have the final say on political matters and on what grounds such power 
should be conferred. Political issues were epistemological issues and vice versa – they 
were not treated separately. According to Shapin and Schaffer, therefore, experimental 
practices were the site of  intense discussions and figurations whose central objects were 
both epistemology and the social order. It is only in the aftermath of  the conflict 
between Hobbes and Boyle that the cleavage between science (knowledge) and politics 
(power) came into being. 
The Revolution that Never Was 
In his book The Scientific Revolution Steven Shapin makes a striking claim. He suggests that 
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what we refer to as the Scientific Revolution never actually happened (Shapin 1998). He, 
of  course, does not mean to suggest that the work and ideas of  Isaac Newton, Galileo 
Galilei or Nicolaus Copernicus are historical fictions, but he does draw our attention to 
the possibility that we tend to overestimate how many of  their contemporaries were 
familiar with the work done by these scientific revolutionaries. He also suggests that the 
revolutionaries were not engaged in a cohesive intellectual project and were divided on 
many issues. In other words, Shapin suggests that the Scientific Revolution is an artefact 
of  historical scholarship. There was never a revolution. It is simply a way of  relating to 
our intellectual heritage. 
In a somewhat ironic move Bruno Latour (1991; 1993b) does something similar to 
Shapin's own work. While he applauds and largely concurs with the analysis of  Shapin 
and Schaffer (1985), Latour suggests a different take on the same problem. Shapin and 
Schaffer seemed to be advocating the view that Hobbes' philosophy of  science, which 
Shapin and Schaffer believe to be constructivist in nature, was actually the more accurate 
of  the two because it highlighted the artificiality of  knowledge. Remember, however, that 
a common criticism of  SSK (in which I presume to include Shapin and Schaffer) was that 
it paid scant attention to the materiality of  the world and its role in the process of  
constructing scientific knowledge. It is exactly along these lines that Latour (1993b) 
suggests that the balance needs to be redressed, and the insights of  Boyle should also be 
taken into account.  
After having had the stroke of  genius that led them to compare the experimental 
practice and political organization of  two major figures from the very beginning of  the 
modern era, they [Shapin and Schaffer] back off  and hesitate to treat Hobbes and his 
politics in the same way as they had treated Boyle and his science. Strangely enough, 
they seem to adhere more steadfastly to the political repertoire than to the scientific one. 
(Latour 1993b: 25) 
What emerges from Latour's analysis is the realisation that science/nature and 
politics/society co-constitute each other. Shapin and Schaffer seemed to be implying that 
a kind of  deal had been struck between politicians and scientists. It was agreed that 
neither of  them shall venture into the other’s realm. Scientists would be permitted to 
speak about nature (and non-humans), whereas politicians would lay claim to society (and 
humans). However, does nature not interfere with the workings of  society when an 
epidemic breaks out? Do politicians then not require the work of  scientists and the 
elements of  reality for which they speak? What is more, are scientists themselves not 
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engaged in politics when they claim to represent parts of  nature in a bid to persuade their 
colleagues? And does not society and culture come into play when scientists employ 
socially sanctioned instruments and procedures to explore the realm of  nature? In other 
words, Latour is suggesting that the cleavage between science (and nature) and politics 
(and society), and the distribution of  agency among humans and non-humans, is highly 
problematic. These are not fixed categories but exist in a perpetual state of  hybridity, yet 
they are always subject to intense boundary work that seeks to distinguish the normative 
and the descriptive, the scientific and the extra-scientific.  
The first set of  practices, by 'translation', creates mixtures between entirely new types of  
beings, hybrids of  nature and culture. The second, by 'purification', creates two entirely 
that of  human beings on the one hand; that of  non-humans on the other. 
(Latour 1993b: 10-11) 
The distinction between society/politics on the one hand and nature/science on the 
other is fundamental to our understanding, but it is rather dubious. Even though there 
are persistent attempts to disentangle them, both sides are meshed together. 
The Volatile Waters of  Science and Policy 
In the last two decades this form of  reasoning has developed a more definite vocabulary 
and become the co-production idiom (Jasanoff  2004). The claim that changes in 
knowledge (and the practices of  its production and dissemination) have attendant social 
consequences has acquired significant currency in the field of  science studies and 
inspired much work that seeks to elucidate the ways in which science, extra-scientific 
interests (e.g. politics) and social formations co-constitute each other. In other words, the 
way we know the world (and the kind of  knowledge this produces) both reflects (society 
> science) and shapes (society < science) the way we live and organise ourselves. Neither 
side is predefined, but evolves in the process. There are, of  course, many versions of  this 
approach, but Jasanoff  (2004) herself  notes that most attempts have failed since they still 
give explanatory primacy to one or the other. It is, apparently, exceedingly complicated to 
discuss socioepistemic configurations in a way that considers both sides in conjunction 
with each other, rather than introducing some form of  analytical hierarchy that privileges 
one over the other.  
A good example is the discussion initiated by a paper that Harry Collins and Robert 
Evans published in Social Studies of  Science, which has since become the journal's most 
downloaded article. In it they criticised what they called the second wave of  science 
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studies for its inability to provide robust criteria and guidelines for science-policy 
interactions (Collins and Evans 2002; 2007). They argued that science studies thus far 
have mainly been descriptive, and the plethora of  case studies challenging the perception 
of  science as qualitatively different from other forms of  knowledge has only served to 
undermine its credibility. What is more, by extending the circle of  those who can and 
should contribute to the settlement of  technical disputes, some scholars (e.g. Brian 
Wynne) have blurred the boundaries between qualitatively different forms of  expertise.  
The debate highlighted a number of  important differences between Collins and Evans, 
and their critics. Collins and Evans sought to disentangle politics and expertise so as to 
limit the number of  people whose knowledge is considered pertinent to the issues at 
hand. Their focus was on decision-making. Sheila Jasanoff  (2003; 2005) and Brian Wynne 
(2003), on the other hand, emphasised the entanglements of  politics and expertise 
(Durant 2008). The latter highlighted the sensitivity of  scientific expertise to the settings 
in which it is embedded (be they cultural or institutional) and the identities of  the 
individuals operating in these settings. They were more interested in how the issues were 
framed and the resulting exclusion of  knowledges and interest groups from the process 
of  deliberation. Jasanoff  and Wynne are not dismissing science but simply pointing to the 
fact that social and institutional factors are integral to an accurate description of  how 
expertise operates. In addition, Brian Wynne and Alan Irwin (1995) argue that public and 
science studies criticisms of  policy initiatives are often misunderstood because policy 
makers operate with a number of  assumptions of  what the public is like. The criticisms 
are seldom directed at science itself  (though they can be in cases where uncertainty is 
intentionally concealed and/or disregarded). Quite often the reason is (i) the blatant 
disregard for the interests of  the people affected and (ii) the unwillingness to engage with 
stakeholders and take their concerns and suggestions into account. 
Questions of  this nature have inspired a wide range of  books and articles dealing with 
science-policy interactions and the resulting co-production of  both the social and 
scientific order (e.g. Bijker et al. 2009; Callon et al. 2009; Desrosieres 1998; 2003; Ezrahi 
1990; Jasanoff  1990; 2005; Waterton and Wynne 2004; Wynne 2011). What is quite 
intriguing, however, is that scholars working in the field of  science studies seem quite 
comfortable with the task of  managing the interactions between publics, policy makers 
and scientists (Webster 2007). Alan Irwin (2008), for example, has argued that science 
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studies is in a privileged position to analyse scientific governance; similar sentiments have 
been expressed by Wiebe Bijker (2003). Helga Nowotny (2007) has even gone so far as to 
argue that '[w]orking inside STS presupposes some kind of  multilinguistic competence, 
an ability to communicate with very different actors and engage with different kinds of  
communities' (2007: 487). What is never questioned, though, is the commitment to 
science as the epistemic tradition of  choice. This, of  course, may seem like a peculiar 
criticism to make, but the insights provided by science studies have given us considerable 
reason to doubt the status of  science as the fully justified canonical example of  
knowledge, its superiority vis-à-vis other knowledge systems and even the fact that 
science is something discrete (Fuller 2000b; Guggenheim and Nowotny 2003). As Dick 
Pels once put it, 
[t]o Feyerabend's notorious question "what is so special about science?" the modern 
social studies of  science univocally reply: little or nothing. 
(Pels 1995:79) 
There is certainly confusion as to how one should relate to the results of  the numerous 
case studies (Fuller 2006b), but this has not been followed by an interrogation or re-
evaluation of  our attachment to science (with a few notable exceptions – see Chapter 2).  
Why Science, though? 
Steve Fuller (1987; 2002; 2003) has suggested that philosophy of  science can be regarded 
as an attempt to apply political philosophy to science. He contends that Thomas Kuhn, 
who was one of  the most important precursors to SSK4, was in fact an authoritarian 
when it came to science. How so? Well, in retrospect such an accusation does not seem 
all that peculiar. Kuhn (1996) is (in)famous for bringing the word paradigm into the 
academic mainstream. Kuhn's use of  this term is varied and often difficult to pin down 
(Masterman 1965). It can range from the fairly narrow exemplar to something as broad as 
a research tradition and theoretical framework, and encompass everything from 
ontological commitments to conflicting preferences vis-à-vis scientific values (e.g. 
explanatory scope over precision and vice versa)  (Matheson 2008). It is clear, however, 
that the underlying theme of  his work concerns the conditions that make concerted 
scientific work possible. Paradigms are what bind researchers together and allow them to 
practice science whilst expending very little (if  any) energy on disputes concerning the 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that Kuhn distanced himself  from SSK interpretations of  his work (e.g. Kuhn 
1977). 
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theoretical and experimental apparatus at their disposal. This seems to require a modicum 
of  consensus, which, while not violently enforced, discourages, though it does not 
preclude, radical innovation. Normal science is to be practised within the parameters of  
the one paradigm, and replaced only by way of  revolution.  
Karl Popper, Fuller argues, is a traditional liberal. This again seems somewhat puzzling, as 
the rigidity of  the falsification principle (Popper 2002) seems to suggest an authoritarian 
approach to knowledge production. Not so, argues Fuller. Popper's suggestion that 
science develops by way of  conjectures and refutations allows for the possibility of  
radical critique within a particular research tradition. In fact, such critique is to be 
encouraged. Fuller's invocation of  Popper's open society is instructive at this point. 
Kuhn's paradigms do not foster critique and can be replaced after a revolution has taken 
place. Popper's open society, on the other hand, encourages critique and allows for a 
change of  government that takes place non-violently (i.e. a theory is refuted by a bold 
conjecture). In other words, change can be effected through the available channels and by 
means of  keeping our beliefs open to critique. No radical break or overthrow is required. 
Popper’s criticism (Popper 1970) of  Kuhnian normal science illustrates this quite well. In 
addition to questioning whether Kuhn’s thesis regarding paradigms is an accurate 
representation of  science, he laments Kuhn’s commitment to dogmatism (however 
innocuous). Consensus is crucial for Kuhn. It is what enables science to function 
efficiently and not waste time on debates concerning its fundamentals. For example, if  
Fuller is correct in arguing that sociology is actively self-deconstructive (Fuller 1991), it 
can serve as a good illustration of  what would constitute something akin to a nightmare 
for Kuhn, because a significant portion of  work is devoted to debates as to the nature of  
sociology, rather than actual research. Popper, while accepting that a certain degree of  
dogmatism is necessary to prevent science from disintegrating, favours a critical stance 
towards the status quo. 
Finally we come to Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos, whom Steve Fuller labels an 
anarchist and social democrat respectively.  
Popper's self-styled "open society" vision of  the scientific community marks him as a 
classical liberal, while Feyerabend's emphasis on the "open" and Lakatos' on the 
"society" aspects of  the Popperian vision marks them as, respectively, an anarchist (or 
libertarian) and a social democrat. 
Fuller (2002: 6) 
Fuller's characterisation of  Feyerabend is less surprising, given that Feyerabend's 
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theoretical position is known as epistemological anarchism (Feyerabend 2010). However, 
as Fuller suggests, Feyerabend's connection to Popper should not be overlooked. Popper 
argued for the necessity of  critique and an active and conscious reworking of  the 
tradition of  which you were part. One should continually make bold conjectures and 
incessantly test one's existing beliefs. However, Popper was committed to one tradition 
(i.e. science). Feyerabend generalises Popper's critical stance and drops his commitment 
to science. For Feyerabend science is simply one tradition among many and should not 
receive preferential treatment at the cost of  other forms of  inquiry (Feyerabend 1978). 
Various alternatives should be nurtured, and this goes beyond competing scientific 
theories. Alternatives to science itself  should be explored, developed and allowed to 
compete with science and one another. However, I would urge the reader not to construe 
Feyerabend's arguments as an attack on science per se. Science is certainly the target of  
his literary flair, but I would suggest that it is not so much science-as-a-tradition that 
Feyerabend finds distasteful. Rather, it is the monopoly that science possesses. 
Alternatives to science should be pursued simply because an unreflective commitment to 
science will render us dogmatic and incapable of  thinking otherwise. This is what 
Feyerabend finds disquieting. 
Extending the Metaphor 
I want to propose a reworked version of  Fuller's metaphor and map it onto the field of  
science studies. The following should not be regarded as an accurate representation of  
science studies. It is, at best, a heuristic reconstruction and should not be treated as 
anything but. There are, of  course, various combinations and the differences are more 
accurately represented in the form of  a continuum rather than discrete categories (e.g. 
Ian Hacking would not be happy in either of  the two groups). This narrative is merely an 
abstraction. 
I would argue that a major turning point in the way scholars from disciplines other than 
the natural sciences perceived science was the work of  Thomas Kuhn (Turner 2008: 33). 
There had, of  course, been people before Kuhn who had proposed versions of  scientific 
reasoning (e.g. Fleck's thought styles, Quine's webs of  belief  and Polanyi's tacit 
knowledge) that were not, strictly speaking, in accordance with the picture provided by 
the logical positivists or critical rationalists, such as A. J. Ayer (2002) or Karl Popper 
(2002). However, in none of  the cases did the ideas seriously alter the nature of  the 
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debates outside the core academic audiences. Kuhn's book, on the other hand, managed 
to create a schism between two camps that, even though both combined elements of  
Kuhn’s authoritarianism and Popper’s liberalism, ended up at odds with each other.  
The first camp is populated mostly by philosophers of  science. These people retained a 
belief  in the existence of  a particular method, or at least the possibility of  outlining a set 
of  rules, procedures, rules of  thumb that would be specific to science and good 
reasoning, and distinguish these from other forms of  knowledge-making. In other words, 
they persisted in trying to come up with a list of  conditions for something to count as 
science and, therefore, guarantee a zone of  certainty that would serve as a foundation for 
the construction and evaluation of  candidate disciplines, theories and instruments. The 
scientific method (or scientific tradition) is something that is more or less context-
independent and distinct. Political interests and pressures are regarded as something that 
is external to good science and contaminates it. They may well be co-extensive in 
practice, but science has a distinct logic of  its own once it is purified of  such accidental 
accretions (e.g. Robert Merton’s ethos of  science). These philosophers are committed to 
a normative project that seeks to articulate a scheme by which authoritative knowledge is 
to be produced and certified. It is, however, up to them and philosophically minded 
scientists to do this. Popper’s liberalism is present in the form of  a possibility of  critique, 
and Kuhn’s authoritarianism is present in the form of  a tradition that limits the scope of  
inquiry. Functionally, however, the roles are reversed. The impetus from Kuhn comes in 
the form of  history and the recognition of  contingency, whereas Popper’s contribution is 
expressed in the importance attached to rules of  inference. In other words, history serves 
as a backdrop for narratives about the rationality of  the choices that scientists make. 
The alternative tradition is the foundation of  this thesis and is represented by the diverse 
approaches within science studies. Science is perceived as a complex practice than cannot 
be reduced to, and expressed in, methodological directives and rules of  inference. 
Knowledge and skills are embodied by practitioners and function at an unconscious level 
that eludes propositional treatment. Science is always situated in particular configurations 
of  social structure, culture and political interests. It is, therefore, thoroughly context-
dependent and sensitive to the specificities of  the local environment (though not 
necessarily reducible to these). Science, according to this group of  scholars, is a 
historically and geographically specific phenomenon, and one among many ways of  
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organising our experience and knowledge of  the world. What is more, the right to (i) 
criticise and comment on what counts as good science and (ii) decide how it should be 
integrated with other interests extends beyond the control of  scientists. This is both a 
political and epistemological point. The recognition of  historical and geographical 
specificity is entwined with the idea the science produces accounts of  reality that are 
partial and embody highly particular conceptions of  knowledge and objectivity. Different 
perspectives should be included, and a plurality of  approaches should be encouraged so 
as to counter the wilfully ignorant (as regards history) and necessarily particular nature of  
scientific research.  
This group urges us to recognise the inconvenient fact that science is shot through with 
non-evidential reasoning. The philosophers did this too, but they gave primacy to the 
formal, epistemic and evidential and saw reasoning that contravened such norms 
(however specific historically) and expectations as incidental and secondary in a 
description of  the specificity of  science. They regarded the presence of  non-epistemic 
factors as a regrettable nuisance. For a number of  strands within science studies, on the 
other hand, this was an integral part of  scientific reasoning, because they treated science 
as a collective form of  inquiry where discourse and exchange followed conventions and 
protocols that were socially agreed upon. Science was never just about abstract formal 
expressions (e.g. mathematical formulae). It also involved the procedures of  justification 
that validate the formulae, and the applications of  such formal principles in practice 
(Harding 1986). However, it is the inherently social nature of  science that necessitates 
intervention (especially in the case of  feminist epistemology [Anderson 2011]). Thus, 
from Kuhn they inherited the belief  that science is a form of  collective culture, whereas 
Popper provides the belief  that one should maintain a critical stance towards the status 
quo. There are even glimmerings of  Feyerabend in the suggestion to multiply research 
trajectories concerned with similar questions, so as to prevent dogmatism and a 
monopoly of  partial perspectives that work with a specific set of  background 
assumptions both with regard to its object of  study and its conception of  what 
constitutes knowledge. This divergent framing of  science was reflected in their respective 
politics of  science. The former placed the right to define science in the hands of  
scientists and philosophers of  science, whereas some science studies scholars were much 
more permissive and allowed outsiders to comment upon science (e.g. Brian Wynne). In 
fact, this was precisely the point – as science affects the lives of  non-experts, it should be 
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accountable to them. 
Conclusions 
SSK can be regarded as an attempt to study science dispassionately and turn the analytical 
methods of  science against itself. This move, while intriguing, attracted a great deal of  
critique both from philosophers of  science and other sociologists. Some of  this may have 
been due to the perception that SSK work was undermining the authority of  science, but 
numerous authors questioned the academic merit of  explanatory mechanisms that 
privileged the insights of  sociologists and paid scant attention to the role of  non-human 
agency. The solution was to become more reflexive about the relationships between 
knowledge and power, science and politics, and the distribution of  agency between 
humans and non-humans. However, an unintended side effect of  such research (and 
similar work in the philosophy of  science) was that it became difficult to articulate what 
constitutes the distinctiveness of  science. It is true that science studies' commitment to 
science as an epistemically distinctive form of  inquiry is much more restrained, reserved 
and sometimes even implicit. What is more, there is a general acceptance among such 
scholars that science should be tempered, but this is done out of  recognition that science 
is socially enmeshed in networks constituted by different and conflicting cultural logics. 
There is a growing appreciation that a separation between technical solutions and ethical 
and political considerations is no longer as compelling as it was a few decades ago, and 
this has led to the belief  that technical expertise should not be permitted to reign without 
question or prevent public deliberation. One needs to carefully consider and interrogate 
the process by which knowledge is produced and what political and economic 
potentialities it embodies (and which ones it erases). The actual content of  the knowledge 
provided by science is now only one aspect among many to consider when constructing 
academic narratives about science. However, this move has come at the cost of  
challenging and repudiating conventional accounts of  science. How to square such 
insights with a commitment to science as a worthwhile and distinctive cognitive 
endeavour? This is a question I turn to in the next chapter.
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2. Studying Science, Part II: Dealing with 
Misadventures 
 
An important consequence of  the arguments and approaches I looked at in the previous 
chapter was a less deferential attitude towards science. Unfortunately, this was 
complemented by an inability to block accusations of  sociological reductionism. A 
possible solution to this problem was provided by a reworking of  the symmetry principle 
that would complement a symmetrical treatment of  truth and falsity with an equal 
appreciation for the complex processes through which both sides of  the nature/culture 
and human/non-human divide, co-construct and depend on each other. Much like the 
move championed by the Strong Programme, however, the introduction of  this 
additional dimension made science studies susceptible to a plethora of  academic 
accusations. In particular, while a number of  contemporary scholars influenced by 
science studies have argued for epistemically (as well as ontologically) sensitive, risky and 
self-aware forms of  science (e.g. Haraway 1991; Law 2004; Stengers 1997; 2000), there 
seems to be a kind of  ambivalence about science as the epistemic tradition of  choice, 
especially in view of  the accumulated evidence suggesting that its uniqueness has been 
overstated.   
In this chapter I (i) explore a number of  approaches that have been put forward to refine 
the constructivist tendencies inherent in science studies and (ii) identify a potentially 
problematic aspect of  a self-aware form of  what Sergio Sismondo (1992; 1996) calls 
heterogeneous constructivism. My main example of  heterogeneous constructivism is 
actor-network theory, and I conclude that it and similar approaches cannot challenge 
particular scientific practices on the grounds that their integrity has been compromised. 
Building Worlds from Heterogeneous Materials 
Sandra Harding (1986) has suggested that the division of  labour between philosophy of  
science and sociology of  science has resulted in philosophers trying to elucidate an 
idealised form of  scientific reasoning, while sociologists have been much more 
concerned with the actual practices of  science. This is equally true of  the science studies 
that have attempted to come up with an empirically grounded explanation for the 
undeniable success of  the sciences and the prestige attached to them as forms of  
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knowledge. However, in the previous chapter I argued that one of  the main issues with 
SSK in particular was its insistence on the importance of  interests (be they political or 
disciplinary) and social factors in the growth and development of  scientific knowledge 
(e.g. Barnes 1977; Barnes and Bloor 1982). It was gradually recognised that reducing the 
success and vigour of  science to non-epistemic factors was unsatisfactory. The question 
remained open – what exactly is it that separates science from other forms of  
knowledge? A prominent line of  reasoning that developed in response to this was 
constructivism. 
Two Species of  Constructivism 
Much like the word paradigm, constructivism is a term drenched in confusion and 
ambiguity. It is no surprise, therefore, that in science studies alone there have been a 
number of  books and articles devoted to clarifying what kind of  relationship to the world 
this word suggests (e.g. Hacking 1999; Radder 1992; Sismondo 1992; 1996). What does it 
mean to say that something is constructed? What materials are being used? Science 
studies in particular has suffered greatly as a result of  this confusion because its 
constructivist leanings have often been conflated with relativism (Fuller 2006b: 35-39). 
Furthermore, while some scholars choose to merge SSK and constructivism (e.g. Brown 
2001; Panofsky 2010), I believe that there are important differences that justify 
distinguishing between the constructivism championed by SSK and other variants of  this 
approach (e.g. actor-network theory).  
In Chapter 1 I argued that the former emphasised the pliability and the inherently 
negotiable character of  the rules and norms regulating scientific research. However, their 
decidedly interactionist approach to scientific norms was complemented by a realism as 
regards social entities (Collins and Yearley 1992). What is more, it was noticed by some 
that early science studies focused almost exclusively on high science and only paid lip 
service to the more mundane practices and technology-based forms of  science (Giere 
1993; Hacking 1983; Bijker  and Pinch 1992). Early science studies scholars were 
concerned with the theoretical content of  science, and it was argued that SSK (and early 
science studies work in general) was implicitly a form of  social constructivism whereby 
science was construed as the effect of  social, economic and political relations (society > 
science). While it would be unfair to claim that SSK paid no attention to the role of  
instruments (e.g. Collins 1975), the emphasis was usually placed on theoretical content or 
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scientific disputes. Consequently, it was a form of  epistemological constructivism that 
focused on ideas and arguments, rather than the materials and artefacts that are an 
integral part of  scientific work. The brand of  constructivism I will discuss below 
highlighted the importance of  practice and introduced a material and ontological 
dimension into the equation. This was supplemented by a move away from a 
representational and discursive take on science and scientific knowledge (e.g. Hacking 
1983). Theories were still important, but the emphasis gradually shifted towards science 
as a material practice, as a form of  material culture. To be sure, the constructed nature of  
scientific realities was central to the new understanding, but they no longer merely 
reflected contemporary social mores or projected these onto the world. The materials 
deployed in the process of  construction were varied. Science was the result of  work and 
accommodation. Specifically, the accommodation of  the obdurate qualities of  materials 
that are involved in constructing particular ontologies, and the social and material 
practices (e.g. experiments) that make them visible, deployable and stable (Hacking 1999; 
Knorr Cetina 1981; 1993; Oudshoorn 1994; Radder 1992; Sismondo 1996). Science is a 
form of  knowledge, but it is equally involved in constructing the material artefacts (e.g. 
trains) that it works with and constructing the world in which the products of  scientific 
labour are to be deployed (e.g. laying train tracks). 
There are different versions of  this. Some authors explicitly played down the extent to 
which the material world was obdurate and subscribed to fairly radical forms of  
nominalism and contingency (e.g. Ashmore 1989; Woolgar 1988); others were much less 
impressed by the idea that the materiality of  the world is radically contingent, but they 
also acknowledged the productive nature of  scientific knowledge (e.g. Hacking 1999; 
2002; Radder 1992). In both cases, however, science and its renderings (both material and 
semiotic) of  the world were treated as the result of  competently marshalling social 
relations (collective negotiations, interests), employing scientific instruments and 
disciplining non-humans. Humans were no longer the only actors that had to be 
negotiated with. An increasingly prominent branch of  this way of  talking about science is 
what Sergio Sismondo (1992; 1996) has dubbed heterogeneous constructivism. 
The networks are heterogeneous in the sense that they combine isolated parts of  
the material world, laboratory equipment, "black-boxed" knowledge, patrons, 
money, institutions, and so on. It is all of  these agents together that create the 
successes of  technoscience; no one piece of  that network wholly determines the 
shape of  the whole. 
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(Sismondo 1996: 72) 
It should come as little surprise that Sismondo was referring to actor-network theory. 
Might and Materiality 
In addition to introducing a vast array of  terminological innovations and challenging a 
series of  entrenched assumptions in Western metaphysics, actor-network theory5 
suggested an interesting explanation for the immense success of  science. It is really quite 
simple – science is ruthlessly efficient at building sociomaterial networks (Callon 1986; 
Callon and Latour 1981; Latour 1983; 1993a; 1993b; 2005; Law 1986; 1992; 2004). 
Science is an effective and efficient way of  building alliances between human needs, 
interests and non-human actors. It is not the result of  genius, serendipity or strict 
adherence to methodological directives, but neither is it window dressing for political or 
non-epistemic interests. It is, in fact, the result of  hard work. Science is a heterogeneous 
sociomaterial practice. It employs a vast array of  instruments and devices, and circulates 
artefacts and inscriptions. Furthermore, it reconfigures ontologies by introducing new 
entities (e.g. bacteria) into the collective and forges links between heterogeneous actors 
(both human and non-human).  
Research is best seen as a collective experimentation about what humans and non-
humans together are able to swallow or to withstand. 
(Latour 1999: 20) 
Scientific research sometimes results in networks of  human and non-human agents 
mutually reinforcing each other, and these connections reconfigure the sociomaterial 
landscape (composed of  other networks) that preceded them. For example, Bruno 
Latour (1983; 1993a) argues that Louis Pasteur's laboratory was a success story because it 
managed to insert itself  into its respective sociomaterial network by incrementally turning 
itself  into a sine qua non in the battle against anthrax. Pasteur had to contend with 
existing knowledge and alternative explanations for  the outbreaks and manifestations of  
diseases, and the death of  livestock. Pasteur emerged victorious, however. He achieved 
this by, among other things, (i) introducing a new entity into society and (ii) claiming to 
be its representative. In other words, Pasteur and his colleagues redefined reality by 
weaving another thread into its fabric and positioning itself  between it (the anthrax 
bacillus) and the actors whose lives it affected (e.g. farmers). They created interest both in 
the sense of  arousing curiosity and positioning itself  between numerous sides whose 
                                                 
5 Hereafter – ANT 
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interactions it was competent to manage, and created a monopoly on an aspect of  reality 
about and for which they could speak.  
The specificity of  science derives from the regularity with which it is capable of  forging 
robust and durable networks. This is not to say that science is not subject to contingency 
or somehow exempted from problems that are characteristic of  other forms of  human 
association (bias, intrigue, misinformation, personal dislike). Latour's account of  Pasteur's 
rise to prominence is replete with such details and in this way similar in spirit to the work 
championed by proponents of  SSK. However, actor-network theorists contend that 
science cannot be reduced to political manoeuvring. Culture can colonise the realm of  
nature, and humans can impose their descriptions on non-humans but only insofar as the 
latter cooperate and do not bump back. In effect, ANT supplements the symmetry thesis 
proposed by SSK with an ontological dimension (Callon 1986) and urges scholars to 
recognise the agency of  non-humans. By doing so, it gives science studies a way to (a) 
explain the immense practical success of  science and (b) supplement the insights of  early 
attempts to understand science empirically. 
Underlying these claims is a non-representational view of  knowledge that suggests that 
science is actively involved in constituting the world, rather than uncovering pre-existing 
structures (Porter 1993). The descriptions of  the world that scientists offer are certainly 
part of  this process, but of  equal importance are the instruments and practices that allow 
them to materialise and interact with the ontological constituents that their theories posit. 
The materiality and causal powers of  the world should not be excluded from accounts of  
science, and their ability to affect our (human) lives should become a prominent part of  
academic narratives. The requirements of  the co-production idiom seemed to have been 
satisfied – neither science nor society is given a privileged role. 
When Might is Right 
The elegance of  ANT and its implicit refusal of  committing to any one political agenda 
is commendable. From a descriptive standpoint it is innovative, but I would suggest that 
there is an important issue with it. What is quite striking about ANT is that, in effect, our 
proxy for the validity of  a particular scientific rendering of  reality is the resilience and 
durability of  the sociomaterial network that constitutes and supports it (Latour 1993a; 
2004b). For example, the quality of  Pasteur's theories and techniques derives from how 
well it deals with challengers and alternative explanations and practices. Truth and agency 
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are the result of  competition between various networks. This is particularly pronounced 
in the work of  Bruno Latour, and his insistence on trials of  strength suggests a refusal to 
decouple the quality of  science from its durability (or truth from power). Latour says as 
much himself. 
We cannot distinguish between those moments when we have might and those when we 
are right. 
(Latour 1993a: 183) 
Quite a few scholars have noticed this (e.g. Fuller 2000b; 2006; Collin 2011) and 
expressed their discomfort with such a take on science (e.g. Haraway 1997b). There is 
something troubling about framing the question of  success in terms of  durability and 
conflict. The history of  science is replete with examples of  discriminatory (e.g. racist and 
sexist) modes of  thinking that had significant currency in scientific circles (e.g. Laqueur 
1990; Schiebinger 1989; Fausto-Sterling 1995). What is more, they were exemplary of  the 
sciences of  the time. Complex argumentative strategies were developed so as to weave 
together measurements and beliefs about race and gender so that white males of  
European descent came out on top in all the relevant categories. I do not see why one 
should have difficulty (i) treating these symmetrically as instances of  science in the past 
and (ii) rendering their success intelligible in a comparable manner. However, there would 
probably be an implicit urge to make it apparent that these kinds of  projects were 
dissimilar to today's scientific practices, or at least a vague unease about equating them. 
This is the ambivalence that I alluded to at the beginning of  the paragraph – we would 
like to be able to differentiate theories on more solid grounds than the contentious ones’ 
eventual dissolution. This does not necessarily mean an invocation of  truth, but 
robustness and durability seem equally unsatisfactory, since the argumentative repertoires 
were certainly robust and persuasive at the time.  
Similarly, one could make the argument that ANT's emphasis on forging alliances and 
representation sounds ferociously political. Indeed, Bruno Latour has been explicit about 
this (Latour 1991; Brown 2009). The difference from politics, of  course, is that in science 
humans have to negotiate with non-humans and come up with terms that work for 
everyone involved. What is more, there is always something outside the network that can 
and eventually will disrupt its smooth functioning (Latour 2005). But is it not a general 
point about building sociomaterial networks that seems to be the issue here? That is to 
say, is ANT making a point about science or science as a kind of  network? It seems to me 
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that the latter is true, since the talk is of  networks that transgress and confute the 
distinctions power/knowledge and society/nature (Latour 1999: ch. 3; Collin 2011; 
Guggenheim and Potthast 2011). This puts ANT in an awkward position. If  science is 
only a particular instance or component of  sociomaterial networks, it becomes 
insufficiently differentiated from other kinds of  activity and epistemic endeavours that 
can systematically rely on the cooperation of  non-human agents (e.g. religion). In other 
words, it loses its distinctiveness and identity as a particular kind of  sociomaterial 
network. Consequently, we are left with an uncomfortable conclusion. ANT is an 
exceptionally powerful descriptive technique, but its emphasis on durability gives us little 
in the way of  tools for dealing with conflicts between networks of  comparable resilience 
and vitality. More recent literature has certainly moved away from using the language of  
force and durability, and manifested an interest in the ethical and political implications of  
science and technology (e.g. Latour 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; Law 2004; Mol 1999; 2003), but 
this is a difference in emphasis, rather than a full-blown re-imagining – the resilience and 
durability of  networks is still present in the background. 
This presents us with a problem, as it is not clear how we could approach a rendering of  
reality that (we believe) is problematic yet commands the assent of  political or scientific 
authorities. Is there anything more to our unease than an unwillingness to endorse it and 
forge links with the sociomaterial network supporting it? The work of  social scientists 
and humanities scholars studying science has given us ample reason to doubt its exalted 
status and the privilege we thrust upon it (Collin 2011; Fuller 2000b; 2006; Pels 1995; 
1996; 2003). What is more, contrary to philosophers of  the analytical tradition who can 
fall back on good standards of  reasoning, rationality and the logical compulsion of  the 
better argument, there seems to be no way out for science studies scholars – 
constructivists in particular.  
Situating Risky Knowledge 
The work of  Isabelle Stengers (1997; 2000) shares ANT's non-representational take on 
knowledge. She provides a number of  arguments that complement, draw upon and have 
influenced Bruno Latour and John Law, and could potentially rectify the problem I have 
outlined above. I read Stengers as arguing against the position that our recognition of  the 
fallibility of  science leads us to abandon it. Science is permeated by a variety of  
unfortunate metaphors (a lot of  them gendered), unchecked assumptions and hampered 
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by a wilful ignorance of  its own specificity and contingency. Work in science studies has 
made us acutely aware of  our capacity for getting things wrong and failing to recognise 
the specificity of  the positions we speak from. Stengers' response to these developments 
is intriguing. 
Theodore Porter has argued that there is a strand of  constructivism which contends that 
'scientific knowledge is true, but chiefly in relation to a world we have constructed' 
(Porter 1993: 87). It is along these lines that the arguments of  Isabelle Stengers (1997: 
2000) should be understood. She contends that the specificity of  the sciences lies in their 
ability to create material apparatuses that simultaneously (i) define what counts as a 
scientific problem and (ii) put potential answers to such problems to the test. This is what 
was so unique about Galileo. He constructed an experimental apparatus that 
demonstrated the veracity of  his theory and provided a framework against which other 
theories could be assessed and legitimated. He devised a way to construct scientific facts 
out of  fictions. This move was crucial. The power of  science rests in its ability to make 
other narratives and knowledge systems appear as fictions and distinguish itself  from 
them by way of  procedures of  justification and tests of  legitimacy. Science is about 
putting stories to the test and inviting others to challenge them. By going through this 
process stories lose their fictional status and become detached from the person who 
created them (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Law 2004). They move from the realm of  
stories to the realm of  facts that can travel from context to context. The trouble with 
science (or more precisely – scientists) is that they often want to claim more than their 
achievements allow.  
As Theodore Porter's neat summary illustrates, the reality and durability of  scientific 
constructions and insights is tied to particular situations, experimental apparatuses and 
procedures. Science is a constructive and creative process that meshes different kinds of  
materials, but its ability to reshape the world is historically contingent and tied to 
particular instruments and contexts.  
Physicists cannot simply abandon these equations since it is through them that physics 
established a particular experimental relation with the observable world. [...] they are 
situated in a tradition from which they receive their instruments and their language: if  
they reject them they lose any possibility of  communication with their colleagues, they 
are no longer physicists, they find themselves isolated, alone in a labyrinth of  
phenomena that have again become indecipherable. 
Stengers (1997: 26) 
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The reality and authority that scientists want to claim for science goes beyond this, 
however, which is where the political dimension of  science comes in.  
While Stengers distances herself  from attempts within science studies to understand 
science as a kind of  power politics or social construction (e.g. Stengers 2000: ch. 1), she 
freely acknowledges that politics is part of  the scientific tradition. For one, science is an 
active participant in the redistribution of  rights and duties with regard to agency, truth 
and the standards of  inference. However, even though the realities constructed by and 
with science are not reducible to power and politics, the intimate connection between 
science and politics becomes clear if  one acknowledges that scientific knowledge is 
involved in the production of  highly particular social and material configurations. The 
reason for this is simple. The content of  scientific knowledge may be irreducible to 
politics, but the decision to test and stage some stories rather than others is clearly 
political and revealing of  the non-epistemic dimension of  science. Stengers suggests that 
a solution to this is a conscious integration of  human affairs and the management and 
production of  things (Stengers 2000: 147-149), not unlike the parliament of  things put 
forward by Bruno Latour (1993b; 2004c). Science should be sensitive to the contexts in 
which it operates and remakes, and the individuals it describes and affects. Politics and 
science are, indeed, meshed together. Science reconfigures both the epistemic 
(redistribution of  rights with regard to truth) and social (new configurations of  human 
and non-human entities) landscapes. More importantly, however, the intimate connection 
between particular sciences and the repertoire of  material tools and procedures that allow 
for the construction of  their respective scientific facts should not be overlooked. A direct 
consequence of  this is that scientists should restrain their urge to claim more than their 
achievements merit and should not assume that other forms of  knowledge or explanation 
are illegitimate, for it is at this point that a politics of  reason becomes a disagreeable from 
of  power politics.  
This last point in Stengers' account manifests similarities with the work of  Paul 
Feyerabend, who also argued that scientists are often smug and condescending towards 
alternative knowledge traditions. The disagreeable aspect of  this is that such derision has 
more to do with the chauvinism of  science (or particular scientists), rather than any 
intellectual deficiencies of  the opponent. Such disregard for alternatives comes from a 
reification of  science and a fetishism about past scientific achievements and the 
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procedures that lead to them. Indeed, Feyerabend believed that the contemporary 
obsession with the scientific method was indicative of  a broader tendency to equate 
science with what counts as scientific in the present. The problem, of  course, was that 
the current state of  science was a product of  historical and philosophical development. 
and actually quite diverse internally. What is more, there is no reason to assume (in fact, 
Feyerabend believed this was counterproductive) that science will not continue to evolve. 
As I said in Chapter 1, Feyerabend is not an enemy of  science – he disliked the reification 
of  science and the attendant arrogance. Consequently, while this may seem 
counterintuitive at first, it is plausible to argue that Feyerabend shared Stengers' 
commitment to science as a creative and historically contingent process. 
The Performativity of  Method 
Thus far Stengers' approach is quite similar to Latour's variant of  ANT. What Latour 
(2004c) borrows from her is a tentative account of  how one can distinguish between 
good and bad science. Stengers contends that scientists' interactions with the world are 
mediated by intricate apparatuses and conceptual frameworks that attempt to 
accommodate complexity (Stengers 1997). This in itself  is not an issue.  The problem 
appears when scientists force the world to correspond to these abstractions. For Stengers 
good science seeks to devise questions and experimental apparatuses that put beliefs at 
risk and subject them to experiment and the possibility of  confutation.  
[D]evise your inquiries so that they maximize the recalcitrance of  those you interrogate. 
(Latour 2004c: 217) 
The vulnerability of  our understandings should be exposed, and others should be allowed 
to challenge them. Vulnerability is, therefore, a kind of  strength. For Stengers, the work 
of  Ilya Prigogine, Barbara McClintock (Stengers 1997) and Shirley Strum (Stengers 2000) 
serve as examples of  such sensitivity. These scientists did not impose their own 
descriptions and allowed their objects to articulate themselves. 
A related line or argument has been developed by John Law (2004; 2008; 2009; Law et al 
2011), Annemarie Mol (1999; 2003) and (to a certain extent) Bruno Latour (2010). These 
authors have argued that the nature of  the method chosen brings with itself  a particular 
kind of  imagination as regards its object. In other words, there are certain assumptions in 
place that shape and limit the nature of  the results generated from the data. What the 
aforementioned scholars emphasise is that these assumptions do not just describe 
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whatever their particular object might be, but they also enact a particular version of  it. 
The renderings of  reality that these methods produce, therefore, provide a description of  
a part of  reality that is already imagined in a particular way – the results are a description 
of  the reality of  the object according to the method in question. This is somewhat similar 
to what Wynne (see Chapter 1) said of  policy-making, in that policy makers operate with 
certain implicit assumptions about what the public is like and on what its objections are 
based.  
If  one method enacts a particular rendering of  reality, alternative approaches might come 
up with something completely different because renderings are always partial. They tend 
to explain away or ignore certain elements of  situations that are, in fact, crucial to them 
simply because the methods employed are only capable of  dealing with ontologies that 
are bound in a particular way (Law 2004: ch. 4). The upshot of  this argument is that there 
are always multiple possible realities, whose existence and practical relevance to our lives 
depends largely on whether, and in what contexts, we enact them (Law 2004; Law and 
Singleton 2005; Mol 1999; 2003). How to choose between these? This is a question of  
ontological politics. If, as the performativity argument suggests, reality is not fixed but 
enacted through the way we choose to interact with it, our choices determine the nature 
of  our knowledge and the realities it makes possible. This is what ontological politics is 
about – the struggle over the recognition and enactment of  different realities.  
An interesting implication that follows from this is argument is that knowledge-making is 
indeed permeated by ethical and political questions. It goes beyond choosing which 
avenues of  research to follow (e.g. Hacking 2000; Kitcher 2001; Oudshoorn 1994) and 
argues that the choices we make influence the kind (but not necessarily quality) of  the 
knowledge we end up with. Gad and Jensen (2010) argue that this approach is salutary 
from an academic point of  view. In particular, it undermines a relativistic account of  
knowledge that focuses on the multiplicity of  perspectives but assumes a relatively stable 
material baseline (Fuller 2006b: 35-39). The work of  John Law and Annemarie Mol 
illustrates that our perspectives, and the realities they enable, both produce and are 
produced by the world. It makes us uncomfortably aware that the versions of  reality we 
choose to enact and support bring with them a series of  commitments and hopes.  
I would argue that something similar could be said of  other work in science studies (e.g. 
Fausto-Sterling 2000; Barad 1998; Haraway 1997b) that highlights the intimate and highly 
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consequential entanglements of  culture, ethics, method and materiality. They are 
simultaneously cautionary and enlightening. They urge us to accept responsibility for our 
actions and consider both the positive and negative effects of  how we chose to practice 
science and the sorts of  technologies we choose to deploy. However, it also illustrates the 
multitude of  possibilities, which, while not infinite, subvert the presumption of  
inevitability in what we are and what we can be. This, I believe, is why highlighting the 
contingent nature of  science and the realities it enables is so important. It is not 
necessarily a matter of  showing that our beliefs and practices are false or misguided. 
Rather, the import of  the abovementioned impulse derives from the ability to interrogate 
our most cherished epistemic commitments and showcase their plasticity. Things could 
have been otherwise. The decision to follow a particular path was determined by a 
multitude of  factors, only some of  which were not subject to human control (though 
they may well have been beyond the reach of  individuals). I would argue, however, that 
this very same approach, which is so liberating academically, makes epistemic critique 
somewhat complicated. 
The Elusiveness of  Science 
An important issue in the debate between Larry Laudan and David Bloor was Laudan's 
contention that we do not really have a clear idea of  what makes science unique and 
whether there are any principles that distinguish it from other forms of  knowing (Fuller 
2002). In view of  this, Laudan found Bloor's insistence on the scientific nature of  SSK 
problematic. Laudan's argument was basically this: if  we have examples of  X, but we lack 
an understanding of  what makes them Xs, how do we know if  a purported instance of  X 
is actually an instance of  X? Bloor replied that it is enough to have examples of  
something to be able to study it and chastised Laudan for having an overly propositional 
understanding of  knowledge; feminist epistemologists have also accused traditional 
philosophy of  science of  this, so Bloor is not alone. The work of  Polanyi (2009), Kuhn 
(1996) and the numerous laboratory studies have provided ample evidence that 
knowledge is not always propositional or possessed explicitly – it is often embodied and 
passed on in the form of  practices and particular ways of  doings things, rather than 
explicit instructions. But even if  we accept Bloor's objections, it seems that his approach 
only works just in case a discipline can claim scientific status. This suggests that 
proponents of  SSK have to be content with institutionally sanctioned scientific 
disciplines. Without a set of  necessary or sufficient conditions (in the vein of  the 
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principles of  verification or falsification) the situation becomes complicated and its 
resolution elusive. A discipline becomes part of  the category science only when it is 
regarded as such by a number of  heterogeneous actors. There is no straightforward list 
of  qualities a discipline can manifest in order to qualify as a science. 
This is not to say that such a list of  criteria is desirable. If  we had something like this, it 
would most likely be retrospective and would reify a particular version of  science. This 
would complicate life for new branches (which it did – e.g. the social sciences), as their 
acceptance would hinge on their consistency with their more established relatives. 
However, the fact that we do not have such a list makes things very problematic for a 
distinctly prescriptive and normative take on science. Feyerabend's epistemological 
anarchism can be seen as a response to this. His pronouncement that anything goes 
(Feyerabend 2010) is not prescriptive, or even descriptive. Instead, I read it as ironic. It is 
an oblique way of  claiming that novel forms of  inquiry (or even theories in one 
discipline) often contradict the prevailing norms. According to Feyerabend, numerous 
scientific breakthroughs have been made by people who were either ignorant of  or even 
blatantly disregarded the standards of  their time. His interpretation of  the arguments and 
theories of  Galileo is illustrative of  this point. Contrary to most historians of  science, 
Feyerabend portrays Galileo as an opportunistic cheat whose methods were wildly 
inconsistent with what was acceptable at the time, and that was precisely the point – 
Galileo succeeded because he cheated. Consequently, “anything goes” is best seen as an 
injunction against a criterion of  demarcation, as this would merely be a snapshot of  what 
passes for science at a particular point in time. It would be a reification of  science whose 
good health depends on risk-taking and creativity unconstrained by conventional rules. 
We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of  what 
once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it 
against all those who will accept a view only if  it is told in a certain way and who will 
trust it only if  it contains certain magical phrases, called “observational reports”. And 
this is not an exception – it is the normal case: theories become clear and 'reasonable' 
only after incoherent parts of  them have been used for a long time. Such unreasonable, 
nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of  
clarity and of  empirical success. 
(Feyerabend 2010: 10-11) 
I would argue that contemporary developments in ANT and the work of  Isabelle 
Stengers (among others) are aware of  these issues and are promoting a more self-aware 
and responsible approach to the sciences. However, it remains unclear what exactly is the 
tradition that needs to be reworked, practised responsibly and developed so as to allow 
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the material world to articulate itself  in interesting and potentially surprising ways. For 
example, feminist epistemologists have argued that we need to re-imagine science and the 
notions and concepts that organise it (Anderson 2011), but what is it that makes science 
distinctive and preferable to other forms of  knowledge? Isabelle Stengers takes this 
question seriously by pointing to the crucial importance of  experiment and risk-taking. 
However, she argues that these characteristics are also present in psychoanalysis (Stengers 
1997: ch. 5). This is not to suggest that Stengers is wrong for identifying laudable 
impulses in a controversial school of  thought, but by doing so Stengers reveals an interest 
in epistemic endeavours with a manifest willingness to put their claims and beliefs in 
danger, be surprised by their objects and let them speak, rather than the distinctiveness of  
science. Latour has suggested that one way of  reading Stengers' argument is that she 
wants to move away from an epistemological account of  what makes science distinctive 
and develop and argument located at the level of  ontology (Latour 2004c). In other 
words, Stengers is perfectly aware of  the epistemological difficulties involved in 
specifying a criterion of  demarcation (Stengers 2000: 1-52) and chooses to reinterpret the 
issue as being one of  epistemically interesting pursuits, rather than science vs. non-
science. For her the crucial question is not whether something can claim scientific status, 
but whether it manifests a sensitivity to the specificities of  the object under study and 
provides the object with an opportunity to challenge the queries that are being put to it. 
This suggests that Stengers would happily acknowledge that not everything that passes as 
science is worth out attention – interesting and risky articulations of  social and material 
realities are more important. 
A potential problem appears at this point, though it only affects Latour's variant of  non-
represential constructivism. The upshot of  ANT is that reality is procedurally 
constituted. That is to say, reality is a product of  various actors working together to 
construct it and acquires a definite form and set of  relations only after the fact. 
Furthermore, an actor's agency is (i) determined after a particular a particular network has 
come into being and (ii) is defined in relation to other elements constituting the network.  
According to Latour, certain actants only come to exist as a result of  the activities of  a 
well-established network. The conclusion seems inevitable that those actants could not 
have contributed to establishing the network in the first place – although this is a 
corollary that Latour apparently misses. 
(Collin 2011: 117) 
The above might not be a big problem for Stengers, but it complicates matters if  we want 
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to infuse Latour's account with her insights. In other words, Stengers talks of  objects or 
phenomena in a way that allows for agency before said objects or phenomena are 
articulated, which is why she can chastise certain forms of  science for limiting the 
potential of  speech and confutation. It is harder to see how Latour can do the same 
without allowing for agency that precedes the stabilisation of  the network.  In his case 
the success and resilience of  particular sociomaterial articulations are crucial to the 
explanation of  science, and it is not clear that one can talk of  bad science, rather than 
failure and unsuccessful science. At this point science becomes a descriptive term whose 
referent is polymorphous and historically contingent. It is a term designating a specific 
set of  instruments, practices, institutions, ontologies and practitioners that constitute a 
form of  inquiry at a particular moment in time. The boundaries of  what is included in 
this category can be tightened and loosened. This means that, according to ANT, our 
approach to science is to be explained in terms of  successful instances of  it because these 
are the ones that have earned the right to be counted among the sciences. This leads us 
back to the importance of  success – science consists of  those assemblages, instruments, 
practices, institutions, ontologies and practitioners that can marshal support and persuade 
others. ANT in this instance is akin to reverse-engineering. It can explain why a particular 
endeavour failed or succeeded, but it can only do so from the privileged vantage point 
afforded by the present (Asdal 2012; Radder 1998a; 1998b). Once we have divested 
science of  its traditional rhetorical ammunition and subjected it to analyses of  objectivity 
and rationality, we have to justify our commitment to science in a different way. The 
analytical weight placed on trials of  strength is not able to do this if  we want to retain the 
option of  distinguishing between being right and having might. This is especially crucial 
is one wants to argue that something has a corrosive effect on science. 
When Things Go Wrong 
The upshot of  the above arguments is that numerous enactments of  reality are possible. 
The choice to focus on, prefer and materialise certain enactments over others is open-
ended (constrained by institutional and epistemic inertia). A consequence is that many 
ways of  appropriating scientific knowledge and understanding ourselves are possible. 
According to Donna Haraway, we should stand up for certain ways of  doing this and 
challenge others (Haraway 1997b). This, presumably, means "casting our votes" for more 
inclusive and liberal material-semiotic figurations and forms of  knowledge. However, the 
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commitment to performative ontologies and a non-representational view of  knowledge, 
while making us responsible for the choices we make, renders the language of  biases and 
corrosion complicated. For example, I would argue that most science studies scholars 
would assent to the claim that the incapacity of  people other than white males of  
European descent was a construction. What is more, it was not only a discursive 
construction, because it was made real through material practices (e.g. limiting access to 
education) and legislation. Consequently, it was a sociomaterial construction of  the kind 
favoured by heterogeneous constructivism. From an ANT perspective, however, it is not 
clear that the scientific justification for these practices was lacking, or that they were 
contaminated by undesirable non-epistemic factors, because the foundation for these 
beliefs was located, at least in part, in widely accepted and institutionally recognised 
forms of  knowledge. A less dramatic illustration would be a comparison between Ian 
Hacking's claim that child abuse was a construction (Hacking 1991; 1999) and the debates 
surrounding the link (or lack thereof) between smoking and cancer (Ashmore 1996) and 
hormones and homosexuality (Oudshoorn 1994). These are all constructions, but we 
should like to differentiate between different constructions and identify ones that are 
dubious or permeated by bias and prejudice, or perpetuated by commercial interests, 
regardless of  how much assent they command. The problem is that ANT cannot really 
do this, due to the fact that assumptions about what moves were justified are collective 
achievements and agreements that only become clear after the fact (i.e. post-
construction).  
Identifying Malpractice 
Different responses are possible depending on what conceptions of  agency (human or 
non-human) you subscribe to and what form of  critique you wish to practice. If  you 
believe that agency is an emergent, relational or procedurally constituted quality, your 
options are somewhat limited because reality is an effect, a result. If  you allow for 
agential potential that precedes the enactment of  it in particular sociomaterial practices, 
you are slightly better off, but it is still unclear as to how much agency there is and what 
positive claims, if  any, one can make. In relation to this Hans Radder (1992; 1998a; 
1998b) has made the point that constructivist science studies is plagued by a slightly 
ambiguous politics regarding constructions. He suggests that in some cases talk of  
constructions is a proxy for illustrating contingency (epistemic, ontological or 
methodological). Such instances, I would argue, fall into the category of  cautioning and 
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enlightening us, and raising self-awareness. However, there are instances where talk of  
constructions is a veiled way of  saying that something is inaccurate or based on 
problematic assumptions.  
Now, I mentioned above that constructivism is internally varied, and a seemingly 
pertinent distinction at this juncture is between what Andrew Abbot calls ideological and 
constitutive forms of  constructivism6 (Abbott 2001b: 61-67). ANT's emphasis on the 
constitutive role of  scientific practices (e.g. work on vaccines in the laboratory) in the 
construction of  reality (e.g. a world with vaccinated people) suggests that it is closer to 
the latter. This point becomes especially pertinent in cases where an enactment, 
construction of  issue-definition is challenged, and we want to make the case that the 
integrity of  a scientific project has been compromised, cultural prejudices have interfered 
with the research process, or the interpretation of  results has been narrow-minded. It is 
not sufficient to say that there are certain assumptions at play, because this is always the 
case. The challenge is to show that at least some of  these assumptions are not warranted. 
This, however, involves making at least a tentative or implicit claim as to the actual state 
of  affairs, but this is complicated to do for a consistent constitutive constructivist 
because reality is a product of  sociomaterial practices, rather than a stable and pre-
existing platform for them. 
After all, the positive claims that “reality is complex”, or that “there is a crucial political 
asymmetry between experts and lay people in the twentieth century”, are simply two 
more opportunities for deconstruction, and not a motive for normatively relevant 
reflexion [sic]. 
(Radder 1992: 149) 
The same ambivalence is evident with regard to science more generally. For example, 
what authority can it claim if  it is permeated by ambient values and influenced by non-
epistemic factors? A possible answer might be that what science studies is challenging is 
not science itself. Rather, it is the way institutions (be they private or public) promote 
loaded issue-definitions (Wynne 1998; 2003) and particular kinds of  human and non-
human subjectivities (Haraway 1997b). The target of  critique could also be the danger 
inherent in the commercial appropriation of  science and the resulting displacement of  
values which are constitutive of  it (Longino 1983; 1990; 2013). The last point seems to be 
one of  the guiding principles behind the economics of  scientific knowledge, which, 
among other things, interrogates the consequences and effects of  the commercialisation 
                                                 
6 Abbott uses the term constructionism. 
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of  science. Similar anxieties can be identified in the work of  Sheila Jasanoff  (1990: 2005), 
Donna Haraway (1997) and Steve Fuller (2000b; 2006; Fuller and Collier 2004) and 
Isabelle Stengers (2000).  That is to say, numerous scholars have argued that how and by 
whom science is organised and funded makes a difference to what kind of  knowledge it 
produces (Anderson 2011; Fuller 1987; 1996b; 2002; Haraway 1997b; Kitcher 2001; 
Longino 2013; Mirowski and Sent 2002; Zamora Bonilla 2012). However, a critique of  
the corrosive influence of  biases, prejudice and commercial appropriation presupposes a 
prescriptive approach to science that goes beyond the practical viability of  the products a 
commercialised brand of  science generates, the political climates it reflects (society > 
science) and the realities which it enables (science > society). It presupposes a particular 
way of  doing science and draws our attention to the deficiencies and flaws of  examples 
that fall short of  such principles. 
The above would be a cogent line of  attack if  science had a kernel that could be hijacked, 
perverted and twisted to serve someone’s needs. That is to say, if  there were a binding 
scientific ethos (e.g. Merton [1942; 1968]) which committed scientists to certain forms of  
communication, organisation and distribution of  epistemic benefits, a critique would 
seem to be forthcoming. For example, you could expose claims to scientific objectivity or 
moral neutrality by (i) showing how they fail to pass tests and live up to standards the 
practitioners themselves endorse and (ii) argue that actual scientific practice is not 
congruent with the self-understanding that institutions have of  themselves. It would, 
therefore, be a rhetorical move akin to immanent critique. If  such a kernel is lacking (and 
there is considerable evidence to that effect) and we recognise that science is a diffuse 
sociomaterial practice, rather than a set of  principles, the argument becomes more 
complicated to make. For example, we can say that commercialisation and 
commodification have undesirable political consequences (e.g. economic inequalities lead 
to health inequalities [Wilkinson and Pickett 2010]). In other words, particular kinds of  
funding mechanisms complicate the implementation of  prevalent democratic principles. 
Unfortunately we cannot categorically state that this is corrosive of  science, because it is 
not clear what science is and what are its social functions. The approach taken by Isabelle 
Stengers overcomes this epistemological problem by reframing the question in 
ontological terms. The kind of  constructivism associated with actor-network theory, 
however, cannot benefit from this turn without an account of  the agential capabilities of  
humans and non-humans before they form connections and establish networks. As it 
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stands, we have to be content with durability and success. 
Conclusions 
Science studies scholars have shown that science consistently deviates from the accounts 
of  traditional philosophy of  science. Their research has illustrated that scientific practice 
is considerably more complex and indeterminate than philosophical reconstructions 
would seem to suggest. These insights are invaluable and promote a responsible approach 
to science that takes note of  its social consequences – both positive and negative. Among 
the most effective and philosophically intricate of  science studies' responses to this issue 
is heterogeneous constructivism, whose key strength lies in its non-representational view 
of  scientific knowledge and the rejection of  sociological reductionism that seemed to 
plague earlier attempts to study science empirically. 
An unintended result, however, is that science becomes a descriptive term designating a 
social institution, rather than a set of  principles characteristic of  sound epistemic 
conduct. This is an institution that is tied to particular examples of  it, rather than 
predefined social or cognitive goals. Furthermore, the sources of  its prestige are actually 
different than popular beliefs would suggest. This is a particularly problematic turn for 
constructivist branches of  science studies that subscribe to relational, process-based or 
performative metaphysics (e.g. ANT). They have trouble mounting a critique of  instances 
where the integrity of  a particular piece of  science seems to be suspect, because there is 
no predefined boundary between science and society and the entities that populate it. 
Such boundaries and abilities to act, and be acted upon, are the result, rather than a point 
of  departure. If  these arguments were only illustrative of  how science works, there would 
be no need to concern oneself  with normative questions. Constructivists could content 
themselves with criteria that reduce science to its enactment in science studies texts (e.g. 
Fuller 2002: 188-189). However, their projects often have ethical and political implications 
and sometimes even contain explicit criticism (Collin 2011; Radder 1992; 1998a: 1998b).   
Such cases present a peculiar predicament. On the one hand, because the boundary 
between science/politics and argument/rhetoric has been dissolved, political criticisms 
are also criticisms of  science, and only once the debate has been resolved can we 
distinguish between science and politics. On the other hand, constructivists cannot 
challenge entrenched views and practices on the grounds that they are unscientific (either 
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in spirit or content) or show signs of  political or economic interference. Sociology in the 
Soviet Union is an excellent example of  this. 
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3. Epistemic Ambivalence and Uneasy Alliances: 
Sociology in the Soviet Union 
Many aspects of  Russian science, including whole schools of  thought, do indeed reveal 
the influence of  the specific social environment in which they developed. These 
influences extend, surprisingly, even to “hard” sciences such as physics and mathematics. 
Other developments in Russian science equally convincingly show that science is not 
entirely a social construction, but that it does indeed have a relationship to objective 
reality, and this relationship to reality is the reason science in Russia is far more similar 
to science elsewhere than is Russian philosophy or literature to those disciplines 
elsewhere. 
(Graham 1997: 470) 
 
As I tried to show in Chapters 1 and 2, science studies has provided numerous examples 
that illustrate the multifaceted entanglements of  science and society, and show that the 
sciences are complex sociomaterial practices that are situated in particular configurations 
of  ambient values, social philosophies and political climates. The historian of  Soviet 
science Loren Graham (1997; 1998), however, poses an interesting question to scholars 
with constructivist inclinations: if  the sociopolitical context plays such a significant role 
in the development of  scientific knowledge, how is it that numerous scientific projects 
with a distinctly Soviet political and philosophical underpinning failed? That is to say, if  
the idealistic assumptions underlying constructivism (as Graham sees it) were true, 
science would develop differently in different contexts and the materiality of  the world 
would offer little, if  any, resistance to the inquisitiveness and creativity of  human 
scientists. To be sure, Graham is perfectly comfortable with the claim that cultural beliefs 
and political factors contribute to and mould the specific form that science takes, but a 
kind of  qualified realism seems implicit in his writings and overall stance towards matters 
epistemological (e.g. Graham 1987; 1994; 1998). In other words, Graham rejects social 
constructivism, but he is prepared to accept an attenuated form of  it – one that 
emphasises the social embeddedness of  science, but does not reduce science to its social 
conditions of  emergence.  
In the previous chapter I argued that certain branches of  constructivist science studies 
(e.g. actor-network theory) shared Graham's suspicions as to the validity of  purely 
sociological explanations of  science. However, this was complemented by a difficulty 
articulating criticisms of  science and its social functions in a way that would allow one to 
conceive of  and identify instances where a particular piece of  research or an entire 
scientific discipline has been compromised. Science in the Soviet Union presents an 
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interesting challenge to such approaches and illustrates some of  the fears that stimulated 
the development of  Merton's account of  the scientific tradition. Merton was concerned 
that science would be constrained in totalitarian societies. Loren Graham, on the other 
hand, was quite determined to show that even in a totalitarian society such as the Soviet 
Union the attendant intrusions in science did not manage to excise, though they certainly 
managed to stifle, scientific creativity. The simple fact that science is always embedded in 
particular social contexts is not sufficient to refute the claim that science can remain 
robust even under conditions of  significant epistemic stress.  
Graham is fully cognisant of  the ideological constraints placed upon Soviet science, but 
he makes a point of  drawing attention to numerous instances where Soviet scientists 
were at the forefront of  their respective scientific fields (Graham 1987; 1998). 
Consequently, Graham makes a few concessions to constructivism but suggests that 
explanations emphasising the importance of  external encroachment (e.g. censorship, 
ideology) are insufficient to understand the peculiarities of  Soviet science. However, what 
becomes clear after examining Graham's work on Soviet science is that he devotes very 
little attention to the development of  the social sciences (though he does touch upon 
social psychology [Graham 1987]). 
The question that I shall explore in this chapter is whether Soviet sociology followed the 
same or at least a similar kind of  pattern to the one introduced by Graham. I believe that 
this question is made all the more pertinent given the ideologically sensitive subject 
matter of  sociology. I will begin this chapter by looking at some of  the arguments as to 
the nature of  dialectical materialism and its influence on science in the Soviet Union. The 
overview is necessarily limited and expository by design and it does not aim to capture 
the variety of  interactions between the various scientific disciplines and the officially 
sanctioned philosophy of  science. Its main purpose is to characterise Soviet 
understandings of, and approaches to, science. The second part is devoted to the fate of  
sociology as staged in Euro-American publications. My analysis is influenced by the work 
of  Shlapentokh, Shiraev and Carroll (2008) who analysed how the perception of  the 
Soviet Union in Euro-American scholarship changed and evolved from the Russian 
Revolution of  1917 until the dissolution of  the USSR. This chapter, however, will only 
focus on sociology and explore how scholars working in the West7 staged the fate and 
                                                 
7 This also includes the work of  Soviet émigrés. 
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attempted to understand the peculiarities of  sociology in a totalitarian state. Finally, I 
consider whether Soviet sociology and sociology in general exhibit characteristics that 
complicate matters for a constructivist take on science. I conclude that examples like 
Soviet sociology show that constructivist science studies in general and actor-network 
theory in particular are ill-equipped to deal with situations where the balance of  force is 
asymmetrical, because there is an implicit assumption that the sciences are strong enough 
to counterbalance political rhetoric and participate in the construction of  common reality 
– something that may be lacking in the case of  sociology. 
 
The Scientific Life of  Dialectical Materialism 
Although “science” is often perceived as an opposite of  “ideology,” in the Soviet case 
the language of  science proved inextricably linked with newspeak. 
 
(Gerovitch 2002: 26) 
According to Loren Graham, dialectical materialism has been both neglected and vilified 
outside the Soviet Union. The reason for this seems obvious. It is a philosophy that, in 
the eyes of  many, stunted scientific development and let (pseudo)scientific theories, such 
as those of  Trofim Lysenko, establish themselves (Pollock 2006). In other words, it was a 
debilitating philosophy of  science that was responsible for the failures of  Soviet science. 
For example, it has been argued that dialectical materialism rapidly devolved from a 
scientific meta-theory (however contentious) to a pernicious ideology that defined 
scientific validity in terms of  practical relevance (Feuer 1949). That is to say, relevance 
was defined in terms of  how a particular piece of  research relates to practical goals, and 
research that failed this test and did not have any immediate practical applications was 
disregarded (and even castigated). Or, as Slava Gerovitch (2002) has argued, dialectical 
materialism functioned as an integral part of  Soviet newspeak, which fused politics, 
ideology and science (Krementsov 1997; Pollock 2006).  
The controversy surrounding Trofim Lysenko is an example of  a scientist appropriating a 
particular philosophy for the purposes of  a kind of  political pragmatism. Lysenko's 
approach resonated with the dominant views on science and the political agendas of  
those at the top of  the bureaucratic apparatus. It succeeded at retarding Soviet genetics, 
which at the time was the forefront of  international research before Lysenko's rise to 
prominence (Graham 1987; 1994: ch. 6). What is more, Lysenko and his supporters did 
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this by opposing themselves to other approaches that were much more conservative in 
their claims and not as concerned with practical applications as was Lysenko. 
Furthermore, as Graham's (1987; 1994) analyses of  the historical developments of  
physiology, psychology, physics and debates pertaining to the question of  nature vs. 
nurture in humans suggest, dialectical materialism did have a profound and often negative 
effect on scientific disputes. However, as Graham himself  argues, the positive effects of  
this philosophy of  science should not be overlooked. That is to say, dialectical 
materialism should not just be accused of  being the cause of  all scientific misadventures 
in the Soviet Union – it should also be credited with the successes of  Soviet science. 
Thus, Graham is arguing for a symmetrical treatment of  dialectical materialism that does 
not regard it as an ideological or philosophical malformation in the corpus of  science - a 
mere ideological appendix with little, if  any, epistemic fecundity.  
The implications of  this are quite intriguing and politically unsettling. Graham is urging 
us to consider the possibility that a politically sanctioned philosophy of  science can be 
epistemically productive. What is more, he has pointed out that it might be mistaken to 
think that a certain level of  political freedom is a prerequisite for a flourishing scientific 
culture (Graham 1998). The reason for this is quite simple – Soviet scientists were leading 
experts in many scientific fields, such as mathematics and theoretical physics (Graham 
1992). However, this alone does not seem like enough to establish the scientific relevance 
and fecundity of  dialectical materialism. 
Now, Graham himself  has pointed out that the history of  Soviet science illustrates the 
need to consider science as a set of  material practices pursued by professional groups 
who were interested in both epistemic and economic rewards (Graham 1998). The work 
of  Slava Gerovitch is interesting in this regard. Gerovitch (2002) has argued that the 
scientific newspeak provided a kind of  ideologically infused linguistic repertoire, which, 
when skilfully deployed, could be used to frame scientific questions and theoretical 
positions in a politically sensitive manner. In other words, Gerovitch seems to be 
suggesting that the theoretical framework afforded by dialectical materialism served as a 
way to keep up appearances. It does not necessarily mean that science suffered. Rather, 
survival in this environment depended on how rhetorically nimble you were with the 
conceptual tools at your disposal.  
This seems congruent with David Holloway's (1974) analysis of  the formative years of  
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Soviet cybernetics. In his paper Holloway suggests that in the early years the struggle 
between the critics of  cybernetics (who saw it as an expression of  bourgeois idealism 
with obtrusive capitalist overtones) and its defenders involved the deployment of  
“techniques of  persuasive argumentation”. These techniques were the tools with which 
the opponents fought over who had the right to pass judgement on scientific innovations. 
However, Holloway differs from Gerovitch in that he seems to be working with at least 
an operational distinction between science and politics. That is to say, Gerovitch's 
newspeak merged scientific, political and philosophical discourses. Holloway, on the other 
hand, seems to be suggesting that, while scientists had to take part in philosophical 
debates (and thus engage in a fair bit of  newspeak), the overall aim was to move the locus 
of  recognition to the scientific community; even though, as Holloway is quick to point 
out, a clear-cut distinction between the inside and the outside of  science is problematic. 
Kuhn speaks of  'the techniques of  persuasive argumentation effective within the quite 
special groups that constitute the community of  scientists'. The arguments about 
cybernetics in the Soviet Union indicate that it may not always be clear who those quite 
special groups are; nor what techniques of  persuasive argumentation are effective within 
them.  
(Holloway 1974: 335-336) 
What both Holloway and Gerovitch have in common is a discursivist attitude towards 
dialectical materialism, whereas Loren Graham is a realist. In other words, Holloway and 
Gerovitch are much more concerned with the public persona of  dialectical materialism. 
They are implicitly agnostic as to its cognitive import. Graham, on the other hand, is 
attempting to persuade us that dialectical materialism also had a positive and productive 
effect upon scientific inquiry in the Soviet Union (Graham 1987). Graham is, therefore, 
trying to dissociate facets of  dialectical materialism which are (or at least have the 
potential to be) of  genuine interest to scientists from their ideological trappings. The 
difference between the approach of  Graham and that of  Holloway and Gerovitch is an 
excellent illustration of  the ambiguity surrounding the impact that external factors play in 
the development of  scientific knowledge – an issue of  great interest to a discipline called 
naukovedenie, which can be regarded as the Soviet variant of  science studies. 
Science as an Object of  Study: Naukovedenie 
As I mentioned above, Soviet philosophy of  science recognised two very important 
aspects of  scientific work: (i) the problematic nature of  perception/cognition and (ii) the 
interrelationship between science, practical goals and needs (Lubrano 1976). Soviet 
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approaches to the history of  science in the period preceding World War II seem to have 
taken these two problems quite seriously. At first glance this only seems natural, as it 
would appear quite reasonable that Marxist scholars would seek to locate scientific 
developments in a socioeconomic context and analyse the attendant implications for our 
understanding of  science and scientific progress. For example, David Joravsky (1955) 
argued that early Soviet approaches to the history of  science were dominated by a kind 
of  vulgar sociology. However, as Alexander Vucinch (1982) has shown, Soviet historians 
of  science were not immune to the internalism/externalism debate alluded to in the 
previous section and were aware of  the attendant complexities (Josephson 1985; Lubrano 
1976).  
The tradition of  reconstructing the development of  Western science in a manner more 
reminiscent of  classical philosophy of  science stretches all the way back to the beginnings 
of  Soviet history of  science (Graham 1994: ch. 7). Early work in historical reconstruction 
was characterised by an emphasis on the argumentative repertoires deployed in scientific 
debates. This was the cause of  significant philosophical problems. For example, Vladimir 
Vernadskii (the first head of  the Commission on the History of  Knowledge8) argued that 
conceptual changes in science often resulted in epistemic discontinuities between the old 
and the new schools of  thought. This contradicted the prevailing interpretations of  
historical change that regarded revolutionary episodes as expressions of  continuity. What 
is more, Vernadskii also stressed the importance of  creative genius, thus pushing the role 
of  the wider sociohistorical context into the background. His, therefore, was an 
internalist history of  science that only paid lip service to external factors. The result of  
such a policy was that Vernadskii and his school were accused of  being idealists (Graham 
1994: ch. 7). 
Nikolai Bukharin9, on the other hand, stressed the socially contingent nature of  science. 
He argued that science should be understood as a social product and therefore could not 
be separated from its context of  emergence. By this he meant the institutional and 
economic arrangements that constitute science in a particular society, as well as the nature 
of  perception itself  (i.e. perception is never pure – it is always mediated). His 
contemporary Boris Hessen went even further. If  Bukharin's views now seem like trite 
                                                 
8 A group in the Academy of  Sciences devoted to the historical analysis of  both the social and natural 
sciences. 
9 An important ideologue and one of  Stalin's main contenders in the wake of  Lenin's death. 
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banalities for anyone coming from a science studies background, Hessen's arguments 
often feel like caricatures, but this belies the forceful impact his views had on those who 
heard his presentation in London in 1931. The main thrust of  his paper was that 
Newton's physics would not have emerged if  not for mercantile capitalism and the new 
technologies this particular economic system required (Graham 1985). Newton's physics, 
according to Hessen, was an expression of  particular historical, economic and class 
(bourgeoisie) needs and interests. Thus, while Bukharin emphasised the interrelationship 
between science and society, Hessen seemingly reduced science to society. However, the 
situation was not as simple as it would appear at first glance.  
The Sociohistorical Contingency of  Naukovedenie  
Boris Hessen's The Social and Economic Roots of  Newton's Principia is a seminal paper in the 
history of  science that highlights the historical contingency of  scientific thought. 
However, as Loren Graham (1985) has tried to show, the paper itself  is the result of  a 
highly specific configuration of  academic pursuits and political circumstances. Prior to 
the conference in London Hessen had gotten himself  into trouble by trying to persuade 
Soviet academics that the ideological content of  quantum mechanics and Einstein's 
special theory of  relativity could be separated from their scientific core. In doing so 
Hessen had attracted a considerable amount of  ideological flak. The situation was so 
grave that the conference in London was regarded as Hessen's last chance to redeem 
himself  in the eyes of  the Soviet academic and political establishments. Consequently, his 
paper on Newton Principia can be seen as a pragmatic move in line with the conventions 
of  Gerovitch's newspeak or Holloway's rendering of  Kuhn's techniques of  persuasive 
argumentation. In other words, Hessen's emphasis on the social and economic factors 
that contributed to the development of  Newton's theory could be seen as ideological 
pandering, regardless of  how fruitful this move turned out to be for future historians of  
science. However, Graham suggests an additional reason why Hessen chose this 
particular line of  argument. 
In view of  Hessen's earlier work, it is possible to read his paper on Newton as a subtle 
move to vindicate his earlier arguments abut the ideological shell and scientific core of  a 
theory (Graham 1985). Newton's theories were undisputed in the Soviet Union. By 
showing that the emergence of  Newton's theories was contingent upon a particular mix 
of  social and economic interests he achieved two goals. Firstly, he redeemed himself  in 
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the eyes of  his critics because his argument stressed the importance of  the economic 
base. Secondly, he used a widely accepted and highly regarded episode from the history 
of  science to make the point that the scientific core could be extracted from its 
ideological shell. The study of  science was, therefore, itself  just as subject to 
sociohistorical contingencies (Graham 1985). 
Debates such as these constituted the emerging field of  naukovedenie that approached 
science as one would any social institution. In the case of  science, however, there was an 
additional pragmatic dimension to this. There was a hope to understand science in a way 
that would allow for the possibility of  planning it according to the principles of  a socialist 
state (Lubrano 1976; Mirsky 1972; Mongili 1998). Science and state were intimately 
intertwined, as is evidenced by various strands of  utopian thought during the first 
decades of  the Soviet Union (Stites 1989) and the prominent role that the engineer 
played in public debates (Graham 1994). Stalin's purges, however, put an end to such 
aspirations, as well as the field of  naukovedenie.  
The field was resurrected in the 1960s – about the same time as two other ideologically 
contentions disciplines (i.e. sociology and cybernetics) that had incurred considerable 
rhetorical flak (Rabkin 1976). Much like its Euro-American counterpart, practitioners 
came from various different fields and attempted to integrate approaches from sociology, 
philosophy, history and other disciplines (Lubrano 1976; Mirsky 1972; Mongili 1998). 
The interdisciplinary character of  naukovedenie hampered the articulation of  a unified 
research programme. Nonetheless, it was publicly positioned as a kind of  science of  
science (Aronova 2011), and put to work in the service of  the state, especially in relation 
to the Scientific-Technical Revolution (Lubrano 1974; Mirsky 1972). The Scientific-
Technical Revolution10 was a term used to refer to recent innovations in science and 
technology, which were believed to presage significant socioeconomic changes (Nystrom 
1974; Aronova 2011). Philosophy and the social sciences (sociology and naukovedenie 
among them) were set the task of  articulating a plan of  action that would allow the 
socialist economy to adjust to these rapid changes without challenging or inordinately 
Westernising the Soviet system. What is more, it was believed that the areas of  science 
and technology were key if  the Soviet Union were to match the success of  its political 
nemesis (Rabkin 1976). As a consequence, STR scholars developed theories that (i) dealt 
                                                 
10 Hereafter – STR 
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with questions pertaining to the relationship between society and technology, and 
technology transfer from the West and (ii) articulated possible ways in which the 
coordination and funding of  scientific activities would yield better results (Aronova 2011; 
Lubrano 1976; Rabkin 1976). In addition, STR theorists, contrary to traditional Marxist 
renderings of  social transformation that postulated class-based social dynamics as the 
main source of  change, argued that recent innovations in science and technology had 
become the most prominent source of  societal transformations (Aronova 2011: 188; 
Lubrano 1976: 43-45). Naukovedenie, therefore, played a role that is not dissimilar to 
science policy studies in the West. What is more, it was often modelled upon advances in 
scholarship and management techniques developed in the West (Rabkin 1976). 
Practitioners of  naukovedenie, however, responded to developments that were specific to 
the Soviet system (i.e. STR), and its political and institutional (i.e. as a field of  academic 
inquiry) legitimacy hinged upon its being regarded as a source of  information, analysis 
and technical advice on managing the course and development of  scientific inquiry. 
The apolitical character of  naukovedenie was crucial. While it was true that naukovedenie 
was political in the sense that there was an implicit (and mandatory) acceptance of, 
commitment to, a Marxist vision of  social development, its practitioners were expected to 
refrain from making politically sensitive remarks about topics which seemingly fell 
outside their immediate areas of  expertise. As the ethnographic work of  Mongili (1998) 
at the Institute for the History of  Science and Technology11 of  the USSR Academy of  Sciences 
illustrates, this created a rift between those who defined themselves in terms of  how 
useful they were to the current political establishment, and others who saw themselves as 
being committed to standards of  academic excellence. However, the perception of  
naukovedenie as apolitical was integral to it being recognised as a valid form of  inquiry. 
Curiously enough, this perception may have had something to do with the disciplinary 
background of  most of  its practitioners, as an overwhelming majority of  them came 
form the natural or mathematical sciences (Rabkin 1976). Social sciences, such as 
sociology, were just beginning to re-establish themselves (see below) and there was very 
little prestige attached to them. The situation was such that, if  the social sciences had had 
a visible presence in naukovedenie, its credibility would have suffered (Rabkin 1976). The 
combination of  these various factors contributed to the specificity of  the Soviet 
                                                 
11 An important academic hub for naukovedenie 
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equivalent to science studies. It may have developed out of  similar concerns and raised 
similar sorts of  questions, but naukovedenie was somewhat different to Euro-American 
science studies.  
Firstly, it was considerably more applied than its Western equivalent. To understand the 
full import of  this point one has to juxtapose the views of  Rabkin (1976) with those of  
Levin (1984) and Mongili (1998). The latter argue that the Soviet equivalent of  science 
studies was a stunted and academically irrelevant field of  inquiry whose achievements 
pale in comparison to those of  scholars in the UK and USA, for example. However, one 
should note that both Levin and Mongili place the locus of  identity squarely in the 
academic environment. But, as Rabkin, Aronova (2011) and Lubrano (1976) show, the 
practitioners of  naukovedenie addressed questions and problems of  both philosophical 
and practical interest to people living in the Soviet Union. Its post-World War II 
incarnation was concerned with, and animated by, the social and economic implications 
of  STR, and sporadically addressed more general questions pertaining to the nature of  
scientific knowledge that captured the interest of  scholars working in the 1920s. Rabkin's 
contention that naukovedenie is better understood as a form of  science policy studies 
(and, consequently, a subfield of  science studies) is telling in this regard, though this 
would exclude the work done at the Institute for the History of  Science and Technology 
and other theoretically driven research (Aronova 2011; Lubrano 1976; Mirsky 1972). 
Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, the contingent of  academics practising naukovedenie 
was populated mostly by people from the natural and exact sciences, and this was also 
true of  the more philosophically inclined practitioners of  naukovedenie (Mongili 1998). 
The reason for this was quite simple – the social sciences had a very limited presence in 
the Soviet Union. 
Soviet Sociology 
In my discussion of  naukovedenie I tried to illustrate the complexities inherent in 
attempting to understand the relationship between the state and scientific knowledge in 
the Soviet Union. Dialectical materialism may have been an ideologically sanctioned 
philosophy of  science, but this, as Loren Graham suggested, does not invalidate it or 
discredit the scientific breakthroughs it facilitated. Similarly, naukovedenie, while 
envisioned as a study of  science with potential future applications, had to strike a balance 
between attempts to optimise scientific research, and theories of  science and forms of  
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organisation that were congruent with the political climate. Soviet sociology, however, 
fares worse in Euro-American commentary.  
According to Alex Simirenko (1967), speculation of  a sociological nature was reasonably 
developed in 19th century Russia. However, during the first decades of  the Soviet period 
the academic liberties of  this discipline were radically curtailed. The reason for this seems 
to have been that it was not clear how regime-friendly this discipline was or could 
possibly be (Shalin 1990). Nonetheless, some empirical and even theoretical work in the 
social sciences was done in the 1920s, though this was primarily devoted to ascertaining 
the theoretical import of  historical materialism (Lane 1970; Weinberg 1974).  
Historical materialism is an approach to the study of  history and society that regards (i) 
human labour and (ii) the production of  the basic means of  subsistence as the kernel of  
human society. The way human labour is organised determines the principles by which 
members of  a society are divided into classes (relations of  production). Much like 
dialectical materialism, historical materialism emphasises the importance of  change both 
in nature and society. In the case of  society contradictions are resolved by transitioning to 
a new way of  organising labour and productive forces; though views differ on the 
mechanics of  this process (e.g. is it teleological or subject to social, economic and 
historical contingencies?). A corollary of  this approach is the belief  that the mode of  
production (relations of  production in conjunction with the means of  production and 
the human labour operating them – what Karl Marx called the forces of  production) 
shapes the superstructure (the culture, belief  systems and modes of  social organisation 
prevalent in a society). Or, to put it another way, being determines consciousness. Hence, 
a capitalist ideology is more likely to represent the relations of  production existing under 
capitalism in a positive light and protect the interests of  these who benefit most from this 
particular arrangement. 
Thus, early forms of  Soviet sociology were preoccupied with elucidating the relationship 
between historical materialism and empirical research. The question was whether 
historical materialism was a theory of  social and historical change or a method with 
which change could be studied (Lane 1970; Novikov 1982; Vucinch 1974). Under Stalin 
such discussions were brought to a speedy conclusion and the fate of  sociology was 
decided unequivocally – sociology was a pseudo-science, a vulgar and bourgeois 
discipline that had no place in a progressive socialist state (Hollander 1978; Nahirny 1958; 
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Shalin 1980; 1990; Shlapentokh 1987). Sociology, therefore, did not exist in the Soviet 
Union as an academic discipline until the end of  the 1950s, and even then its disciplinary 
status and relationship to historical materialism was unclear. This is not to say that there 
was no social research, but it was largely done by ethnographers, whose work was seen as 
too esoteric to be of  any political danger, and literary theorists working within the 
Formalist tradition (Greenfield 1988; Gerovitch 2002; Weinberg 1974). As regards social 
theory, it was almost exclusively derived from, or consonant with, historical materialism 
(Shalin 1980; Simirenko 1973). When it did address developments outside the Soviet 
Union it was mostly to criticise the reactionary nature of  bourgeois sociology and its 
attempts to protect and perpetuate the interests of  the capitalist class by hiding behind 
the veil of  value-free inquiry (Kassof  1965; Labedz 1967b; Nahirny 1958; Novikov 1982; 
Simirenko 1967a). The reasons for the re-emergence of  sociology, however, are not so 
clear and illustrate a point of  disagreement in the literature on Soviet sociology. 
Politics, Rhetoric and Academic Interests 
By far the most popular explanation among the different alternatives is the political thaw 
associated with the death of  Stalin and the policies of  Nikita Khruschev.  In other words, 
the re-emergence of  sociology is associated with a loosening of  restrictions and obstacles 
imposed by politically-minded academic censorship. This view is indirectly supported by 
similar developments in the fields of  economics, cybernetics and naukovedenie. 
However, a sudden (though considerable) loosening of  restraints is, at best, a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for the emergence of  an entire academic field. A more 
incisive line of  reasoning, adopted by Beliaev and Butorin (1982), suggests that the 
reasons behind the emergence of  sociology are to be articulated in terms of  practical 
needs and various actors working together – sometimes consciously and sometimes 
unwittingly – to establish sociology as an institutionally recognised form of  academic 
inquiry. The impetus for this was the growing interest in the superstructure and the 
recognition of  the need to study it which became prominent after Stalin's death. The 
explanatory stress should, therefore, be placed on the aspirations of  the Communist 
Party to employ less coercive and repressive forms of  social management, and implement 
policies that are based on evidence gathered in a systematic and sound manner (e.g. 
Kolaja 1978; Hollander 1978). This suggests that the causes behind the re-emergence of  
sociology are rooted in interests that were not strictly speaking intellectual. The rebirth of  
Soviet sociology is instead connected to the need to manage the production process and 
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the population without resorting to violence and coercion. However, there is some 
confusion as to the motivations and involvement of  the Communist Party in this process. 
For example, the preceding argument stresses the importance of  instrumental needs, but 
Beliaev and Butorin (1982) have argued that it is equally plausible that the re-emergence 
of  sociology was a party-directed process, but not necessarily an attempt by the party to 
develop better methods of  management (Beliaev and Butorin 1982: 423). Political 
assistance, to put it somewhat simplistically, was necessary because a number of  factions 
within the academic establishment refused to recognise sociology as an independent 
discipline, as this would displace a purely theoretical historical materialist discourse of  
social change (Novikov 1982). However, it is also true that several members of  the 
Community Party itself  were equally ambivalent about sociology (Shlapentokh 1987; 
Zaslavsky 1977), so obtaining political support was not a straightforward task. 
This state of  affairs is reminiscent of  the work of  David Holloway on Soviet cybernetics 
(Holloway 1974; 1976). In it he argues that a major obstacle to the establishment of  a 
cybernetic research programme in the Soviet Union was a contingent of  philosophically 
minded scholars and bureaucrats whose arsenal consisted mainly of  different strategies 
that highlighted the incompatibilities between cybernetics and dialectical materialism. The 
fate of  sociology was similar. What Beliav and Butorin (1982; Shlapentokh 1987) seem to 
be suggesting is that the birth of  Soviet sociology was not the result of  a recognition of  
the usefulness of  sociology by the political leadership or the loosening of  ideological 
censorship. Instead, the reintroduction of  sociology was facilitated by a loosely structured 
network of  academics and politicians who tried to establish a new form of  inquiry in a 
context where there was suspicion from the political and academic establishments. 
Sociology was not just an ideological problem – it was also a philosophical threat to 
certain groups within academia.12 In other words, the question of  sociology straddled the 
line between rhetorical manoeuvring and genuine argument. This becomes clearer when 
one looks at early attempts to establish it as a discrete academic discipline. 
The Early Forms of  Soviet Sociology 
The Soviet Sociological Association was founded in 1956. At that point, however, sociology 
was not yet an established academic discipline. It had its own association, but it had very 
                                                 
12 This perspective is congruent with an argument put forward by Lubrano (1993). She contends that 
Soviet scientists developed complex informal academic networks access to which largely determined 
whether or not a particular area of  research could be pursued.  
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little else. Firstly, most of  its practitioners came from other disciplines (mostly 
philosophy) and had very little training in, and knowledge of, sociological research 
methods and theory (Gray 1994; Shalin 1978). Secondly, there was little institutional 
support for the recruitment and training of  new sociologists. And thirdly, it had no 
academic journal of  its own, though sociologists could use existing academic outlets to 
publish their work13. Other than a lack of  any discernible institutional foundations, it was 
also destitute in political and academic credibility, since it was still regarded as the 
illegitimate and politically subversive offspring of  philosophy (Weinberg 1974; Beliaev 
and Butorin 1982). Shlapentokh (1987: 18), for example, argues that during the 1950s 
sociologists often had to associate themselves with economists to avoid arousing 
suspicion. 
The solution to these problems was not straightforward, but a prominent strategy was to 
link up with the objectives and practical needs of  the Communist Party and prove that 
sociologists could provide valuable assistance to those in charge (Simirenko 1967a; Shalin 
1978). During the first two decades of  Soviet sociology this was especially true in relation 
to work and productivity (Weinberg 1974), which lead George Fischer (1964; 1967b) to 
argue that Soviet sociology was primarily a sociology of  work. In practice this meant that 
Soviet sociology was characterised by a practical orientation and was seen primarily as a 
tool for social transformation in line with pre-defined goals and interests. In addition to 
aligning itself  with these interests, sociology also engaged in what has been referred to as 
“creative debunking” (Simirenko 1967a; Vucinch 1982). That is, a significant portion of  
theoretical work in Soviet sociology was devoted to criticising Western (bourgeois) 
sociology. The nature of  these criticisms varied. Some were, at best, expressions of  
ridicule and irony, while others were more conventional academic discussions (Kassof  
1965), and, according to Labedz (1967b), the overall tone became much less abusive than 
under Stalin. The main criticism was that Western sociology was either implicitly or 
explicitly protecting the class interests of  the bourgeoisie. However, similarly harsh 
remarks were levelled against its atomistic (societies as aggregates of  individuals) and 
idealistic (over-emphasising the role of  ideas) tendencies, as well as its internal 
heterogeneity, which was contrasted with the holistic and homogeneous nature of  Soviet 
sociology (Fischer 1964; 1967a). An interesting case of  such a criticism is presented by 
                                                 
13 Some of  the work was made available to English-speaking audiences through Soviet Sociology and Soviet 
Review (now Russian Social Science Review). 
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Alexander Vucinch (1974) in his article on Parsons' functionalism.  
The attitude towards structural-functionalism in Soviet sociology was ambivalent. On the 
one hand, it was criticised for being a theory devoted to protecting the status quo 
(whereas Soviet sociology was concerned with the dynamics of  change). On the other 
hand, it resonated with the emerging fascination with cybernetics (Gerovitch 2002 and 
Holloway 1974; 1976) as an approach to rationally managing different kinds of  systems 
(including social and economic ones). In the post-Stalin period the idea that it was 
possible to centrally manage a socioeconomic system as vast and complicated as the 
Soviet Union came under attack from economists; even though not all of  them favoured 
a cybernetic approach. Economists offered numerous alternative scenarios which would 
increase efficiency at the cost of  decreasing centralisation (Bernstein 1964; Knox Lovell 
1968; Spechler 1970; Sutela 1991 and Zauberman 1963). Parsons' emphasis on functional 
relations tied in rather nicely with cybernetics and the analysis of  the dynamics of  system 
maintenance. The problem was that for Parsons' theory to become acceptable it would 
have to be integrated with a satisfactory theory of  historical change (i.e. historical 
materialism). Unlike cybernetics (which was problematic from the perspective of  
dialectical materialism because information was neither matter nor energy), Parsons' 
theory failed to clear its philosophical hurdle. 
However, even though Soviet sociology emphasised homogeneity, it was itself  internally 
divided. Much like during the pre-Stalin period, an important problem was the role of  the 
materialisms (both dialectical and historical). This, however, went beyond the problem of  
theory-ladenness, and the significance of  empirical research itself  was problematised and 
came under scrutiny (Greenfeld 1988; Novikov 1982; Shalin 1978). It was argued that 
sociology should operate at a higher level of  generality and abstraction, and that it should 
first and foremost be a theoretical discipline. Consequently, during its first two decades 
sociology in the Soviet Union can be divided into at least three camps. First, we have a 
group of  Soviet philosophers who were opposed to an independent empirical sociology. 
Historical materialism was the explanatory theory par excellence when it came to social 
change (Katz 1971; Novikov 1982; Shalin 1978), and an empirical science with dubious 
social origins could not hope to dislodge it. As I mentioned earlier, many people who 
regarded themselves sociologists came from other disciplines. This group was in favour 
of  a philosophically inclined sociology that would study general laws of  social systems in 
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line with the basic tenets of  historical materialism and opposed the idea of  an 
independent academic discipline (Beliaev and Butorin 1982; Novikov 1982; Zaslavsky 
1977). A second group of  researchers did not yet see sociology as an independent 
discipline, so they regarded sociological research as part of  general social research. This, I 
believe, is why Katz's (1971) enthusiastic description of  the ubiquitousness of  
sociological research in the Soviet Union is somewhat inaccurate, as much of  what he 
describes as sociology is mostly low-level data gathering (Shalin 1978; Horowitz 1978). 
Finally, there was a group of  researchers who wanted to pursue a scientific sociology, 
which, while still working within the framework provided by Marxism, would study 
regularities specific to Soviet society and seek to refine theoretical principles directly 
useful to empirical research (Shalin 1978; Shlapentokh 1987). 
Sociology and Politics 
As I have already hinted above, opinions and emphases differed on the involvement of  
the Party and its ability and interest to facilitate the institutionalisation of  sociology in a 
hostile academic environment, but there was a general recognition that the 
institutionalisation of  sociology required both political and academic support. However, 
there is a widespread belief  that sociologists were not allowed to remain politically 
neutral, and commentary on the partisan orientation of  Soviet sociology is characterised 
by widely shared concerns as to the effect this had on the integrity of  the discipline and 
its output. A number of  authors have emphasised that the Soviet Union had no 
equivalent to Western Sociology (e.g. Greenfield 1988: 1991; Labedz 1967a). That is to 
say, even though a discipline that went under the name sociology gradually emerged in 
the Soviet Union, it was a profoundly different kind of  activity. For example, it has been 
argued that most sociological research explicitly or implicitly tested, or (more often) 
worked within the parameters set by, Marxism (Simirenko 1967b; 1973; Horowitz 1978). 
In practice this meant that social realities in the Soviet Union had to be interpreted in 
light of  Marxist theories of  social change and economic development. This often 
resulted in an imperative to reinterpret discrepancies present in the data in such a way as 
to render them compatible with the belief  that the Soviet Union was moving towards 
communism. Another common strategy was to treat truth in a normative and future-
oriented manner. That is to say, the line between what is and what could be (for example, 
the potential of  socialism to produce social equality and deploy technology for the 
benefit of  all) was obliterated, with the discourse of  what could in principle be the case 
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under socialism displacing the description of  the current state of  affairs. The future and 
the potential inherent in socialism became reality (Marcuse 1967; Nystrom 1974). This, of  
course, was not always the case, and more moderate assessments are also available.  
Some authors point to the recognition on the part of  the authorities that the Soviet 
Union had problems that were either specific to the Soviet Union or resembled 
difficulties familiar to governments in the West. For example, the attitude of  young 
people towards work was considered problematic, as it contradicted the belief  that the 
Soviet Union was the home of  a new kind of  person (Katz 1971: Weinberg 1974; 
Zaslavsky 1977). A more prominent alternative, however, was to treat social problems 
(e.g. crime, alcoholism, class differences) as vestiges of  capitalism or the result of  
Western propaganda (Weinberg 1992; Katz 1971; Kubat 1961). In view of  the above, 
many authors contend that, in spite of  the official claim that empirical research would 
correct the inadequacies of  Marxist social theory, this was seldom the case. Empirical 
research was consigned to the role of  confirming, rather than verifying, elements of  the 
dominant social theory (Brym 1990). In case of  blatant discrepancies the quality of  the 
data was questioned, rather than the adequacy of  the theory (Shalin 1978).  
Now, this may seem like an over-exaggeration. It is true that only in the conference of  
the Academy of  Social Sciences in 1967 was it admitted that the Soviet Union had significant 
social problems that needed to be dealt with. However, as Katz (1971) shows, many 
politically inconvenient studies were published unscathed. In other words, it would be a 
mistake to assume that politically contentious sociological research was systematically 
ignored, explained away or eradicated. Sociology did, indeed, manage to establish itself  as 
a worthy and instrumentally useful form of  academic inquiry, which is exemplified by the 
establishment of  a sociological research institute in 1968 and a journal in 1974. This, 
however, brings us to a further problem – even though the usefulness of  sociology was 
recognised, its institutions and publications were periodically subject to politically 
motivated purges (Beliaev and Butorin 1982; Novikov 1982; Shalin 1978; Shlapentokh 
1987; Zaslavsky 1977). A number of  critics of  early Soviet sociology pointed out that, 
while the official position with regard to sociology was that it was a kind of  fact gathering 
for policy purposes, the political pressure on this process was overbearing. Thus, while 
the impetus for fact-gathering may have been practical, the empirical aspect of  it was 
questionable, for, as I mentioned above, discrepancies were explained away with relative 
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ease. The central theme of  the criticisms made by Western scholars was that, in the case 
of  Soviet sociology, science and politics were fused together (Hollander 1967; Fischer 
1964; 1967a). Yes, the state wanted a better understanding of  the dynamics of  social 
processes to be able to deal with practical problems. However, sociology was (i) treated 
simply as a sophisticated tool for social management (ii) constrained both by institutional 
(the interests of  the Communist Party) and conceptual (Marxism) limits.  
As I mentioned above, the ideological control and censorship imposed upon sociology 
was not total, and some politically inconvenient research was allowed to circulate. This 
point introduces some complexity into the accounts of  Soviet sociology because it 
implies a measure of  independence. What is more, even from the perspective of  Western 
scholars, sociology had a liberating effect (however slight) on Soviet society. For example, 
some authors have argued that public opinion research, while plagued by methodological 
issues (e.g. White 1964), had positive political effects. The sociologist steadily emerged as 
a representative of  public opinion, and, given the role that sociologists gradually acquired 
in policy circles, research on public opinion allowed for the possibility of  public 
participation in policy-making (Mickiewicz 1972; Weinberg 1974; 1992). Granted, the 
questionnaires dealt with politically innocuous topics, but research on public opinion 
created a channel between the public and policy makers.  
One way to make sense of  such equivocation is to look at the publications 
chronologically. Papers and books published in the sixties recognised and discussed the 
consequences of  constraints placed upon sociological research, but also manifested a 
measure of  optimism about the future of  sociology (e.g. Lane 1970). This is expressed 
most clearly by Alex Simirenko. 
An important open question is what kind of  science Soviet sociology will be. Will it be 
primarily an administrative arm for fact-gathering and planning? Or will it also be 
capable of  turning itself  into a theoretical discipline satisfying intellectual curiosity? 
None of  the answers to these questions can be given with any certainty at this time. 
However, on the basis of  the contributions by Soviet sociologists in the new discipline's 
short period of  revival, the future of  Soviet sociology looks very promising. 
Simirenko (1969: 42) 
Soviet sociology had made enormous strides towards becoming an established academic 
discipline in a short period of  time, so Simirenko's cautious optimism must have seemed 
well founded. Furthermore, there was also a line of  argument that outsiders tended to 
overestimate the extent to which Euro-American sociology is different from Soviet 
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sociology (e.g. Brodersen 1967; Dunn 1979a; Gouldner 1970; Kassof  1965)14. 
Commentary published in the 1970s, however, manifested a gradual dissipation of  
optimism about the future of  Soviet sociology and a return to a bleak take on the 
relationship between sociology and the political regime. For example, the Soviet émigré 
Vladimir Shlapentokh published a history of  sociology in the Soivet Union in which he 
described institutional purges and politics that affected sociology in the 1970s 
(Shlapentokh 1987). Much like Beliaev and Butorin (1982), Shlapentokh suggests that 
sociology was given relative freedom only during liberal periods in Soviet history. Most of  
the time, however, both sociologists and their work were vigilantly monitored and 
interfered with (e.g. censored, publicly criticised) if  that became necessary. 
In response to such developments in the Soviet Union, commentators were implicitly and 
explicitly arguing against political intervention in, and censorship of, scientific inquiry. 
For example, Hollander (1967) argued that sociology simply could not function properly 
in a totalitarian state without damaging its scientific integrity and claimed that political 
freedom was a prerequisite for a scientifically robust form of  sociology. This brings us 
back to the point raised by Loren Graham. Remember that for him the Soviet scientific 
establishment illustrated the possibility that political freedom was not a necessary 
condition for a thriving scientific culture (Graham 1998). However, as I mentioned in the 
introduction, Graham pays little, if  any, attention to the fate of  the social sciences in the 
Soviet Union. This would explain why he does not address the pervasive pessimism 
regarding Soviet sociology. 
Greenfield (1988; 1991) is an excellent illustration of  the discomfort that outsiders felt. In 
her writings she explicitly opposed an instrumental form of  sociology, whose primary 
occupation was generating research useful for policy purposes, to a sociology whose 
ultimate aim is an understanding and description of  social reality. Furthermore, while the 
Soviet emphasis on applied research was deemed problematic, it was complemented by 
concerns as to the effect that a necessary connection to Marxism had on the autonomy 
of  sociology and its status as a self-regulating form of  scientific inquiry. This, however, 
was not regarded as a problem in the Soviet Union – officially at least. For example, the 
official position of  the journal Sociological Research was that sociology was inextricably 
                                                 
14 I will return to this point later in the chapter, but the underlying assumption was that there was nothing 
inherently different or unique about the Soviet interpretation of  sociology as a research branch of  
public administration. 
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intertwined with Marxism-Leninism in its search for solutions to problems faced by the 
government (Greenfield 1988). What is more, the credibility and value of  sociology was 
based on its partisan nature – sociologists had to be committed to building communism 
and provide an interpretation of  facts from the perspective of  the class whose interests 
coincided with the inexorable trajectory of  historical development. Consequently, the fact 
that Sociological Research aligned itself  with the needs of  the Party and defined objectivity in 
terms of  partyness (i.e. a partiality towards the interests of  the party) is understandable. 
Nonetheless, this point did not met with acceptance among émigrés working in Europe 
and the US (Novikov 1982; Shalin 1978; 1979; 1980; Shlapentokh 1987; Zaslavsky 1977) 
and Euro-American commentators (Brym 1990; Greenfeld 1988; 1991; Hollander 1978; 
Horowitz 1978; Simirenko 1967; 1973). The objections, while varied, focused on the role 
of  data in relation Marxist social theory and the monopoly that the former enjoyed in 
Soviet sociology. 
The nature of  the commentary changed again during the period when Mikhail 
Gorbachev was the General Secretary of  the Communist Party of  the Soviet Union. It 
was noted that sociology became much more prominent in public discourse (Gray 1994; 
Shalin 1990; Weinberg 1992), its flagship journal Sociological Research doubled in circulation 
(Shalin 1990), and a number of  issues specific to the socialist state were discussed 
publicly and were not explained away simply as vestiges of  capitalism. Prominent Soviet 
sociologists became Gorbachev's advisers, and the discipline promoted itself  as a tool of  
perestroika15. This lead the likes of  Shalin (1990) and Weinberg (1992) to argue that the 
work of  sociologists was a significant contributing factor to perestroika; Shalin (1990) 
even argued that the ethos of  ideology so characteristic of  Soviet sociology was finally 
giving way to the ethos of  science.  
Two Theses 
The response to Soviet sociology presents a somewhat ambiguous answer to Loren 
Graham's question. It was argued that the development of  sociology was impeded and 
hampered by the institutional and theoretical restrictions placed upon it by the Soviet 
state and the academic culture of  which it was a part. Sociology emerged as something 
akin to a research branch of  public administration and had a very uneasy relationship 
                                                 
15 A political reform movement in the 1980s whose goal was the restructuring of  the Soviet political and 
economic system.  
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with the dominant philosophical schools. Its development was uneven and plagued by 
political uncertainties. What is quite intriguing, however, is that such a context, allegedly, 
spawned a sociology that was confident about its potential and duty to inform public 
policy and shape society. Granted, it did not have much say in the matter, but the end 
result seems slightly baffling. According to the authors I have looked at, this may have 
been because of  a mixture of  the applied nature of  Soviet sociology, the active role of  
party officials in managing the course of  sociological inquiry, and the partisan stance 
inherent in Marxism. Thus, while Soviet sociology employed research methods that were 
quite similar to those of  Western sociology, it was distinct from it. In this case, therefore, 
the political situation and the prevailing philosophical discourse significantly altered the 
nature and aspirations of  a form of  inquiry.  
Soviet sociology presents an interesting challenge to social studies of  science (especially 
its constructivist branches). Both the methods it employed and the philosophical 
repertoires it drew upon (e.g. Marxism) are familiar and intelligible to Euro-American 
audiences, but the fusion of  the disciplinary ethos with political commitments strikes 
scholars as problematic. This ostensibly has to do with traditional expectations of  what 
science ought to be and what values (i.e. cognitive, rather than political) should govern its 
practice. However, as social studies of  science have shown in some detail (see Chapters 1 
and 2), scientific integrity and its imperviousness to external influences (be they corrosive 
or epistemically fruitful) is an inherently problematic and contentious topic if  we 
consider actual examples of  science. A possible reason is that the authors commenting 
on Soviet sociology may not have shared the intuitions and theoretical inclinations of  
science studies scholars. In fact, they may have been working with a highly idealised 
variant of  sociology that is more in line with pre-Kuhnian philosophy of  science. Were 
they justified in doing this? 
We can distinguish between two different ways of  stating the problem. The first is that 
sociology in the Soviet Union was flawed because external interference and the needs of  
the state directed the focus of  sociological research. The problem in this case is the lack 
of  independence (from the Party) and an implicit normative orientation towards 
preserving the status quo, or improving it in line with a highly specific vision of  what 
society should be like and how it should be organised. The state interfered with sociology 
insofar as it was made to work with a set of  assumptions that could not be challenged. 
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Sociology was a partisan and politically complicit form of  technical inquiry, rather than a 
self-regulating and politically neutral discipline whose goal was the study of  social reality. 
In other words, the discipline was carefully regulated. I shall refer to this as the Complicity 
Thesis (its target – administrative sociology). Notice, however, that this thesis locates the 
source of  the problem outside of  sociology. Sociology should be something, but it is not 
allowed to achieve its potential and work as it should because the political situation places 
constraints upon it. 
The second thesis is more complicated. It states that sociology in the Soviet Union was 
flawed because it was set up in such a way as to rule out the possibility of  confuting facts 
(either by way of  omission or creative integration). Its theoretical backbone was 
compromised. This is perfectly compatible with the Complicity Thesis, but introduces an 
element of  alterity. Soviet sociology was not simply repressed. The political context 
spawned a highly peculiar species of  sociology. Power in this case was not repressive, but 
conducive to the emergence of  something new and distinctly Soviet that approached data 
with a highly specific and circumscribed set of  assumptions. What is more, Marxism  
(officially at least) enjoyed a theoretical monopoly.  Let us, therefore, call this the Monistic 
Thesis (its target – monistic sociology). The problem in this scenario is not so much that 
sociology was forced to serve a particular political regime (though it can be this as well), 
but that the theoretical constitution of  the discipline was flawed.  
The claim that these two theses highlight problems specific to Soviet sociology can be 
challenged, however. A theory of  sociology is implicit in both of  them. The Complicity 
Thesis seems to be less demanding, since all that is required to sustain it is that the state 
not dictate what can and should be researched. The Monistic Thesis, on the other hand, 
is more complicated because it suggests foul play that compromised the very core of  
sociology – theoretical eclecticism is a virtue, and the limitations placed upon the range 
of  academic resources that a discipline could draw upon maimed Soviet sociology. The 
problem is that it is not always clear which thesis is at play. The above is a precise 
description of  a fuzzy and complicated problem, but I believe it is a fair approximation. 
Nonetheless, while the emphases may vary, we can surmise that the crux of  the matter 
was the instrumental, partisan and theoretically monistic nature of  sociology (the cause), 
which had a negative effect upon its integrity and credibility among non-Soviet scholars 
(the effect). What is more, while some reservations were expressed, the implication was that 
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this was unlike Euro-American sociology.  This is not simply a matter of  intrusion or 
external interference, but depends on the relationship that sociology and its practitioners 
build with publics that are the target audience for their work or the source of  their 
funding. The complicated relationship of  the sociological profession and the state makes 
sociology especially vulnerable to external interference, as the autonomy of  sociology 
depends in part on institutions who may seek to curtail it (Halliday 1992: 15). For 
Halliday the precarious status of  sociology derives from the ambivalence that 
governments have towards it. The middle part of  the 20th century saw a number of  states 
using sociological expertise for their purposes and sociology obliging the demands of  its 
main benefactor – the state (Fridjonsdottir 1991; Halliday and Janowitz 1992: Halsey 
2004; King 2007). This, of  course, does not prove that sociological expertise was 
tampered with or co-opted in an intentional way. As Bulmer (1992) argues, matters are 
seldom so simple as to substantiate the claim that the providers of  funding automatically 
determine the focus of  sociological research and the political loyalties of  its practitioners 
(Smelser 1992). The above does, however, have interesting implications for a discussion 
of  the Complicity Thesis.  
The history of  sociology as a discipline and social data in general appears to suggest that 
administrative sociology is a prominent theme and a familiar mode of  existence for 
sociology, so it seems quite plausible to argue that the Complicity Thesis does not point 
to anything that is peculiar to Soviet sociology. Indeed, the response of  critical theorists 
to positivist sociology in the West (e.g. Adorno 2002; Adorno et al. 1976; Habermas 
1971) is based on arguments not unlike those levelled against Soviet sociology. 
Furthermore, as I mentioned above there were authors who argued that a number of  the 
criticisms directed at Soviet sociology were somewhat unfair and based on an idealised 
conception of  sociology at home, especially since a prominent issue was the 
embeddeness of  sociology in administrative apparatuses. The main difference was that in 
the Soviet Union the discipline was represented by a school that, historically speaking, 
had constituted the partisan wing of  Euro-American sociology. For example, in his 
history of  sociology in the United Kingdom Halsey (2004: 122) laments the politicisation 
of  sociology by Marxists and feminists, and similar sentiments have been expressed in 
relation to American sociology (Horowitz 1993; Lipset 1994). 
At this point we can make sense of  the work of  Alvin Gouldner and Robert Friedrichs, 
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both  known for their sociology of  sociology. They were both arguing against the 
conception of  sociology as value-free inquiry. From the perspective of  contemporary 
debates such a move seems innocuous, but this would ignore the fact that a positivist or 
Weberian understanding and presentation of  the sociological self  seems to have been 
integral to sociology's becoming a dependable ally of  the administrative apparatus 
(Smelser 1992). It was precisely because sociology was not a partisan discipline that it 
could be trusted and relied upon. The introduction and re-discovery of  Marxist 
theorising, however, jeopardised such a relationship and, according to some, had a 
destabilising effect vis-à-vis the credibility of  sociology. In the Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, the partisan inclination of  Marxism is what made sociology politically and 
philosophically acceptable.  
The Petrification of  Sociology: Is Complicity the Wrong Target? 
An interesting analysis of  Soviet sociology can be found in the work of  Alvin Gouldner 
(1970). While the vast majority of  his book is concerned with the development of  
sociology in the West (USA in particular), he devotes one chapter to the 
institutionalisation of  sociology in the Soviet Union. Gouldner illustrates similarities 
between the development of  sociology in the USA and the Soviet Union. His diagnosis 
of  the situation is strikingly simple – sociology can only function without interference 
once it has convinced the political establishment that it is either innocuous or implicitly 
supports the current regime (Gouldner 1970: 470).  
Sociology in the UK and USA was an appropriately liberal form of  expertise because it 
was, in principle, value-free and shorn of  partisan inclinations. It was used for the 
purposes of  liberal statecraft, but this was because sociological research was value-
relevant and pertinent to normatively saturated topics. In the Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, Marxist sociology was acceptable precisely because it was a partisan discipline. The 
reasons behind the relationship between sociology and the state may have been different, 
but in both cases sociology reflected the imagined relationship between individuals and 
the state and, in principle, facilitated the implementation of  policy. Sociology was, 
therefore, complicit in both cases – the main difference was the political regime under 
which it lived.  
This, I believe, is why the Monistic Thesis cuts deeper – it addresses transgressions 
against intellectual autonomy and academic freedom. Simply put, the Monistic Thesis 
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claims that Marxism had ossified and become the dominant school. The criticisms of  
Soviet sociology that fell under this heading were based on the assumption that the 
discipline has to be autonomous, tolerate theoretical heterogeneity and introduce 
alternative and conflicting explanations as needed. In this case the problem was not the 
politicisation of  research but academic censorship and conservatism facilitated by the 
state. A weak response to Soviet sociology would seem to be forthcoming. That is to say, 
underlying the criticisms is the notion that sociology has to be autonomous and able to 
be as eclectic and internally divergent as necessary. This, however, is exactly the point 
where the specificities of  constructivism come into play. 
Conceptual Symmetry and Contextual Asymmetry 
The conventional wisdom in constructivist science studies in general and actor-network 
theory in particular is that the relationship between science and society is dynamic. The 
upshot is that the distinction between science proper and contaminant political matter is 
difficult to establish and maintain. We are confronted by a material-semiotic mesh where 
science and society emerge as distinct categories only after the fact; a straightforward 
conception of  autonomy is a dubious notion. The issue with this approach was that it 
was unclear how one could identify cases of  external encroachment upon the integrity of  
a particular discipline and argue against heteronomous constructions, enactments or 
articulations of  the social and material world. To put it simply, it seems to me that 
constructivists have dropped categories such as truth or verisimilitude, but in doing so 
have deprived themselves of  a clear point of  reference against which to contrast 
instances of  scientific misconduct and external interference. Instead, the weight is placed 
on ethical and political considerations, and a sensitivity to the realities that scientific 
constructions enable. On the other hand, one of  the main reasons why actor-network 
theory in particular was attractive was its recognition of  the insufficiency of  a purely 
sociological description of  science and technology. A common move was to supplement 
the symmetrical treatment of  truth and falsity already present in sociological forms of  
constructivism with a recognition of  non-human agency and a greater attentiveness to 
the material dimension of  scientific practices. While social constructivism focused on 
intra-science politics, actor-network theory looked at the social and material dynamics of  
the relationship between science and politics. Approached from this perspective, 
sociology becomes an interesting and tricky case for the latter form of  constructivism 
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because sociology is a relatively weak discipline with an ambiguous relationship to its 
object and a pronounced internal heterogeneity. These aspects of  sociology, however, 
suggest possible reasons why a symmetrical treatment of  various forces and actors (be 
they political or scientific) may be problematic. 
Carving Out a Niche for Science 
In her book Designs on Nature Sheila Jasanoff  (2005) argues that policy cultures vary 
among countries. Even countries that are broadly similar culturally have markedly 
different practices for coping with the influx and determining the quality of  knowledge 
claims. Her work is sensitive to the local specificities of  the institutional apparatus that 
processes knowledge claims, but, I would argue, she simply takes it for granted that the 
differences between the three countries (USA, UK and Germany) she looks at are to be 
found in the way they respond to (scientific) knowledge. In other words, she proceeds on 
the assumption that science is enmeshed in attempts to construct a particular kind of  
national identity (vis-à-vis the policy apparatus) and is shaped by these local specificities. 
She does not consider the possibility that expertise may, in fact, be (made) marginal to the 
debate, and a civic epistemology may go beyond a particular balance between politics and 
science. It is, I would argue, possible to conceive of  a civic epistemology where scientific 
expertise and research are made irrelevant by, or subordinated to, the exigencies of  the 
political situation. By this I do not mean that knowledge is shaped or distorted by 
political interests. Rather, I would like to suggest that expertise is simply circumvented – 
it is not an obligatory point of  passage (Callon 1986). That is to say, the nature of  the 
civic epistemology is such that that epistemic practitioners and their contributions can 
exert influence only sporadically. 
A good illustration of  my point is a case study done by Bent Flyvbjerg (1998) in which he 
shows how a particular urban development plan (The Aalborg Project) was thoroughly 
dependent upon a precarious balance of  power between and within various municipal 
and state authorities, and the local Chamber of  Industry and Commerce, which had a 
long history of  getting its way in Aalborg. What is interesting for my purposes, however, 
is that he shows how a number of  studies were made peripheral to the debate on whether 
or not a particular aspect of  the Aalborg Project should be implemented. Research only 
made an impact when political confrontation was avoided. When the issue under 
discussion was particularly contentious, “naked power” prevailed. In view of  this, 
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Flybjerg suggests that the rationality of  power is more deeply rooted historically than the 
power of  rationality. Consequently, the exercise of  power has traditions which are much 
more developed and intricate than the deployment of  rationality, and he is unequivocal 
about the fact that democratic governments need to be aware of  this.  
Flyvbjerg's invocation of  traditions resonates with the cultural specificity of  civic 
epistemologies. However, as I have argued above, the discussion surrounding civic 
epistemologies is generally restricted to the reception of  knowledge claims and the rituals 
of  justification surrounding them. Jasanoff's take on civic epistemology assumes that 
science is something that has to be and is dealt with by the political establishment. While 
I am sympathetic to the symmetry and co-construction theses championed by 
constructivist science studies, I believe that studies such as the one carried out by 
Flyvbjerg point to a slightly different issue. If  science studies scholars are interested in 
the politics of  knowledge, the likes of  Flyvbjerg argue that there are situations where 
knowledge (in this case scientific) first has to be infused in and be able to counterbalance 
politics. In other words, knowledge does something slightly different in the case of  
Flyvbjerg.  
If  we assume that science is a powerful agent that allows for various different enactments 
and models of  social organisation, we are right to be suspicious of  those individuals or 
institutions who obfuscate and refuse to acknowledge that the technical solutions they 
propose have attendant social consequences. We are justified in politicising knowledge 
and highlighting the social and political costs of  practising science in a certain way. 
However, in cases where a scientific discipline is destitute in political potency and 
institutional credibility, its ability to participate in, and have an impact on, a confrontation 
is severely limited.  In short, the first version approaches science from the assumption 
that knowledge operates in a context where it has agency and actively competes with 
other considerations. The production and application of  knowledge is relatively 
unconstrained, and the issue that concerns us is which of  the available alternatives to 
pursue so as to build the kind of  society we want to live in. The other option is a 
situation where science is still in a subordinate and institutionally precarious position. 
In the latter scenario epistemic practitioners are more like science studies renderings of  
Robert Boyle (Latour 1993b; Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Instead of  simply challenging 
the practices that constitute good science, the experimentalists challenged existing power 
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configurations and the way disagreement was managed (see Chapter 1). The 
experimentalists introduced a fundamentally different form of  politics – a politics where 
matters of  fact bear on our values and political aspirations (Latour 1993b; 2004a; Pels 
1996; 2003). However, even though Bruno Latour criticised the Strong Programme for 
granting reality and causal powers to the social while downplaying the importance of  
non-humans and material artefacts, he made a number of  assumptions as to the 
relationship between knowledge and power that are contentious in the case of  sociology. 
Revisiting Latourian Symmetry 
Dick Pels has argued that Latour's brand of  constructivism operates on an assumption of  
generalised symmetry and co-production where different groups constantly compete with 
one another (Pels 1996: 2003). One of  Pels' main claims is that constructivist science 
studies are sometimes not clear as to whether their call for symmetry is to be understood 
in a descriptive or normative sense. In other words, is symmetry a move in the knowledge 
game or is it instead a description of  how knowledge claims evolve and assert 
themselves? Or maybe both? Even if  it is the latter, the problem is that symmetry at a 
conceptual level may be ill-suited to analyse a situation where the mobilising capacities of  
individual actors are asymmetrical. In such situations a symmetrical approach will provide 
a partial and distorted picture of  the process because the principle of  symmetry will be 
tasked to deal with a configuration where there is, in point of  fact, a glaring asymmetry. 
An example would be a scholarly dispute in which one player (or tradition) has become 
dominant and marginalised all the others (Pels 2003: 134). Furthermore, Steve Fuller has 
suggested that this flaw is characteristic of  constructivism as a whole. 
Constructivists tend to be insensitive to pre-existent ("structural" or "historical") power 
relations between the parties to an exchange that may overdetermine the outcome of  
the ensuing negotiations, as in British imperial encounters with African natives in the 
1930s and '40s.  
(Fuller 2006b: 39) 
Soviet sociology seems to fit this pattern rather well. As I argued above, Marxism's 
becoming the dominant school within Soviet sociology was the result of  competition and 
negotiation between adversaries with disparate levels of  support abilities to mobilise 
people and arguments. However, Marxism did not emerge victorious after long and 
complicated disputes between proponents of  divergent theoretical positions. It was, to be 
sure, the result of  cooperation between government bureaucrats and a number of  
scholars, but the negotiations concerned the details and extent to which sociology would 
85 
be allowed to develop – there was never any real alternative to Marxism. It would 
certainly be unfair to prejudge the situation, but it would be equally unwise to ignore the 
asymmetry between sociologists and the theoretical position supported by the Soviet 
administrative apparatus and its allies. Sociologists were not well-organised, lacked a clear 
identity and could not resist heteronomous interests. However, it is not clear that 
constructivists would assent to the claim that Soviet sociology was compromised in some 
way, and this is is precisely my point. I would suggest that this stems in part from 
background assumptions that posit a symmetrical relationship between sociology and the 
ambient political situation. Latour's rendering of  the Hobbes-Boyle dispute provides a 
good illustration of  this. 
Revisiting the Two Realms 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Bruno Latour has suggested that attempts to disentangle 
science (and nature) and politics (and society) are characteristic of  a Modern malady that 
overlooks the ubiquitousness of  hybrids that mesh the former and the latter. 
Hobbes's State is impotent without science and technology, but Hobbes speaks only of  
the representation of  naked citizens; Boyle's science is impotent without a precise 
delimitation of  the religious, political and scientific spheres, and that is why he makes 
such an effort to counteract Hobbes's monism. 
(Latour 1993b: 27-28) 
In other words, politics and science are not distinct, clearly separated spheres of  action 
but exist in a perpetual state of  hybridity and co-constitute each other. However, Latour's 
take on the Hobbes-Boyle dispute betrays an implicit belief  that the diffuse and 
heterogeneous activities of  scientists are potent enough to engage with, resist and correct 
the alliance-building and ideological machinations that are characteristic of  the world of  
politics.  
At first this appears innocuous – an attempt to point out the deficiencies of  an approach 
that tries to explain science and nature in terms of  interests and alliances between 
humans (see Chapter 1). The problem with Latour's rendering of  the dispute is that, 
while it offers to highlight the complexity of  the conflict, it is inextricably tied to forms 
of  science that are more closely related to the natural sciences. This, I would argue, goes 
some way towards explaining why Latour believes that the objects of  scientific 
investigation are presumed to be tractable to, and articulated in, semiotic constructions, 
but essentially irreducible to them (e.g. Latour 1999: ch. 3 and ch. 4). More importantly, 
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however, the ability to affect to course of  scientific disputes is distributed among 
different agents (humans/non-humans and politicians/scientists), and the resolution is 
figured as the result of  an open-ended struggle between different alliances. This, I 
believe, is where the argument betrays an equation of  science with the natural sciences 
and relies upon the authority and prestige the latter presently command. 
While the bulk of  the analysis of  Shapin and Schaffer's book explores the various 
intersecting debates, disputes and alliances in the 17th century, their interest for doing so is 
animated by concerns that are unequivocally contemporary. The examination of  the 
exchange between Hobbes and Boyle is so potent at animating scholarly interest largely 
because it explores the relationship between knowledge and power whose contemporary 
relevance is (i) transposed onto people arguing in the 17th century (Pels 1996; 2003) and 
(ii) predicated upon a resolution that, in the eyes of  the general academic community at 
least, gave a special place to science. In other words, what makes this book interesting is 
that Robert Boyle is whom we now identify as the philosopher of  science and Thomas 
Hobbes is regarded as the political philosopher. Constructivists may hold that in actual 
practice we have forms of  knowledge that deal with hybrid questions that mesh political 
concerns with technical solutions, but the rhetorical potency of  scientific arguments and 
technical proposals is predicated on the distinction between science and politics, and a 
rejection of  hybridity.  
In other words, social constructivist accounts of  science are largely correct, but science's 
high epistemic status in contemporary society depends on the principled rejection of  
such accounts. 
(Fuller 2006b: 17) 
Indeed, Bruno Latour would probably concur. 
The two branches of  government that Boyle and Hobbes develop, each on his own side, 
possess authority only if  they are dearly separated. 
(Latour 1993b: 27) 
Politics is distinct from science, and science is distinct from politics. However, not all 
forms of  scientific knowledge are framed in this way. It is important to note an important 
aspect of  the allegory that Shapin, Schaffer and Latour draw upon to discuss the 
relationship between power and knowledge – namely, The Royal Society was given a royal 
charter once it was agreed that it would not 'experiment in metaphysical, religious, and 
political matters' (Fuller 1993: 78). In other words, the story told by Shapin, Schaffer and 
Latour omits an important detail – the agreement between the Scientists and the 
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Politicians did not extend to what would now be called the human sciences. What is 
more, this development has not been kind to the social sciences, which  
have often been treated as a joke, a more or less expensive way of  discovering the 
obvious; or as an impenetrable thicket of  jargon; or as congenitally indecisive (“on 
the one hand, on the other”). Many have imagined that, apart perhaps from 
economics, they are not serious: that, if  they are not a joke or a set of  neologisms, 
then they are the last redoubt of  an outmoded radical politics. 
(Law and Urry 2005: 391) 
In the case of  the social sciences the possibility of  making the distinction between 
knowledge and politics has been routinely questioned (e.g. Friedrichs 1970; Gouldner 
1970). 
Conclusions 
The response to Soviet sociology suggests that it followed a pattern unlike the one Loren 
Graham identified in the case of  the natural sciences and mathematics, and it presents an 
interesting challenge to social studies of  science (especially its constructivist branches). 
The methods and philosophical sources it drew upon are familiar and intelligible to Euro-
American audiences, but the fusion of  the disciplinary ethos with political commitments 
strikes scholars as problematic. I would argue that this was because the fate of  Soviet 
sociology upsets traditional expectations of  what science ought to be and what values 
should govern its practice. Crafting a response to Soviet sociology from the perspective 
of  constructivist science studies, however, is more complicated.  
Constructivism provides a powerful arsenal of  analytical tools for describing the 
processes through which scientific claims become institutionalised, but it has difficulty 
dealing with (and identifying) asymmetries between different forces and identifying 
transgressions against the logic of  a particular discipline. Soviet sociology is an excellent 
example of  this. True to its Marxist heritage, it was partisan in inclination and explicit 
about its political ideals and aspirations, but a number of  outside commentators raised 
concerns as to the debilitating effect that this had on sociology and the quality of  the 
knowledge that it could produce. Their objections were not based solely on concerns as 
to whose interests sociologists served (Complicity Thesis) and addressed the epistemic 
integrity of  the sociological enterprise (Monistic Thesis). However, constructivism cannot 
identify with such a diagnosis of  Soviet sociology, because the latter rests on assumptions 
about scientific autonomy that do not sit well with the constructivist theory of  science – 
actor-network theory in particular. One of  the reasons for this tension is that 
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constructivism is based on assumptions that make it ill-equipped to deal with situations 
where the balance of  force is asymmetrical. That is to say, constructivism can analyse 
configurations where there are obvious discrepancies between the resources, mobilising 
capabilities and agential capacities of  individual agents, but there is an implicit 
assumption that the sciences are strong enough to counterbalance political rhetoric and 
participate in the construction of  common reality. What kind of  theory of  sociology 
could justify the objections I looked at in this chapter? Most importantly, can such a 
theory be compatible with the insights provided by constructivist science studies? I 
believe that the work of  Pierre Bourdieu goes some way towards providing us with the 






4. A Discipline that Makes Trouble (for Itself) 
 
In Chapter 3 I argued that constructivist discussions of  symmetry were insufficiently 
attuned to the specificity of  the human sciences. As I suggested in the Introduction, this 
is not an isolated problem and illustrates a more general issue pertaining to the 
relationship between science studies and disciplines like sociology. In particular, it 
concerns the fact that the “science” in science studies is usually one of  the canonical 
scientific disciplines (e.g. physics) or has the potential to produce technological artefacts 
that alter the sociomaterial landscape (e.g. vaccines, cars, television sets). In response to 
this, some doubts have been raised whether, for example, the distinction between Mode 1 
knowledge and Mode 2 knowledge16 can be applied to sociology (Wittrock 2003). Bjorn 
Wittrock, for example, argues that this distinction does not apply itself  easily to the 
institutional trajectory of  sociology. In other words, there is something about sociology 
as a discipline that does not conform to the narrative put forward by science studies. I 
believe that the previous chapter illustrated this quite well. My point was to show that the 
peculiarity of  Soviet sociology derived from its intellectual and institutional fragility, 
rather than the fact that it served the political regime and focused on applied research. 
What is more, this was figured as a problem. However, such a diagnosis did not sit well 
with a constructivist understanding of  science, because the latter implicitly assumed that 
the authority that science possesses can offset attempts to mangle it. 
The work of  Pierre Bourdieu becomes relevant at this point. It combines a constructivist 
theory of  science with a thorough discussion of  the specificity of  sociology and 
addresses the attendant relationship between power and intellectual autonomy. Bourdieu's 
diagnosis is particularly interesting in view of  the fact that his approach runs counter to 
the sentiments expressed by actor-network theory in general and Bruno Latour in 
particular (Fuller 2000b: 16).  
In this chapter I will outline Bourdieu's theory of  sociology and highlight a number of  its 
advantages and flaws. In view of  the fact that my target is the theory of  science provided 
                                                 
16 Mode 2 refers to the way scientific knowledge has been produced in recent times. The key 
characteristic of  this mode is that teams of  researchers are brought together for short periods of  time 
(e.g. the duration of  a project) and are generally interdisciplinary in composition. This is contrasted 
with so-called Mode 1 knowledge production that focuses on fundamental, rather than applied, 
research and is generally organised around discrete disciplines (Gibbons et al. 1994). 
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by Bruno Latour, I will proceed by using the chapter “Science's Blood Flow” from 
Pandora's Hope (Latour 1999) as a point of  reference. I will then move on to discuss 
Bourdieu's theory of  science in general and sociology in particular. This chapter argues 
that Bourdieu's brand of  constructivism highlights a number of  issues specific to the 
science of  sociology, but constructivist science studies glosses over certain integral 
aspects of  sociological practice and self-perception which may be damaging vis-à-vis the 
latter's quest for institutional and social recognition.  
The Four Loops 
In his book Pandora's Hope Latour provides a kind of  framework against which to 
understand science studies attempts to explain science. He eschews the dichotomy that 
opposes internal and external factors, and suggests that science studies would be better 
off  giving up on the idea of  a conceptual core. Scholars should instead approach science 
as a set of  interconnected loops, and, while Latour's discussion would suggest that all the 
elements have to work together, his diagram (Latour 1999: 100) illustrates that one can 
analytically disaggregate the dimensions or loops. 
The first loop is the mobilisation of  the world, which refers to 'all the means by which 
non-humans are progressively loaded into discourse' (Latour 1999: 99). Now, Latour 
immediately qualifies this by saying that each science does this differently, and it appears 
that the social sciences have to make do with surveys, whereas other disciplines can rely 
on all sorts or instruments and equipment (e.g. microscopes). A prime example of  what 
Latour's approach implies is illustrated by the work of  Alain Desrosieres, who, in 
exploring questions pertaining to the use of  statistics by states, analyses the creation of  
social taxonomies and subsequent deployment of  statistical categories for the purposes 
of  administrative record-keeping (1991; 1998). In general, mobilisation refers to the 
methods that scientists use to practice science and gather information about the world. 
However, Latour is quick to point out that mobilisation also pertains to the objects that 
the scientist seeks to articulate in her work. Again, he makes a passing reference to 
society and economy as potential objects for the social sciences (Latour 1999: 99).  
This leads us to the second dimension – autonomy, whereby a discipline 'becomes 
independent and forms its own criteria of  evaluation and relevance' (Latour 1999: 102). 
This, I believe, illustrates a problem I raised in the closing argument of  the previous 
chapter. I argued that the brand of  constructivism exemplified by Latour seemed to be 
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better suited to understanding the vicissitudes of  the natural sciences largely because of  
their institutional strength and the ability of  natural scientists to hold their own against 
other agents without resorting to the use of  force. Granted, this is an achievement, and 
the relative independence of  the natural sciences should be construed as the effect of  
autonomisation, rather than its cause. That is to say, the natural sciences have successfully 
carved out a space of  action in which the opinions of  fellow scientists are valued over 
and above those of  outsiders (activists, politicians or entrepreneurs), but there was 
nothing inevitable about this. What is more, this state of  affairs is, in general, believed to 
be desirable – hence the suspicions directed towards science studies scholars who 
consistently illustrate how such claims to autonomy are both historically and situationally 
variable. The ability of  sociologists to impose their own criteria of  evaluation and 
relevance is a more contentious issue. Indeed, the prominent examples of  social science 
among science studies scholars seem to be those with a pronounced mathematical 
dimension (e.g. Callon 2009; Law 2009; MacKenzie 2006). As Theodore Porter's (1996) 
work has suggested, this may have to do with that trust that numbers inspire; or, if  it is, 
in fact, based on a trust in the social sciences, it has more to do with the characteristics 
they share with natural science (Smelser 1992). Furthermore, claims to autonomy are 
problematic for the social sciences exactly because of  the third loop in Latour's account – 
alliance-building, or the attraction of  interest from heterogeneous actors. 
As Latour is quick to point out, 
[t]he alliances do not pervert the pure flow of  scientific information but are what makes 
this blood flow much faster and with a much higher pulse rate. 
(Latour 1999: 104) 
With the exception of  political science, Latour's examples come from the natural 
sciences. While this may have been a decision motivated by rhetorical expediency, I 
believe that the issue runs deeper. As I showed in Chapters 3, the close association of  
sociology and the state was a source of  great concern and a topic of  great interest for 
sociologists and academics commenting upon the history of  sociology. The issue was not 
just externally defined research questions, but the effect that an alliance with the state had 
on the integrity of  the sociological enterprise. Furthermore, the case of  Soviet sociology 
in particular illustrated a further complication.  
Latour seems to be suggesting that autonomy and alliance-building are both important 
components of  science. My discussion of  Soviet sociology also indicated that alliances 
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had to be forged in order to make possible a situation where sociologists could practice 
their craft in the way they saw fit. Disciplinary autonomy had to be earned by convincing 
philosophers that sociology was a legitimate alternative (or supplement) to historical 
materialism, and co-operation with the political establishment was equally important. 
However, the autonomy of  sociology, such as it was, could be curtailed with impunity if  
sociologists could not maintain a co-operative relationship with other actors (be they 
other academics, politicians or bureaucrats). The independence of  sociology was 
precarious and restricted at moments when the allegiance of  sociologists was in question. 
As I tried to show in Chapter 4, it was not so much the alliance-building that was peculiar 
to the Soviet version of  sociology but the impact this had on the autonomy of  
intellectual work. This illustrated my problem with actor-network theory – it is 
insufficiently sensitive to structural conditions that over-determine the outcome of  a 
debate or confrontation between a scientific discipline and the environment in which it is 
embedded. Furthermore, Latour's instrumental take on knowledge seems ill at ease with 
the idea that something can work and yet still be counter to what a discipline should be 
(see Chapter 2). The criticisms directed against Soviet sociology, however, work with, and 
elaborate upon, the assumption that Soviet sociology was, in many ways, mangled. Can 
Bourdieu's theory of  science provide us with the tools to address these issues? This is a 
question I turn to next. 
The Sociologist and Her Object 
Pierre Bourdieu's sociology is widely renowned for its orientation towards, and an 
emphasis upon, the practical dimensions of  social life as mediated by embodied 
dispositions. This is exemplified by his frequent use of  habitus (Bourdieu 1984) - a 
concept that supplements discursive notions of  socialisation with the internalisation of  
social structures and norms at the somatic level. Not coincidentally, a number of  his 
criticisms against contemporary sociology are rooted in his belief  that sociologists have a 
tenuous and inadequate appreciation of  the practical and intuitive dimensions of  social 
life which have been ignored in favour of  the discursive and intellectual aspects 
(Bourdieu 1990a; 1990b; 1993).  
This malady is characteristic of  all intellectuals (including sociologists). Bourdieu's 
diagnosis is that intellectuals have simply generalised their relation to, and experience of, 
the world. What is more, they are unaware of  the conditions that structure and make 
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possible their perceptions of  the world. They have forgotten 
the collective history that has produced our categories of  thought, and the individual 
history through which they have been inculcated in us. 
(Bourdieu 2000: 9) 
While intellectuals are capable of  articulating the principles that structure the perceptions 
of  their subjects, they appear to be oblivious to the fact that they possess a habitus which 
constitutes, and is constituted by, a particular position in, and experience of, the broader 
social field. This has serious implications for the accounts of  the social world that social 
scientists produce because they tend to project their own relationship to the world onto 
their subjects.  
Projecting his [sic] theoretical thinking into the heads of  acting agents, the researcher 
presents the world as he thinks it (that is, as an object of  contemplation, a 
representation, a spectacle) as if  it were the world as it presents itself  to those who do 
not have the leisure (or the desire) to withdraw from it in order to think it. 
(Bourdieu 2000: 51) 
This prevents researchers from gaining a clear and accurate understanding of  the actual 
mechanisms at play, which are seldom governed by conscious reflection on whether an 
action or utterance is appropriate in a particular setting. Furthermore, this blinds 
researchers to the constitutive role that their training plays in studying social reality. 
Constructing the Object 
Much like Latour, Pierre Bourdieu sees the object of  sociological research as a 
construction (Bourdieu 2000; 2004; Bourdieu et al. 1991) and believes that the object of  
scientific inquiry does not present itself  to the untrained eye – it is shaped by the tools 
available to the scientist. What is more, she can only identify the object once she has 
become accustomed to the rules that regulate the scientific game and the categories of  
perception that her tradition licenses. However, unlike Thomas Kuhn, Pierre Bourdieu 
does not believe that scientific culture is characterised by consensus and puzzle-solving. 
Instead, he treats scientific games as struggles in which a number of  different actors and 
perspectives compete over how a particular phenomenon will be represented. 
[W]hat clashes in the field are competing social constructions, representations (with all 
that this word implies of  theatrical presentation, 'staging'), but realistic representations, 
which claim to be grounded in a 'reality' endowed with all the means of  imposing its 
verdict through the arsenal of  methods, instruments and experimental techniques 
collectively accumulated and implemented.  
(Bourdieu 2000: 113) 
Sociologists are involved in this struggle in a number of  different ways. Firstly, there is 
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the linguistic dimension. Bourdieu sees language as an important part of  constituting the 
object of  sociological inquiry and social reality more generally. However, Bourdieu also 
believes that the complexity and alien nature of  sociological language is key to sociology 
being able to claims parts of  reality for itself. This move reveals a colonising tendency in 
Bourdieu's sociology. It flies in the face of  the belief  that the proliferation of  scientific 
disciplines reflects our growing awareness of  reality's complexity. Instead, it offers a 
picture of  science as a breeding ground for competitive groups who claim parts of  reality 
for themselves by struggling with other contenders (Fuller 2006b: 48; Whitley 2001). To 
use Latour's terminology, Bourdieu discusses the relationship between the mobilisation 
of  the world and the autonomisation of  the discipline in tandem. This view, of  course, is 
hardly surprising to a practitioner of  science studies. What makes it special is that 
Bourdieu has integrated what has traditionally been an outsider's perspective into his 
theory of  sociology. By redescribing an object, sociology claims it for itself  and frees it 
from common and simplistic ways of  seeing it – sociology imposes its own description 
upon the object. This makes it sound like a purely political gesture. However, while the 
process may be political (and remarkably similar to early actor-network theory), the 
reasons for doing so reveal a concern for scientific adequacy.  
The Importance of  Distance 
The sociologist qua member of  society is already familiar with the object of  sociological 
research. This is a source of  great concern for Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu et al. 1991: 13). 
There is a danger that the sociologist will resort to a spontaneous sociology that comes 
naturally as a result of  her proximity to the object. That is to say, the spontaneous 
sociologist will simply reproduce common social categories and distinctions in her own 
discourse – there will be no difference between proper sociology and pandering folk 
sociology. Consequently, familiarity with their object (albeit in a sprawling and 
unconstituted form) is more of  a problem than advantage to the social sciences. 
Sociological language, and the interpretive grid that it provides, alters the relationship that 
a sociologist has to her object. The subjects of  sociological research, on the other hand, 
filter reality through markedly different categories of  perception, which suggests that 
there is a clear distinction between sociologists and the people they study. Moreover, 
sociologists should be aware of  this distinction (see above) and bear in mind that what 
they are engaged in is, in fact, a constructive process that is aided by research methods 
and intricate theoretical structures, and conditioned by their position in social space. This 
95 
brings us to the second point. 
Much like Max Weber, Bourdieu is keen to show that the objects of  sociology are 
scholarly constructions. Weber used ideal-types, but he urged his readers to always bear in 
mind that ideal-types are abstractions that are distinct from real objects (Weber 1949). 
They serve as points of  reference against which to calibrate accounts of  actual 
phenomena. In a similar vein, Bourdieu recognises the importance of  interpretive grids 
and the ways they focus our attention. The experience this allows us is not a direct one. 
The scholarly gaze is mediated by theoretical constructions. Sociologists internalise 
constellations of  concepts and theoretical insights, but they should at all times be aware 
of  this process and remain vigilant so as not to fall into dogmatism (Bourdieu et al. 1991: 
Bourdieu 2000). What Bourdieu is arguing for is, in fact, reflexivity – a practice and 
principle that is quite prevalent in contemporary sociology. However, Bourdieu's brand 
of  reflexivity is not particularly concerned with sociologists qua individuals (unlike 
Gouldner 1970). The object of  reflexivity is the entire conceptual apparatus of  the 
discipline (Wacquant 1992: 40).  This has implications for the quality of  scholarly work. 
By endeavouring to intensify awareness of  the limits that thought owes to its social 
conditions of  production and to destroy the illusion of  the absence of  limits or of  
freedom from all determinations which leaves thought defenceless against these 
determinations, it aims to offer the possibility of  a real freedom with respect to the 
determinations that it reveals. 
(Bourdieu 2000: 121) 
In the case of  Bourdieu, however, this argument has implications that extend beyond the 
academic realm – the purpose of  good sociology extends beyond self-reflection and 
bears directly on what Latour called alliance-building. 
Vexing Administrators 
The social and political conditions that allow for the possibility of  sociological knowledge 
point towards a tension that is quite revealing of  Pierre Bourdieu's views. Let us go back 
to Emile Durkheim. He tried to establish sociology as (i) an independent academic 
discipline with its own subject matter and (ii) a politically engaged profession. Max 
Weber, on the other hand, believed that sociologists should internalise the fact-value 
dichotomy and tread carefully on politically sensitive topics (Weber 1949). The hope was 
that such a compromise would persuade politicians to grant and respect the autonomy of  
sociological discourse. Pierre Bourdieu appears to be following a similar line of  reasoning 
when discussing the institutionalisation of  sociology, but there is a pragmatic twist to his 
96 
take on Weber's compromise. 
[F]rom the very beginning, sociology has been an ambiguous, dual, masked science; one 
that had to conceal and renounce its own nature as a political science in order to gain 
acceptance as an academic science. 
(Bourdieu 1993: 27-28) 
Now, depending on how you read Weber, the need to separate science and politics was (i) 
a compromise necessitated by the institutionalisation of  scientific inquiry or (ii) the result 
of  accepting that knowledge of  the world prescribes no definite way of  being and acting 
in it. Bourdieu's approach seems closer to the former. In other words, the commitment to 
value-neutrality was a necessary concession. Sociology had to renounce its political 
inclinations to establish itself. It had to conceal its true identity as a discipline whose 
subject matter is highly sensitive and controversial. Unlike other scientific disciplines, 
such as physics of  chemistry, the stuff  of  sociological research bears directly on our 
everyday experiences and mundane practices. However, this does not automatically 
suggest that there is something inherently subversive about sociology. Max Weber, the 
champion of  value-neutral sociology, recognised that research in the cultural and social 
sciences was politically pertinent, but there was a sense in which its pertinence was 
unclear. That is to say, the findings of  a sociologist tell us something about the trends, 
beliefs or practices she has investigated, but it is not clear that this knowledge has 
straightforward and definite normative implications without a political context and will to 
act upon this knowledge. In fact, Bourdieu's reasoning seems closer to Emile Durkheim. 
A significant difference between Durkheim and Weber was that the former was quite 
comfortable with the idea that descriptive knowledge can bear directly on normative 
reflections (Durkheim 2010; Turner 1993). More precisely, it could actually have definite 
prescriptive implications. While this is more implicit in Bourdieu's case, he seems to be 
working with similar assumptions (Pels 2003: 116). However, unlike Durkheim, Bourdieu 
does not seem to be comfortable with integrating sociological knowledge with 
administrative projects (Swartz 2003). So, while he is fine with a dynamic relationship 
between sociological knowledge and forms of  normative reasoning, he does not see 
sociology as an instrument that could or would allow government bureaucrats to be more 
effective at managing society.  
Why the reticence? Well, according to Bourdieu, there is something inherently subversive 
and problematic about sociology. It is a discipline that makes trouble and reveals things 
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that have thus far been hidden from view. In fact, Bourdieu even went so far as to say 
that the scientific success of  sociology can be measured in terms of  how much it vexes 
the powers that be. 
[T]he likelihood that sociology will disappoint or vex the powers that be rises to the 
extent that it successfully fulfils its strictly scientific function. 
(Bourdieu 1993: 14) 
Sociology, therefore, is a strange and subversive discipline whose default relationship with 
the administrative apparatus is ambivalent. However, it is important to note that Bourdieu 
did not believe that there was an inevitability to sociology being subversive.  This is where 
a comparison with Critical Theory (Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in particular) 
is instructive. 
Theodor Adorno chastised traditional sociology and its positivist leanings. He believed 
that positivism made sociology susceptible to being integrated into a technocratic 
apparatus whose main goal was the perpetuation of  the established order (Adorno et al 
1976; Adorno 2002; Benzer 2011). In the previous paragraph I argued that Pierre 
Bourdieu shared Adorno's suspicion towards administrative sociology. The reasons for 
this are slightly different, however. Adorno's objections stem from his commitment to a 
specific relationship between knowledge and its object. Administrative sociology is 
undesirable because it (i) is insufficiently attuned to the complexities of  its object, (ii) 
conceals its knowledge-constitutive interests by appealing to disinterestedness and (iii) 
does not aim at emancipation. It is conservative and induces social and epistemic stasis – 
a common criticism running through the work of  critical theorists. This is not a problem 
that is particular to sociology and can be identified in most forms of  traditional scientific 
inquiry (Horkheimer 1982).  
For Bourdieu, on the other hand, the problem has to do with the nature of  sociology as a 
discipline, rather than science in general. The knowledge you can produce about the 
social world depends on your relation to the social world; if  your needs and position are 
purely administrative, the knowledge you produce will reflect this. 
[T]heir interests are bound up with silence because they have no bones to pick with the 
world they dominate, which consequently appears to them as self-evident, a world that 
goes without saying. In other words, I repeat, the type of  social science that one can do 
depends on the relationship one has to the social world, and therefore on the position 
one occupies within that world. 
(Bourdieu 1993: 13) 
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In this Pierre Bourdieu is quite similar to Jurgen Habermas who argued that different 
sciences embody different knowledge-constitutive interests, which means that they are 
constituted in such a way as to be useful for specific purposes (Habermas 1971). 
Bourdieu's approach, however, allows for more diffuse knowledge-constitutive interests 
determined by the position of  individuals or groups within social space. Sociology 
certainly has a mode of  existence as a research branch of  public administration, so there 
is little problem identifying forms of  European sociology to which the Complicity Thesis 
would apply equally well. The issue for Bourdieu is that sociology practised in this way is 
somehow flawed. It is not true to what sociology should be like. The people who engage 
in this type of  sociology legitimise the established order by providing politicians with 
research and the authority of  independent expertise (Bourdieu 1993: 2000). True 
sociology, however, should strive to unveil hidden aspects of  social experience, make 
visible the necessity that conditions the lives of  individuals, and analyse the struggles that 
are rooted in the very fabric of  social life (Bourdieu 1990a; 1993; 2008). The ultimate aim 
of  this exercise is freedom through recognition of  necessity and a subsequent 
intervention in the mechanisms that reproduce necessity (Bourdieu 1993; 2008). In other 
words, sociology should attempt to alter the existing situation, rather than caress or 
perpetuate it. 
Thus far there is no glaring discrepancy between Bourdieu and Critical Theory. Both see 
knowledge as implicated in social struggles and both argue that sociology has a critical 
function to play in these confrontations. Consequently, Bourdieu's response to 
administrative sociology could be pretty much the same as Critical Theory. However, 
Bourdieu's emphasis on struggles reveals aspects of  his sociology that make it different 
and closer in spirit to constructivism. 
Revisiting the Politics of  Reality 
A significant reason why it is paramount to maintain constant epistemic vigilance is that, 
while sociology is involved in struggles over descriptions of  the social world and its 
intricacies, the products of  sociological labour can start to work against it once they are  
deployed in social struggles by other actors (Bourdieu 1990a). As I mentioned before, 
sociological constructions mingle and clash with previously established constructions – 
much like in the natural sciences (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Law 2004). These may be 
constructions established by previous generations of  sociologists, but they can just as 
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easily be folk constructions or constructions perpetuated by the administrative apparatus. 
This is done both consciously (i.e. interest-driven) and unconsciously (i.e. insufficient care 
to produce adequate sociological instruments). A good example of  the latter is 
methodologically suspect polling (Bourdieu 1993: 149-157).  
Pierre Bourdieu's dislike for polling is not based on a suspicion of  quantitative data or the 
method as such. The issues he raises are remarkably similar to some of  the arguments I 
discussed in Chapter 2. I am referring specifically to the arguments regarding the 
performative nature of  method. Now, a simple recapitulation of  the argument is that 
methods work with implicit notions about what their object is like, and the results they 
generate produce particular enactments of  said object. Bourdieu makes similar 
observations about the nature of  polling. This method claims to investigate people's 
opinions about specific topics, but the people who design the questionnaires often 
presume that their respondents share their social philosophy (e.g. not everyone will agree 
that something is a social problem) and ignore a number of  factors (mostly pertaining to 
education, class and gender) that determine whether an individual will feel comfortable to 
voice her opinion in the first place. The compound effect is that polling often provides a 
distorted picture of  social reality whose authors are ignorant of  their own ignorance.  
The significance of  the last point relates back to the nature of  sociology. It is a discipline 
whose work is commented upon by, and bears directly upon the lives of, non-sociologists. 
However, non-sociologists relate to sociological knowledge in a different way. For 
example, they may treat statistical regularities and the results of  opinion polls in a 
fatalistic manner, since they will usually be ignorant of  the assumptions at play in the 
design of  a particular piece of  research and insufficiently sensitive to the historical 
conditions and social mechanisms that reproduce the tendencies that are being 
articulated. As a result, the sociologist will sometimes be castigated for promoting 
fatalism and the preservation of  the status quo. A more problematic alternative is that 
such regularities are treated in a normative fashion by politicians and bureaucrats. That is 
to say, they are treated as inevitable or desirable, in which case mechanisms are altered to 
reinforce the existing tendencies (Bourdieu criticises economics for this [see Bourdieu 
2008]; Theodor Adorno raised this point against positivist sociology in general), and the 
potential for change is foreclosed. In view of  this, sociologists have to be mindful of  the 
consequences their pronouncements may have and cultivate a sensitivity to the repertoire 
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of  extant constructions that circulate in society. However, there may be a potential 
problem lurking in the background.  
The Autonomy of  Science 
Bourdieu believes that the social field and the way it is represented is characterised by 
constant struggles between various groups who want to assert their right to define what 
is actually the case. All these groups are trying to promote and legitimise their particular 
brand of  social philosophy and discredit competing versions. 
One of  the key reasons why sociology has so much difficulty in acquiring its autonomy 
is that those who peddle common sense always have their chance in the field according 
to a principle familiar to economists: bad money chases away good. 
(Bourdieu 1992: 184) 
If  this is indeed the case, what makes sociologists special? Why are they deserving of  our 
time and attention? Well, you may recall that Bourdieu seemed to be working with a clear 
distinction between the observer and the observed. This suggests that sociologists have a 
special status. But what exactly are the reasons why we should privilege their opinion over 
that of  non-sociologists? 
In both his theoretical and empirical work Bourdieu often emphasises the role of  
struggles.  Different groups compete for various social, economic and political goods and 
status positions. Sociology is not exempt or immune from this. However, the peculiar 
thing about sociology is that it studies social struggles and is itself  a participant in these 
struggles. One dimension is sociologists' struggles with existing disciplinary formations, 
such as philosophy and anthropology (in the French context), for its right to exist as an 
independent academic discipline. The second dimension is the struggle for the right to 
define social processes and discredit alternatives. Various groups have proposed different 
versions as to what the social is like, and these are challenged by sociology.  
This conflict over the rights to representation applies equally well to the question of  
science. As I mentioned before, sociology is a participant in social struggles, because it 
has to prove itself  as a science, and Bourdieu sometimes does this by defining it in 
opposition to philosophy. What is more, when Bourdieu tries to explain his reasoning as 
to why sociology is a science, his arguments seem curiously dated and ill at ease within 
the context of  contemporary science studies. 
You have to produce coherent explanatory systems of  variables, propositions assembled 
into parsimonious models that account for a large number of  empirically observable 
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facts and which can be opposed only by other, more powerful models which have to 
obey the same conditions of  logical coherence,  systematicity, and empirical falsifiability. 
I am struck, when I speak with my friends who are chemists, physicians, or 
neurobiologists, by the similarities between their practice and that of  the sociologist. 
(Bourdieu 1992: 185) 
 
There are coherent systems of  hypotheses, concepts and methods of  verification, 
everything that is normally associated with the idea of  science. And so, why not say it's a 
science, if  it is one?  
(Bourdieu 1993: 9) 
This emphasis on procedures of  verification, systems of  concepts and hypotheses seems 
very dated, especially in relation to his sophisticated theory of  practice and social 
reproduction. He does make a few concessions, though. For example, he does not 
overlook the somewhat awkward problem that sociology is a rather dispersed discipline. 
[T]he fact remains that, for obvious sociological reasons, sociology is a very dispersed 
discipline (in the statistical sense), in several respects. That's why it gives the impression 
of  being a divided discipline, closer to philosophy than to the other sciences. 
(Bourdieu 1993: 8) 
On the whole, though, his definition is inadequate, but I believe it can be improved by 
looking at his theory of  science. 
Bourdieu was adamant that a sociology of  intellectual life is a prerequisite for sociology 
in general. One of  the tasks of  sociology, therefore, is to produce a sociological account 
of  science.  This, again, is a site of  source of  conflict and struggles. Sociological theories 
do not develop in a vacuum and often have to deal with a fair amount of  flak for trying 
to displace entrenched views (e.g. the debate between Bloor [1981] and Laudan [1981]). 
What is more, while trying to provide an account of  the scientific field, sociology is also 
defining its relationship to itself  (Law 2008). In other words, sociology is simultaneously 
a participant in the scientific field and a participant in the struggle in which the nature of  
the scientific field is being contested. The above would suggest that Bourdieu is quite 
comfortable with a sociology of  science and science studies more generally. However, he 
has a rather different take on what sociology reveals about science.  
In his response to science studies literature Bourdieu (1975; 2000; 2004) criticises a 
number of  authors for what he believes to be inadequate accounts of  science. Early 
sociology of  science (e.g. Robert Merton) is criticised for paying insufficient attention to 
struggles within the scientific field. Sociology of  science, Bourdieu argues, focused its 
attention on the norms and reward system that govern scientific discourse, but 
approached science as a kind of  profession. Bourdieu recognises that Merton was writing 
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at a specific point of  history where the image of  science had to be rehabilitated (see 
Introduction), but this does not invalidate Bourdieu's criticism that insufficient attention 
was paid to the settlement and resolution of  scientific disputes and the unquestioned 
acceptance of  a division of  labour that ceded the right to describe good science to 
philosophers. 
Thomas Kuhn is praised for recognising the importance of  discontinuities and epistemic 
breaks, but the emphasis on paradigms is criticised for leading to a very problematic 
theory of  scientific change – one that locates the source of  change inside science. The 
likes of  Bruno Latour are taken to task for focusing on the semiotic aspects of  science 
and dissolving science into politics (see also Chapter 2). Bourdieu is equally dismissive of  
the Strong Programme (both the Edinburgh and Bath variants), who are noted for 
emphasising the plasticity of  data but accused of  a decidedly interactionist approach to 
scientific norms (Collins and Yearley 1992). In place of  these visions of  science Bourdieu 
proposes to consider science as a field of  forces, which is both constituted by, and 
reproduced through the actions of, scientists, laboratories and research centres (Bourdieu 
2004: 69-70).   
Fields of  Forces 
Bourdieu's social universe is populated by what he calls fields. A field can be regarded as a 
kind of  autonomous and competitive social setting in which individuals pursue strategies 
according to the rules of  that particular field (Thomson 2008). Fields impose upon their 
members particular rules of  conduct through which individuals can define their 
relationship to the goals of  the field and their competitors within the field.  Education is 
a field, literature is a field and so is science. The influence that any one individual unit can 
exert on others depends on how much capital (understood broadly) and recognition it 
commands. In the case of  science, recognition would most likely depend upon the 
material resources a scientist commands (e.g. equipment, grant money) and the 
recognition that her work has managed to earn. The distribution of  these various forms 
of  capital determines the structure of  the field and the positions that individual units (e.g. 
scientists, universities) occupy within it.  
Now, thus far there seems to be nothing controversial about Bourdieu's theory of  
science. In fact, it has definite constructivist overtones – the field is the result of  
interactions and collective negotiations between between individual scientists, academic 
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institutions and the resources at their disposal. However, what is missing from this 
picture is the political dimension. The reason for this is quite simple – Bourdieu 
considers science to be an autonomous field (much like art or politics itself).  
A scientific field is a universe in which researchers are autonomous and where, to 
confront one another, they have to drop all non-scientific weapons – beginning with the 
weapons of  academic authority. 
(Bourdieu 1992: 177) 
There is certainly intra-field politics (as regards the distribution of  recognition, for 
example), but this form of  politics follows a logic that is unique to the field. The 
scientific field is both regulated and constituted by norms of  argument and other 
cognitive instruments that the collective of  scientists has agreed upon. 
Like the artistic field, each scientific universe has its specific doxa, a set of  inseparably 
cognitive and evaluative presuppositions whose acceptance is implied in membership 
itself. 
(Bourdieu 2000: 100) 
 
Logic itself, logical necessity, is the social norm of  a particular category of  social 
universes, scientific fields, and it is exerted through the constraints (especially the 
censorships) socially instituted in these universes. 
(Bourdieu 2004: 70) 
The specificity of  the scientific field derives from the fact that norms of  argumentation 
are the social norms that regulate struggles (Bourdieu 2004: 70-73). In other words, while 
the norms that constrain individual moves and strategies within the field are social, they 
are social in the sense that they have become generalised and are collectively maintained 
by the scientific community. Such norms might be recognised forms of  inference, data 
interpretation (and collection) and techniques of  persuasion. They are collective norms 
that are peculiar to the field – peculiar to science, and successful participation in the 
scientific field is contingent upon abiding by them (Bourdieu 2004: 72).  
Such principles are socially sanctioned, but they are irreducible to the will of  any single 
scientist, ambient values, or economic circumstances. In this sense Bourdieu is close in 
spirit to Karl Popper (1976). They both seem to be advocating a shift from discussing 
objectivity as a relation between an individual and an object to treating it as a relationship 
between subjects who are committed to socially defined principles of  conduct and 
argumentation (Bourdieu et al. 1991: 74). Science is a collective endeavour, and the 
acceptance of  scientific facts is contingent upon peer recognition. The conflicts within 
the field can, of  course, be rather nasty, and the players may be motivated by the pursuit 
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of  economic and social rewards and forge alliances against their opponents, but they are 
compelled to do so in a way that respects the norms governing the scientific field. By 
engaging in conflicts (however petty) and intra-field politics, scientists actually further the 
cause of  science as an institution (Bourdieu 2000: 93-94). 
The logic described by Bourdieu seems relatively easy to falsify, but that would miss the 
point of  what he was trying to say. The idea was not to articulate a logic that describes 
everyday routines. If  this were the case, Bourdieu's theory would be easily refuted. 
Bourdieu was instead trying to show that there are constitutive and regulative norms that 
have to be satisfied in order to play the scientific game. Even though they may not always 
be followed in practice, the recognition of  practices as scientific depends on (i) them 
being identified with these norms and (ii) them being seen as following these norms. At 
first this seems quite difficult to square off  with a negative reading of  Soviet sociology. 
The point of  the two theses outlined in Chapter 3 was to illustrate that certain forms of  
reasoning had ossified and achieved universal acceptance. In fact, there seems to be 
something peculiar about simply assuming the autonomy of  logical reasoning and then 
postulating it as the basis of  good science. Surely intricate systems of  thought, such as 
historical materialism, can remain logical, garner collective support and so satisfy 
Bourdieu's criteria. For example, Slava Gerovitch's discussion of  dialectical materialism 
illustrated that it had become a rather autonomous field of  disputes where success was 
contingent upon being a competent user of  the argumentative strategies and literary 
canon of  dialectical materialism. In other words, appealing to a logic of  science does not 
seem to be a straightforward way of  doing away with the problems associated with Soviet 
sociology. However, there is another aspect of  Bourdieu's theory of  science that is useful 
for crafting a response. 
Sociology as a Dominated Science 
Pierre Bourdieu repeatedly stressed that science is an autonomous field. However, he 
explicitly rejected the idea of  science as a bundle of  norms or forms of  argumentation 
against which to measure all other cognitive pursuits. There is no inevitability about 
science succeeding – it requires the right social conditions to be able to function and 
exert its influence; or, as Bourdieu put it, 'there are historical conditions for the 
emergence of  reason' Bourdieu (2000: 70). Intellectual autonomy is a historically 
contingent and fragile construction that requires constant maintenance work. However, 
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Bourdieu's choice of  words can have a few unfortunate connotations. When he talks 
about autonomy, he does not mean that scientists, or intellectuals more generally, are 
socially detached or unaffected. Quite the contrary. They occupy a particular place in 
social space, and each of  them can be individually positioned within the scientific field 
(Bourdieu 2000: 10). What is more, Bourdieu does not believe that intellectual activity is 
indifferent to broader social concerns, nor is he committed to a disjunction between facts 
and values. What he does argue against is the subjection of  science and scientific research 
to economic and political interests. This is especially clear in the case of  sociology.  
Bourdieu believed that sociology is a science that makes trouble (Bourdieu 1993: 8). What 
is more, its success should be measured by how successful it is at disturbing patterns of  
domination. The problem for sociology is that it has trouble achieving its potential. 
Sociology is an academically weak discipline that has to constantly justify its right to exist, 
and define itself  in relation to more institutionally established competitors (e.g. 
philosophy and economics). Such a situation has a structurally destabilising effect vis-à-
vis autonomy. Sociology, unlike physics, has not managed to set up an autonomous 
disciplinary field with norms that distinguish between good and bad sociological conduct 
(Bourdieu 2004: 87). Sociology's precarious position as a participant in both the scientific 
and political fields robs it of  a clear backbone that would allow it to resist external 
demands and challenges from other groups who feel they have an equal right to 
comment upon social matters and explain social processes. This very same lack of  an 
established disciplinary ethos allows some parts of  sociology to be used for 
administrative purposes and generally be subject to heteronomous interests. This, 
according to Bourdieu, is related directly to the lack of  autonomy because 'recognised 
scientific authority protects you from the temptation of  heteronomy' (1992: 183-184; 
Whitley 2001). However, as Bourdieu has argued, this is not proper sociology, and the 
only reason why such sociology can exist is because the field has failed to install robust 
quality controls that would disallow various practices from passing as sociology. In other 
words, sociology can be mangled because researchers can pander to ideological 
imperatives, and the diffuse and poorly regulated structure of  the sociological field can 
do nothing to correct these forms of  behaviour (Bourdieu 2004: 87). The norms and 
ideals that censure dilettantes out of  the more distinguished academic disciplines are not 
operational in the case of  sociology, which is simultaneously involved in social struggles 
over its object and scientific struggles to define itself  as a science. Consequently, you 
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could argue that both theses about Soviet sociology simply reflect academic anxieties 
about a structurally unstable scientific field. Soviet sociology was a weak scientific 
discipline whose credibility was contingent upon its relationship to the Party and official 
academic prescriptions. It was not an autonomous field with internally defined criteria of  
quality. Sociology never broke free from the world of  practical affairs and so could not 
hope for the autonomy Bourdieu deemed necessary for it to function as a structurally 
sound field with sufficiently robust criteria of  entry.  
Bourdieu's focus on internal quality control, however, runs the risk of  reducing the ills of  
sociology to factors that derive from the inherent nature of  sociology. In particular, this 
relates to the standards governing sociological work and its ability to claim parts of  reality 
for itself  and institute collective standards according to which new contributions can be 
evaluated. This is where Latour's sensibilities show their strength by introducing the final 
loop – public representation.  
Sociology as a Self-Undermining Science? 
Public representation refers to the integration of  scientific knowledge (or technology) 
and the human collective. Latour emphasises that, while this aspect may appear to be 
superfluous and trivial, students of  science must be attentive to the important role this 
final loop plays in the circulation of  scientific knowledge and technology. 
Our sensitivity to the public representation of  science must be all the greater because 
information does not simply flow from the three other loops to the fourth, it also makes 
up a lot of  the presuppositions of  scientists themselves about their objects of  study. 
Thus, far from being a marginal appendage of  science, this loop too is part and parcel 
of  the fabric of  facts and cannot be left to educational theorists and students of  media. 
(Latour 1999: 106) 
This, I would argue, is the Achilles' heel of  sociology, and is elaborated upon at some 
length by Steve Fuller. 
Fuller (1991; 2002; Fuller and Collier 2003) has argued that a persistent problem for 
sociology is that it is poorly defined as a disciplinary unit. This is not a recent 
phenomenon and goes back to its inception that saw the simultaneous emergence of  
various schools of  thought. This trend has only become more pronounced since then as 
a result of  the proliferation of  academic traditions within sociology. Bourdieu seemed to 
be equally aware of  this, but Fuller's argument paints a more detailed picture of  why this 
is so. Underlying Fuller's claim that sociology is a loosely structured disciplinary 
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formation (i.e. there is no discipline) is a set of  arguments pertaining to the way the 
sciences write their history. To put it simply, one of  the reasons why the natural sciences 
enjoy the authority and prestige they do is because they have control over how their 
history is told and the role that history is delegated (Fuller 2002: 177). This, of  course, 
goes right back to Thomas Kuhn (1977; 1996), who discussed the importance of  
textbooks – textbooks provide a carefully edited version of  the history of  a particular 
discipline. In the social sciences, however, less of  their history is 'consigned to silence' 
(Fuller and Collier 2003: 94), and history plays a significant role in understanding the 
development of  these disciplines. For example, Wagner (1991) deconstructs the notion 
that the period of  classical sociology was a major turning point and recasts it as a failure; 
a number of  historical accounts discuss the emergence of  sociology in relation to the 
needs and particular sociohistorical configurations of  various nation states (Bannister 
2003; Fridjonsdottir 1991; Gouldner 1970; 1973; Ross 1991; 2003; Wagner 1991; 2001; 
2003a; 2003b). Consequently, the historical narrative produces an image of  sociology as a 
decentralised form of  knowledge that is both in and about the world. Sociological 
knowledge is figured by way of  entanglements with extra-scientific factors, and, while 
textbooks present a streamlined version of  theoretical developments (Best and 
Schweingruber 2003; Lynch and Bogen 1997; Manza, Sauder and Wright 2010), 
overviews and reconsiderations of  classical theory are more explicit about the role of  
context in understanding social theory (e.g. Giddens 1995;  Gouldner 1970; Turner 1999).  
Given the social sciences’ uphill battle to secure epistemic legitimacy, the rhetorical 
seams of  their attempts to represent the world, without appearing to intervene in it, are 
easy to see. 
(Fuller and Collier 2003: 88) 
Science studies has tried to show that this is true of  all forms of  knowledge. All sciences 
are only partially autonomous from the societies that support them, but it is telling that 
this had to be done for the natural sciences and biomedicine, whereas it could simply be 
assumed about sociology. This, I would argue, is partly because sociologists themselves 
do this on a regular basis (Fuller 1991; Jones 1983; Hamilton 2003; Turner 1998), but it is 
possible that such routine exercises in academic integrity may actually run counter to the 
colonising tendencies evident in the work of  Bourdieu and Latour. 
Conclusions 
The work of  Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu illustrates a tension in constructivist 
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attempts to understand sociology from a science studies perspective. In particular, the 
tension concerns the difficulties that sociology encounters whilst trying to establish itself  
as a distinct and autonomous form of  inquiry. For example, even though the notion of  
scientific autonomy is important to Bourdieu, he, much like Latour, contends that it is an 
achievement, rather than a given. Bourdieu differs, however, in that he argues for the 
importance of  having at least some notion as to what constitutes a transgression against 
the logic of  a particular discipline. The way he proceeds to argue for this is both a 
strength and a potential weakness of  his theory. 
Bourdieu's optimism about science and scientists is shared by a number of  scholars I 
have looked at. What differentiates these authors, however, is that their theories of  
science seem to be more open to other considerations. Unlike Bourdieu, the likes of  
Stengers and Latour work with a model of  science that is more responsive to signals and 
interference that Bourdieu would have regarded as external. What is more, this 
responsiveness of  science to different concerns is treated as a bonus, as something that 
should be cultivated. To use Latour's language, alliance-building is encouraged because 
this allows different voices to participate in the construction of  the common world. 
Furthermore, such alliances are a key component of  successful scientific projects. The 
peculiarity of  sociology, however, is that there is a pervasive ambivalence about the 
scientific cost of  building certain kinds of  alliances. This is a blind spot for Latour, but an 
integral component of  Bourdieu's theory of  sociology.  
Bourdieu stresses the importance of  instituting robust criteria of  entry and participation 
in the sociological field. Furthermore, the perceived lack of  such criteria and a clear 
disciplinary identity are believed to be the cause of  sociology's ailments. However, this 
insistence on factors that are internal to the discipline overlooks an aspect of  sociology 
that is rather more telling. While constructivism aims to show the processes and arsenal 
of  methods and techniques for constructing and stabilising social and material realities, it 
also uncovers strategies through which science is purified of  accretions that would shed 
doubt on its claim to represent the world as it is. The peculiarity of  sociology is that it has 
(i) not managed to purify itself  consistently and (ii) on occasion even made a feature of  
its own hybridity by illustrating the ways in which it has both described and participated 
in the realities it posits.  
The claim I wish to explore in the next three chapters is that constructivism, while 
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perceptive as to the issues that hamper sociology, may be overly rigid and gloss over 
certain aspects of  sociological practice, sociologists' self-perception and their 
understanding of  sociological knowledge more generally. Furthermore, in Chapter 8 I will 
argue that these characteristics of  sociology resonate positively with recent developments 
in constructivist methodology. 
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5. Conversations with Latvian Sociologists, Part I: 
Context and Method 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I explored a number of  issues pertaining to the relationship between 
science studies and sociology as a distinctive species of  science, and tried to articulate a 
constructivist take on sociology that took seriously its specificity and place in the 
scientific field. A question that remained open was whether a constructivist treatment of  
sociology was congruent with how sociologists themselves understand and relate to the 
activities they are engaged in. Moreover,  I tried to suggest that the discrepancy was 
intentional and, in fact, a contributing factor to the weakness of  sociology as discipline. 
In order to explore these issues in more detail I now turn to sociology in Latvia. 
Sociology in Latvia has a number of  features that make it an interesting object of  study, 
and the reasons for choosing to study it are both methodological and theoretical in 
nature.   
Firstly, sociology in Latvia is primarily applied in nature (Tisenkopfs 2008a; 2010b), which 
makes it an interesting case for the theoretical framework informing this study. The main 
outlet for sociology in Latvia is commissioned research carried out by both university-
based researchers or privately owned research centres (see below). A small fraction of  the 
research is funded by government grants via the Latvian Council of  Science, and 
sociologists are also involved in various research projects funded by the European Union. 
What is more, undergraduate programmes place an emphasis on providing a new 
generation of  sociologists with the practical skills and methodological competences 
necessary to function as a researcher in the existing arrangement. Sociology, therefore, 
functions primarily as a profession, rather than a form of  disinterested inquiry. 
Consequently, sociology in Latvia is a pertinent example of  how funding and extra-
academic needs, interests and discourses shape and mould the structure and character of  
an entire discipline. Moreover, its emphasis on applied research makes it a good 
foundation for a contrast between the respective theories of  Bruno Latour and Pierre 
Bourdieu and the interplay between autonomy and heteronomy more generally. 
Secondly, while it would not be true to say that sociological knowledge has had no 
bearing on the implementation of  policies (e.g. Muižnieks [2012] refers to a number of  
111 
policies based on sociological research), sociology has had very little impact on policy-
making (Tisenkopfs 2010b; Aivars Tabūns, personal communication). For example, in his 
overview of  the development of  sociology in Latvia since 1966 Tisenkopfs (2010b) 
argues that sociological knowledge has been of  little use to policy makers, because, while 
it has been (and still is) applied in nature, it has not been heavily involved in the design 
and implementation of  practical innovations and solutions; Berdņikovs (2011), Kūle 
(2009) and Tisenkopfs (2011) have also argued that expertise generated by the social 
sciences and humanities is thoroughly undervalued in general.  In view of  my discussion 
in the preceding chapters, I would like to suggest that sociology in Latvia is interesting 
precisely because of  its ambiguous status: (i) it is primarily applied (with little in the way 
of  theoretical and speculative content), (ii) societal challenges that sociology could help 
to resolve are explicitly discussed in a number of  strategic policy documents adopted by 
the government of  Latvia (e.g. The Latvian National Development Plan 2007-2013) and 
(iii) the knowledge sociology can provide is recognised as a valuable resources for civic 
education and social integration (Latvia 2030: 92)17, and yet it is an undervalued form of  
knowledge whose pertinence is routinely questioned or disregarded.  
Thirdly, it is a peculiar example in that the development of  sociology in Latvia has 
followed a trajectory that is unlike that of  most Western states. However, the discipline is 
involved in Western projects (e.g. International Social Survey Programme, the 7th 
Framework Programme) and its practitioners attempt to forge links with Western 
academia. 
Finally, the sociological community in Latvia is relatively small and, therefore, well-suited 
to an in-depth study limited by the time constraints of  a doctoral dissertation. 
In this chapter I will attempt to situate the analysis of  the two subsequent chapters. In the 
first part I provide a general overview of  sociology in Latvia. In the second part I discuss 
my methodology, the difficulties I encountered while interviewing sociologists working in 
Latvia, and the resulting limitations to my analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Sociology in Latvia: Early Days 
According to Aivars Tabūns (1996; 1998; 2002; 2010), Latvia has a fairly substantial 
sociological tradition stretching back to the period prior to World War I. The foundations 
                                                 
17 http://www.varam.gov.lv/lat/pol/ppd/?doc=13857, accessed on 01/03/2015. 
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of  this tradition were based on translations of  original texts and overviews thereof, as 
well as the theoretical syncretism of  practitioners working in other disciplines (i.e. history 
and philosophy). Tabūns argues that the roots of  Latvian sociology can be traced back to 
the nationalism of  the 19th century and the sociological ideas that circulated in 19th 
century Russia (see also Stites 1989; Simirenko 1967a). In order to understand the nature 
of  social (though not necessarily sociological) thought in pre-war Latvia Tabūns singles 
out a book written by Pēteris Birkerts, who studied philosophy and sociology at 
Columbia University. The book he is referring to was published in 1921 and was called 
Zocioloģija. Tabūns argues that the most prominent strands in Latvian inter-war social 
thought are discernible in this book. The first of  these is that of  the early Chicago 
school. The second is the experimental psychology of  Wilhelm Wundt and the social 
psychology of  Gabriel Tarde (Birkerts wrote a number of  books on psychology as well). 
Seen in conjunction, the first two strands show an inclination towards micro-sociology 
with a psychological twist. The third strand consisted of  the protosociological ideas 
implicit in the works of  Russian and Latvian authors, which, as Tabūns emphasises, were 
seldom Marxist in nature. 
The inter-war period, according to Tabūns, was characterised by great theoretical 
diversity. Publications covered topics ranging from national culture (which intensified 
during Kārlis Ulmanis' dictatorship), demography and meta-philosophical commentary 
on the nature of  sociology. The latter is significant in that one of  the more prominent 
books on this topic was written by the distinguished Latvian philosopher Teodors Celms, 
whose work has attracted considerable attention from philosophers in post-1991 Latvia. 
Sociology in Latvia: Latvian SSR 
The Latvian story seems to have followed a trajectory comparable to the one I outlined in 
Chapter 3. Sociology was plagued by similar kinds of  problems and faced comparable 
forms of  censorship. What is more, the emergence of  sociology in Latvia (then Latvian 
SSR) was characterised by equally protracted attempts to define its relationship to, and 
obtain independence from, philosophy. Sociological theorising suffered a serious blow 
after Latvia was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. It was isolated from theoretical 
and methodological developments in Western Europe and the United States, and was 
given only limited access to local traditions and schools of  thought (ethnographic 
research was better off  in this regard, see Gellner 1988; Dunn and Dunn 1979; 
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Greenfield 1988). The institutional emergence of  sociology in Latvia began in 1966 with 
the establishment of  a Cathedra18 of  Applied Sociology in the Department of  Philosophy. 
This coincided with the formation of  similar academic units in the other Baltic states 
(Tabūns 2010; Titma 2002: Vosyliute 2002). These were intended as places where a new 
generation of  sociologists would be trained. The impetus came from the belief  that 
sociology could be a useful tool for social planning. However, this process was hampered 
by the damage incurred by the sociological establishment in the preceding decades; there 
was a distinct lack of  international contacts and cooperation, little access to books and 
very limited proficiency in the use of  sociological methods. Only a select number of  
people had access to sociological books published in the preceding decades, and there 
was no way to obtain them if  you were not part of  the academic establishment. The work 
of  sociologists who had escaped the attention of  Soviet censors (e.g. Max Weber and 
Georg Simmel), however, was available. Additional complications arose due to the 
unclear disciplinary status of  sociology. In 1970 the Department of  Philosophy was 
merged with the Department of  History (Zellis 2010). As a result, sociology and 
philosophy were lumped together in the Cathedra of  Philosophy and Concrete Social 
Research. One of  the issues that came up as part of  various attempts to reorganise and 
rejuvenate (e.g. ageing academic staff) the faculty was the problematic status of  
sociologists (Zellis 2010: 224). The problem had two sides to it.  
Firstly, sociology was an ambiguous academic formation in that it had roots in 
philosophy (i.e. historical materialism), but it had gradually evolved into something 
independent. This independence, however, had not been institutionally acknowledged – 
sociologists did not even have a separate office to work in. The intimate connection 
between sociology and philosophy, and their shared space of  origin, has been 
commented upon by Tisenkopfs (2008a; 2010b). He argues that the intellectual climate in 
the faculty was liberal and fostered critical thinking. Nonetheless, the nascence of  
sociology is directly related to its attempts to sever the umbilical chord with the stem 
discipline. This, he argues, to a certain extent explains why philosophers defended 
sociology, yet also treated it as an ungrateful offspring.  
Secondly, it was unclear where and how graduates would work after finishing their 
studies. This was compounded by the peculiar situation that the importance of  
                                                 
18 An academic department. The cathedra was a unit in the Faculty of  History and Philosophy until 2000. 
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sociological knowledge for the long-term development of  Soviet society was (officially) 
recognised, but sociologists had no clear professional/occupational status or designated 
place of  work (Zellis 2010: 244). That is to say, even though sociology had achieved a 
tentative and somewhat precarious academic (and political) credibility, there was no 
demand or understanding from employers as to what exactly sociologists could offer, 
even though there were attempts to rectify this problem (Zellis 2010: 246). This was 
equally evident in the case of  philosophers, even though they were (officially) important 
figures in the ideological war against the West and charged with playing an edifying role in 
Soviet life (Runce 2010; Zellis 2010). A tentative solution to this issue was the 
(re)establishment of  a separate Cathedra of  Applied Sociology in 1977. Such material 
constraints notwithstanding, sociological work was done. 
The first arguably sociological book was written by Tālivaldis Vilciņš (educated as an 
historian). The topic was professional prestige, and the study was carried out in 1965 with 
the help of  questionnaires. According to the academic Jānis Stradiņš (both a scientist and 
a historian of  science), Vilciņš was politically cautious and could survive in the Soviet 
academic system without actively supporting the political regime (Tisenkopfs 2010a). In 
addition to writing the first sociological book in the Latvian SSR, he also wrote a book 
about science as an object of  scientific study (Vilciņš 1979). The first doctoral 
dissertation in sociology was defended in 1970. The author was Rita Kvelde, and her 
study concerned radio shows and the formation of  public opinion (a prominent topic in 
Soviet sociology, see Chapter 3). What is intriguing about the work of  Rita Kvelde is that 
she carried out her research while working for a radio station that had its own laboratory 
for social research, which supports Elisabeth Ann Weinberg's claim that the media (rather 
than academia) popularised public opinion research in the Soviet Union (Weinberg 1974). 
Kvelde's dissertation is also conveniently positioned on the timeline of  sociology in 
Latvia. The 1960s saw the establishment of  numerous centres and laboratories for social 
research. The same is true of  Lithuania and Estonia (Titma 2002; Vosyliute 2002). The 
1970s, on the other hand, were characterised by the development of  various research 
programmes. However, the emergence of  an institutional network supporting sociology 
did not necessarily mean that research could proceed smoothly.  
Though not mentioned explicitly in the historical overviews provided by Aivars Tabūns, a 
central theme in a number of  interviews with Latvian sociologists (see Tisenkopfs 2010a) 
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and publications dealing with the history of  the Department of  History and Philosophy 
(Keruss et al. 2010) was the lack of  sociological training, especially as regards the 
application of  sociological methods. That is to say, even though there were practitioners 
of  what we would call sociology, they lacked experience in the use of  their methods. This 
echoed issues raised in the articles on the development of  sociology in Estonia and 
Lithuania. People doing sociology were often ignorant of  statistical techniques beyond 
basic descriptive statistics. What is more, they did not have the resources or the 
technology to process the data adequately (Zellis 2010; Runce 2010). Thus, while an 
institutional base was being established, the skills of  the people populating these 
institutions were lagging behind, and the resources and equipment they needed were in 
scarce supply. The causes of  this ignorance are quite easy to identify. Much like 
sociologists in the rest of  the Soviet Union, most Latvian sociologists were not trained as 
sociologists. The vast majority of  people working as sociologists were trained as 
philosophers, economists or historians; philosophers could specialise in sociology, but the 
core of  their training consisted of  philosophy. What training in sociological research 
methods these people did get came from further-education seminars. 
Sociology and Censorship 
Thus far the development of  sociology in Latvia follows a trajectory that is roughly 
similar to the rest of  the Soviet Union. Latvia's story deviates, however, in one very 
important respect. I argued in Chapter 3 that scholars commenting on Soviet sociology 
felt that it was akin to a research division of  public administration with an overly 
pronounced political stance. The picture put forward in the interviews with Latvian 
academics (Keruss et al. 2010; Tisenkopfs 2010a and the interviews conducted by me), 
however, is slightly less bleak. Sociologists invariably acknowledge that ideology did play a 
part in sociological work. There were limits to what you could study, the kind of  
questions you could ask and the kind of  behaviour and pronouncements that were 
acceptable in public. However, when it came to the kind of  sociological work one was 
allowed to do, the ideological constraints were mainly formal and research could proceed 
without significant interference or close supervision. In other words, one had to refer to 
one of  the classics in the Marxist-Leninist canon and add an ideologically pandering 
sentence to appease the censors (Keruss et al. 2010; Tisenkopfs 2010a). This was 
corroborated by a number of  sociologists I interviewed in July 2012. They claimed that 
most students were fully aware of  the unofficial procedures one had to follow in order to 
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avoid antagonising the political establishment. Sociologists could, therefore, retain a kind 
of  intransigent line, which provided intellectual distance between them and the 
ideological apparatus of  the Soviet system. What is more, it implies that academic 
censorship was not as pervasive as Western scholars would have us believe, though one 
should be cautious about dismissing its impact on the content of  sociological literature 
and reports.  
This created a peculiar situation. There were ideological constraints, but in practice this 
only affected the surface of  sociological research. This allowed for the possibility that, 
even though historical materialism and its derivatives were the officially supported 
theories of  society and sociohistorical development, the vast majority of  sociologists 
employed a theoretical and methodological outlook that was more reminiscent of  
traditional positivism (Tabūns 2010: 112; Gray 1994). The reason for this was surprisingly 
simple. The abstract and theoretical nature of  Marxist social theory did not provide 
sociologists with the necessary tools to study social processes empirically. It restricted the 
sociologist to armchair speculation and provided few concrete suggestions for empirical 
research. If  you recall the discussion in Chapter 3, this was partly by design. American 
positivism, however, provided the methodological tools required for empirical work. 
Furthermore, other than Marxism, sociological theory was somewhat neglected; this is a 
trend that is still characteristic of  contemporary Latvian sociology (see below). 
Towards the end of  the 1980s Latvian sociologists finally had access to internationally 
respected statistical software packages and were allowed to regularly attend international 
conferences, and, a few setbacks notwithstanding19, the discipline of  sociology had 
(re)established itself  in Latvia within the space of  20-25 years. 
Sociology in Latvia: Post-1991 
The transition to a capitalist economy precipitated great institutional changes. Loren 
Graham (1998) argues that in the aftermath of  the collapse of  the Soviet Union Russian 
scientists were much worse off  than under Soviet rule. The reason for this was simple – 
the amount of  money devoted to science was significantly decreased. Consequently, 
Russian science fell behind; research centres simply did not have enough money to pay 
their employees and buy new equipment. This resulted in a brain-drain from academic 
                                                 
19 The Faculty of  History and Philosophy, where sociology was based, was temporarily closed in 1983, 
because the loyalty of  the students and academic staff  was put into question. 
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institutions – scientists emigrated or went to work for commercial organisations.  
The situation is not much different in the case of  Latvian sociology. A number of  
research centres and academic units were closed following the collapse of  the Soviet 
Union. Funding rapidly transitioned to a grant system. Before this, funding was allocated 
to research institutions, rather than specific projects on a case-by-case basis (Tabūns 
2010: 112-113).  This move was not kind to sociology. For example, in 1997 the Latvian 
Council of  Science funded 19 sociological projects with a grand total of  94 852 lats 
(Tabūns 1998; 2010). Judging by more recent reports (e.g. 2011) on the social sciences 
and humanities (Latvian Council of  Science), the situation seems to have improved 
somewhat, and more money is made available, though this may have something to do 
with the hybrid nature of  some of  the projects (i.e. sociologists working with historians 
and media studies scholars). A prominent example of  this phenomenon is the state 
research programme National Identity, which is a 3-year project with a total budget of  just 
over 5.1 million euros. Sociology is one among many other social science and humanities 
disciplines (e.g. philology, history) carrying out research as part of  this project. On the 
other hand, the last two reports where sociology is listed as a discipline20 show that 
funding for sociological projects is down to 45736 lats (2009)21 and 42636 lats (2010)22. 
What is more, the number of  projects is also lower (9 and 3 respectively). This has to be 
put into perspective, however, as most of  the money supporting research activities in 
Latvia comes from the European Social Fund23, the European Regional Development 
Fund, or as part of  7th Framework Programme, rather than the state budget. These 
projects are a chance for researchers to obtain funding for their research, foster 
international contacts and introduce novel theoretical insights and methodological 
approaches into Latvian sociology. A prominent example of  this are projects in rural 
sociology and regional development (see Šūmane 2010). 
The situation is complicated somewhat by the fact that many of  the projects are 
interdisciplinary and involve sociologists working with, or assisting members of, other 
disciplines. Thus, even though there is a sociological component to a number of  research 
projects, it is difficult to gauge exactly how much money is devoted to sociological work. 
                                                 
20 Since 2011 sociology has been included under the heading “social sciences”, which also includes 
economics, anthropology and law. 
21 http://www.lzp.gov.lv/lemumi/L09_1-1-2_piel.htm, accessed on 19/05/2014. 
22 http://www.lzp.gov.lv/images/stories/dokumenti/finsaraksts_2010.doc, accessed on 19/05/2014. 
23 Hereafter - ESF 
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However, a project on migrant communities where sociology is a leading discipline (i.e. 
most researchers are sociologists) attracted 492 049 euros24, so it is clear that the state 
budget only accounts for a small fraction of  the total sum available for research activities. 
This is not particular to sociology or even the social sciences and humanities in general; 
although it should be mentioned that the humanities and social sciences only receive 
about 20% of  state money allocated to scientific research (Kunda 2013). 
A consequence of  the lack of  funding in the 1990s was that sociologists started to make 
a living primarily by doing applied research (commercial or otherwise) with little in the 
way of  academic output. Tālis Tisenkopfs refers to this as 'the privatisation of  sociology', 
which is a development that has had a dramatic impact on the theoretical and academic 
development of  the discipline (Tisenkopfs 2008a: 10). This is also evident in the case of  
academic publications, as the overall majority of  them are based on applied research. To 
illustrate this point we can turn to an overview of  current research activity in Latvia, 
which is provided in the book Socioloģija Latvijā [Sociology in Latvia] (Tisenkopfs 2010)25. In 
the section dealing with current research, most articles refer to reports produced at the 
end of  research projects. The projects range from research done for local institutions26 
(e.g. ministries, state chancellery, NGOs) and international organisations (e.g. World 
Bank). A prominent example of  a project where local sociologists participate on a regular 
basis is the United Nations Human Development Report in which sociologists are frequently 
involved both as editors and contributors. The second group of  publications are books 
and articles that are mainly data-driven and applied in nature. While this is to be expected 
from overview articles, there are few local publications that discuss the theoretical aspects 
of  sociological work (a notable exception is Tisenkopfs 2008b; 2010c). What is more, the 
absence of  sociological theory is not restricted to the chapters in Socioloģija Latvijā. An 
examination of  academic work in sociology published by the Faculty of  Social Sciences, 
University of  Latvia27, the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology, University of  Latvia28 
and the University of  Latvia Academic Press presents a similar picture in that theoretical 
and reflective publications are few and far between. This is not to say that there are no 
publications of  purely academic interest – one can certainly identity examples of  
                                                 
24 http://sf.viaa.gov.lv/lat/zinatne/, accessed on 22/05/2014. 
25 Many of  the chapters are reworked versions of  articles published in Latvijas Universitātes Raksti, Volume 
736 [available at www.lu.lv/apgads/izdevumi/lu-raksti-pdf/736-sejums/]. 
26 Many can be found at: http://petijumi.mk.gov.lv/ui/ 
27 https://sites.google.com/site/szfworkingpapers/, accessed on 25/05/2014. 
28 http://www.fsi.lu.lv/?sadala=59, accessed on 25/05/2014. 
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theoretical reflection on local practices and publications that place a greater emphasis on 
theory (e.g. Beitnere 2012; Kļave and Šūpule 2013). Furthermore, it must be noted that 
the situation has changed in the last few years, and a number of  Latvian sociologists have 
started to regularly publish academic articles in internationally peer-reviewed journals 
both individually and with colleagues working at other European universities. The surge 
in academic activity was concomitant with a significant increase in the number of  
sociologists who hold a doctorate. 
The chronology of  doctoral theses written in Latvia is also illustrative of  the state of  
Latvian sociology. The first new thesis since Latvia regained its independence was written 
by Dagmāra Beitnere (on self-reference in Latvian culture). She obtained her doctorate in 
2003. It was followed shortly by the thesis of  Baiba Bela in 2005. These two, however, 
were the only two doctorates until 2010, at which point there was a sudden outburst – 25 
new sociology doctorates in the period 2010-2014. A possible explanation for this is 
provided by Tisenkopfs (2008a) who argues that the new generation of  researchers did 
not seek to translate their considerable professional experience into institutionally 
recognised forms of  academic capital. However, one should be cautious about making 
the claim that there are two generations of  sociologists. It is true that the people who 
received their qualifications prior to 1991 now occupy prominent academic positions and 
are heads of  research centres (e.g. Brigita Zepa at Baltic Institute of  Social Science; Tālis 
Tisenkopfs at Baltic Studies Centre), but there are a number of  sociologists who 
complicate the distinction between the pre-1991 and post-1991 generation. For example, 
Līga Rasnača and Anda Laķe received their undergraduate degrees before 1991, but only 
received their doctorates in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Furthermore, while not having a 
doctorate is not a major professional setback in Latvia (e.g. Ilze Trapenciere and Oksana 
Žabko are prominent members of  the community, yet they do not possess a doctorate), a 
significant factor influencing the decision not to write a thesis may have been the inability 
to combine professional commitments (little to no funding for doctoral students) with 
academic activities. ESF funding, however, allowed a number of  people with significant 
research experience to take a year off  from work and focus solely on their thesis (Kunda 
2013). 
Institutions 
A number of  universities offer undergraduate degrees in sociology. By far the most 
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prominent one is the University of  Latvia – it has the most professors (4) and a 
significant portion of  sociological research is carried out by people who are either 
working at the faculty or received their degrees there. It is also possible to study sociology 
at Latvia University of  Agriculture (Sociology of  Organisations and Public 
Administration) and Riga Stradins University (Sociology of  Organisations and 
Management). There are two universities that grant doctorates in sociology – University 
of  Latvia and Riga Stradiņš University. Both institutions have been quite productive in 
the last few years, largely as a result of  the availability of  ESF funds. The range of  topics 
is quite broad, though for the purposes of  this thesis I should note that only one thesis 
could be classified as belonging to science studies (Ādamsone-Fiskoviča 2012). All the 
abovementioned universities also carry out sociological research. 
A common complaint voiced by sociologists from the three Baltic states is the lack of  
data archives. There have been attempts to set one up, but due to the fact that the license 
for Nesstar was not renewed the site is currently offline, even though in 2009 the Latvian 
Council of  Science funded a project whose aim was the preservation and accessibility of  
data29. A similar problem plagues the Latvian Association of  Sociologists, whose primary 
function is the dissemination of  information, but it does this irregularly. Furthermore, 
the professional commitments of  its board members prevent them from devoting time to 
organising academic events. 
An equally important form of  existence for sociology are research centres and 
organisations. A list of  such institutions can be found in the book Socioloģija Latvijā 
(Tisenkopfs 2010a: 518-533), where research centres are divided into two groups – social 
and market research companies and academic research units (see Table 1). While the 
number of  research centres might suggest that sociological research in Latvia is 
ubiquitous, a recent research assessment exercise claims that sociology is still a minority 
discipline30. A potential reason for this could be that the dominant form of  inquiry is 
social research, rather than sociological research (see Williams [2000] and Savage and 
Burrows [2007] for a more general discussion). That is to say, most research in Latvia is 
empirical and 'innocent of  specific disciplinary ties' (Williams 2000: 159).  
 
                                                 
29 http://www.lzp.gov.lv/lemumi/L09_1-1-2_piel.htm, accessed on 28/05/2014. 
30 Research Assessment Exercise: Social Sciences, 
http://www.izm.gov.lv/images/zinatne/ZISI/zisi_09.pdf, accessed on 01/04/2015. 
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Analītisko Pētījumu un Stratēģiju Laboratorija, SIA *  
Baltijas Monitors, SIA *  
Data Serviss, SIA *  
Eurodata, SIA *  
Factum, SIA *  
Fieldex, SIA *  
GfK Custom Research Baltic, SIA *  
Kvalitatīvo Pētījumu Studija, SIA *  
Latvijas Fakti, SIA *  
Market Data, SIA *  
Latvijas Reitingi, SIA *  
Nikolo Grupa, SIA *  
SKDS, SIA *  
Sociālās Alternatīvas Institūts *  
Socioloģisko Pētījumu Institūts, SIA *  
TNS Latvia, SIA *  
Baltic Institute of  Social Sciences  * 
Baltic Studies Centre  * 
Institute of  Social Investigations, Daugavpils University  * 
Centre for Scientific Research, Latvian Academy of  Culture  * 
Social Research Group, Latvia University of  Agriculture  * 
Institute of  Philosophy and Sociology, University of  Latvia  * 
Social and Political Research Institute, University of  Latvia  * 
Sociological Research Centre, Liepaja University  * 
Table 1: Social Research Centres in Latvia 
I will return to this point in more detail in the next chapter, but my contention is that, 
even when it is not strictly speaking applied, and is of  considerable academic interest, 
research is driven by data, and is not necessarily located in a theoretical context, with 
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theory playing a kind of  supplementary role. Furthermore, the situation becomes even 
starker when one considers that most of  the research centres listed in Table 1 do market 
research for commercial institutions. 
Topics Covered in Academic Publications 
Even though sociology in Latvia is relatively small, the thematic range of  sociological 
studies and research in which sociologists play a prominent part is fairly broad, so it 
would certainly be possible to identify examples of  sociological work pertaining to a wide 
variety of  topics and issues. For the purposes of  brevity, I shall provide a general 
overview of  the most prominent topics addressed in sociological work published by 
sociologists working in Latvia. In most cases the topics overlap with other areas of  
interest (e.g. oral histories address questions pertaining to national identity), and it should 
also be noted that, while the topics listed below are the most prominent in terms of  the 
number of  publications, the small size of  Latvian sociology leaves open the possibility 
that these topics are representative of  the interests of  a few sociologists, rather than 
indicative of  the research ethos characteristic of  sociology in Latvia. Furthermore, my list 
is somewhat different from the one provided in Socioloģija Latvijā. For example. I will not 
discuss market research and studies of  entrepreneurial activity (Žabko 2010). The reason 
for this is that most of  the publications that the author refers to are research reports, 
rather than academic publications. The following is based on the information available in 
university home pages, library catalogues, personal CVs and various publication databases 
(e.g. Scopus, Web of  Science).  
Main (Local) Academic Outlets 
In addition to book-length monographs or edited collections (e.g. published by Zinātne 
and University of  Latvia Academic Press), sociologists in Latvia publish in a wide variety 
of  academic journals, but there are a few prominent ones that I would single out. The 
first one is Humanities and Social Science: Latvia. It was founded in 1992 and 'reflects 
particularly on the changing situation in Baltic States and Eastern Europe, and the fast 
developing status of  different research spheres there, as well as contribution of  Latvian 
scientists to understanding of  European problems' (home page31). Each issue is devoted 
to a specific topic, and, as the title suggests, it deals with questions of  interest to many 
                                                 
31 http://www.hssl.lv/, accessed on 20/05/2014. 
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different disciplines. The journal Ethnicity is similar in that it contains articles written by 
practitioners of  different academic disciplines, but the focus is much narrower – it only 
publishes papers pertaining to ethnicity and identity. The third outlet is a series of  edited 
volumes called Latvijas Universitātes Raksti (Scientific Papers, University of  Latvia). These are 
collections of  academic articles that are open to all scientific disciplines, and in the last 20 
years at least 5 volumes (629, 701, 714, 736 and 769) have been devoted to sociology. 
Finally, we come to the Social Sciences Bulletin, which is an outlet for academics working in 
the social sciences and is published every six months. 
Ethnicity and Identity 
A popular topic researched by sociologists in Latvia is ethnicity. Compared to other 
topics of  interest to Latvian sociologists ethnicity occupies a rather prominent role in 
academic publications. In addition to a high number of  published books and articles it 
has its own academic journal – the abovementioned Ethnicity. The range of  questions 
explored in these publications is rather broad and covers issues pertaining to minorities, 
discrimination, education, integration, language policies and identities (both ethnic and 
national). Indeed, a prominent social anthropologist has suggested that Latvians are 
obsessed with questions of  identity32. In view of  this, I believe it is also appropriate to 
include research carried out as part of  the state research programme National Identity 
under this rubric. Even though the scope of  this project was broad and included a 
number of  different pathways and researchers from different disciplines (e.g. history, 
economics, philology, sociology and politics), numerous papers dealt with questions 
pertaining to both ethnic and cultural identities. 
Regional and Rural Development 
Sociological research under the above heading can be classified as a series of  disparate 
attempts to gain a better understanding of  (i) social and economic processes and 
developments in provincial towns and rural areas, and (ii) study collectivities and forms 
of  collaboration that have developed among farmers after the dissolution of  the Soviet 
Union. The importance of  Latvia's accession to the European Union cannot be 
overestimated in this regard, both in terms of  the money available for regional 
development and the funding available to research projects interested in studying 
                                                 
32 http://www.la.lv/varam-pretoties-ar-vardiem-un-rakstiem/, accessed on 27/02/2015. 
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socioeconomic development outside Riga (Šūmane 2010). Research in this area has 
produced publications on a myriad of  different topics pertaining to the socioeconomic 
situation in small-to-medium-sized towns, agency and community-building, sustainability, 
employment, food supply chains and innovation in rural contexts. A prominent example 
of  this is the work of  Tālis Tisenkopfs, whose research on rural innovation and food 
chains is published in international journals (e.g. Tisenkopfs et al. 2011). What is more, 
the Baltic Studies Centre he leads was the only sociological research centre to attract 
funding as part of  the 7th Framework Programme (Kunda 2013). 
Migration 
Interest in this topic is not specific to sociologists, but questions pertaining to 
immigration and emigration have become prominent in recent years. The focus is on 
understanding the causes of  emigration and studying Latvian communities in other 
European Union countries in the context of  re-emigration policies. A prominent example 
of  this kind of  research where sociologists play a leading role is a project on migration 
funded by ESF, the state budget and the Institute of  Philosophy and Sociology, 
University of  Latvia33. In addition, a research centre34 dedicated to this topic was 
established in 2014. 
Sociology of  Youth 
This topic is rather diffuse and includes publications on a number of  different factors 
influencing, and pertaining to, the lives of  young people. Koroļeva, Rungule and 
Trapenciere (2010) argue that the interest in the lives and experiences of  young people 
stretches back to the Soviet Union, and their overview of  recent sociological publications 
shows that this interest has not diminished. The range of  studies is quite broad and 
includes research on education, employment, social integration and exclusion, deviant 
behaviour, use of  alcoholic and narcotic substances, and youth culture in general. 
Oral Histories and Narrative Analysis 
This is a somewhat controversial category for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is possible 
that Latvian historians and anthropologists would also lay claim to it. However, there are 
a number of  publications where a prominent role is played by sociologists (Baiba Bela 
                                                 
33 http://migracija.lv/, accessed on 01/12/2014. 
34 http://www.diaspora.lu.lv/eng/, accessed on 27/02/2015. 
125 
and Dagmāra Beitnere in particular) that place it equally under the purview of  sociology. 
Secondly, it is based around a particular method, rather than a topic. However, the 
number of  researchers in this field is relatively small and the publications are organised 
around the overlaps between identity, life stories and social memory. 
Science Studies in Latvia 
This topic is not popular among sociologists working in Latvia, but I believe it is 
necessary to mention it in view of  the theoretical literature informing this project and the 
difficulties I encountered during my fieldwork. The presence of  Latvian scholars on the 
international science studies scene is almost non-existent, but there is a significant 
amount of  scholarship on issues pertaining to contemporary developments in science 
and technology. An overview of  this literature is provided by Ādamsone-Fiskoviča 
(2011); although she is explicit about the fact that science studies does not yet exist as a 
distinct field of  inquiry, it is certainly possible to identify publications that have dealt with 
issues that would be of  interest to science studies scholars (Ādamsone-Fiskoviča 2011: 
100). Traditional branches of  science studies (such as history and philosophy of  science) 
have a long presence in Latvian academia, and there are also examples of  studies that 
have approached scientific communities in a manner reminiscent of  traditional sociology 
of  science (e.g. Vilciņš 1979). This includes a number of  papers written on the topic of  
research ethics. In this context she mentions the work of  a group of  bioethicists working 
at Riga Stradiņš University. Two of  these scholars hold doctorates in sociology (Vents 
Sīlis and Signe Mežinska), and their work is located at the intersection between bioethics 
(in which they both hold a Master's degree) and the sociology of  health and illness (Sīlis 
2010; Gefenas et al. 2010; Dranseika et al. 2010; Salmane-Kuļikovska et al. 2011). 
Another branch of  science studies where sociologists play a prominent role is the study 
of  various forms of  innovation and the intersection between social forms of  innovation 
(e.g. new partnerships), technological innovation and sustainability. Ādamsone-Fiskoviča 
argues that, in contrast to economists and natural scientists, sociologists have focused on 
the social dimensions of  innovation and have primarily employed qualitative methods 
(Ādamsone-Fiskoviča 2011: 115). 
Methodology and Fieldwork 
The analysis of  qualitative data has occasionally been treated as a problem 'because of  
the nature of  qualitative data, which are invariably described as voluminous, unstructured 
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and unwieldy' (Bryman and Burgess 1994: 216). One of  the issues that has attracted the 
attention of  scholars is the intimate connection and interplay between data collection and 
data analysis, and my thesis illustrates this. My research was carried out within the 
framework of  theory-based qualitative methodology. The primary method used in this 
study was the semi-structured interview, but the interviews were complemented by an 
analysis of  sociological literature and textbooks published in Latvia (see above), a number 
of  documents pertaining to the use of  social science expertise in the context of  policy-
making (e.g. Kļaviņa et al. 2005; Latvija 2030) and funding reports. Further insight was 
provided by informal conversations with sociologists and anthropologists.  
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the thesis began as an attempt to explore the 
heritage of  Soviet science policy and attitudes towards sociology in present day Latvia. In 
particular, I was interested in the relationship between sociology and policy-making. After 
the first round of  interviews the focus of  my research gradually shifted towards 
sociology as a form of  knowledge and the difficulties of  approaching the discipline from 
a science studies perspective. This, in turn, affected my selection of  informants (see 
below) and analytical focus. In short, the following two chapters deploy different kinds of  
data and relate these to the theoretical debates and issues fleshed out in the previous 
chapters. However, the questions I address and the resulting analysis took shape during 
the research process and in response to new information. The constructivist framework 
was present throughout the project, but its significance shifted in view of  my 
conversations with sociologists working in Latvia – data gathering and data analysis were 
co-constitutive. 
Selecting a Method 
The decision to study sociologists in Latvia by way of  semi-structured interviews was 
based on a number of  factors. This format allowed the interviews to follow a predefined 
and comparable logic, but it also permitted me to ask additional questions and explore 
issues and experiences that were particular to, and deemed important by, the specific 
interviewee. In addition, I believed that semi-structured interviews were a good choice, 
since I intended to combine my informants' answers with other kinds of  data (Fife 2005: 
101; Atkinson and Hammersley 2007). This was well suited to the nature of  the subject 
under investigation because only the most basic information was available in publicly 
accessible documents and publications. The philosophies of  science practised by 
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sociologists and their understanding of  the discipline could not be clearly identified by 
reading their publications, and an undue focus on such texts would have run the risk of  
presenting an overly idealised picture of  their views on sociology as a form of  knowledge 
and the philosophical assumptions underpinning it. What is more, given that sociology in 
Latvia is primarily applied in nature (Tisenkopfs 2010b), there was a high probability 
(verified upon further analysis) that these publications would not dwell on technicalities, 
and that the philosophical assumptions would be implicit and, therefore, hard to identify 
clearly. This, coupled with the fact that I had little knowledge of  the theoretical 
preferences of  sociologists working in Latvia, suggested that loosely structured 
conversations with the practitioners would (i) allow me to gain a better understanding of  
the importance they attach to the issues of  interest to me and (ii) allow them to challenge 
my assumptions and way of  framing questions. 
Selecting Informants 
When selecting my informants, I employed a strategy that combined elements of  
purposive (because the number of  people with the relevant knowledge was small) and 
expert (because the required information is highly specific) sampling. Choosing 
informants presented few difficulties, but selecting and narrowing down the target group 
of  experts was based on a number of  considerations that derive from the aims of  my 
research and have to be made explicit (Littig 2009: 103).  
Even though the community of  sociologists in Latvia is relatively small, interviewing 
every single sociologist in Latvia would have been impractical, so I limited my attention 
to sociologists with a doctorate35. The decision to focus on sociologists who held a 
doctorate in sociology was based on two considerations. First and foremost it was 
motivated by expediency – this was an easily identifiable group whose defining 
characteristics could be stated unambiguously and in non-trivial academic terms. A 
potential drawback was that this excluded scholars who work with sociologists, employ 
concepts derived from sociological publications or whose research is sociologically 
pertinent, but who were not trained as sociologists. This objection can be countered by 
considering my second motivation for limiting my attention to sociologists with 
doctorates – I believed that a doctorate in sociology was a solid indicator that the 
                                                 
35 Almost all of  my informants had obtained a doctorate prior to the interview. The only exception was a 
sociologist who had not finished her studies, but was interviewed when the sample population was 
broader and included sociologists working in prominent research centres. 
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scholar's knowledge of, and proficiency in, sociology was (i) institutionally acknowledged 
and (ii) extended beyond professional skills as a researcher. This criterion justified the 
exclusion of  scholars who practised sociology but held doctorates in other disciplines 
(e.g. economics and philosophy). Finally, a doctorate in sociology suggested that the 
scholar would have a solid grasp of  the issues I wanted to discuss in the interview. In 
view of  the above, the data I obtained from my informants cannot claim to be 
representative of  all forms of  sociology practised in Latvia. However, it represents the 
views of  those individuals whose abilities and expertise as sociologists have been certified 
by the Latvian academic establishment.   
The interviews were conducted in two waves. The first 12 interviews took place in July-
August 2012, and a further 10 during July-September 2013. Due to a change of  focus 
after the first wave, I decided to re-interview some of  the sociologists whom I had 
already met in the summer of  2012. I re-interviewed a total of  6 sociologists. The analysis 
in Chapters 6 and 7 is based on a total of  28 interviews with 22 sociologists. The list of  
sociologists was obtained via personal communication, from book chapters and articles 
on the history of  Latvian sociology (e.g. Tabūns 1996; 1998; 2010) and the databases of  
the only two universities in Latvia that grant doctorates in sociology – University of  
Latvia36 and Riga Stradiņš University37.. The informants were contacted by email. 
The Interview Guide 
The first section of  the interview guide38 focused on epistemological and ontological 
preliminaries pertaining to sociology as a form of  knowledge, whereas the second section 
dealt with the role and value of  sociology in the context of  politics and policy-making. In 
practice, however, the sections often overlapped, but this was to be expected, as semi-
structured conversations seldom evolve in the same way and not all of  my informants 
focused on the same issues. What is more, some of  the interviews were hampered by 
time constraints and my informants' hectic schedule, which meant that three of  the 
interviews had to be truncated, so I had to drop questions that I thought  (i) were 
inessential or (ii) had already been answered (albeit indirectly). 
When designing the interview guide, I brought a number of  assumptions into play. I 
treated sociology as a diffuse activity whose stability and coherence has to be enacted and 
                                                 
36 https://luis.lu.lv/pls/pub/wct.doktd?l=1, [accessed on 28/05/2014]. 
37 http://www.rsu.lv/petnieciba/promocija/aizstavetie-promocijas-darbi, accessed on 28/05/2014. 
38 See Appendix 1 
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maintained through its institutional foundation, adherence to a specific theoretical 
cannon and forms argumentation, the deployment of  a particular methodological 
repertoire and the right to speak of  and for the variables, interactions and associations 
constituting the social. The assumptions and analytical parameters I have outlined above 
derive from the arguments I discussed in Chapters 1-4. I subscribe to a constructivist 
theory of  science, and I recognise the social and normative embeddedness of  all forms 
of  inquiry. I proceed on the assumption that scientific explanations, techniques and 
instruments are actively involved in constructing enactments of  reality with normative 
implications, but the ability of  different disciplines to do so is contextually varied. For 
example, sociological studies present versions of  reality that posit the existence of  certain 
entities and phenomena, describe the relationships between them, and establish different 
forms of  association between heterogeneous actors. The success or veracity of  a 
particular piece of  research, however, is subject to negotiations between different parties. 
I, therefore, accept the insights of  constructivist science studies and proceed from the 
belief  that knowledge is contested and emerges from struggles and interactions between 
various perspectives and different factors. Such an approach presumes that the cogency 
and persuasiveness of  an argument depends on how well it meshes with or successfully 
transforms pre-existing sociomaterial configurations. That is to say, the quality of  a piece 
of  research needs to be collectively established and should not be treated as if  it were 
something that is intrinsic to it. The reality of  its quality is procedurally constituted. The 
specificity of  sociology, however, is to be found in its relative weakness and inability to 
achieve the abovementioned on a regular basis.  
The aim of  my fieldwork was to derive an account of  sociology from the arguments 
offered by Latvian sociologists and relate it to the debates and issues addressed in the 
previous chapters. For this reason I chose to pose questions that, I believed, were 
fundamental to an understanding of  sociology. However, I had to take into account the 
specificities of  my own theoretical outlook and research interests. This meant that I had 
to pose my questions in a way that was sufficiently open-ended and articulated in a 
language that was comprehensible to scholars whose training and theoretical background 
differed from mine. This gave my interviews an ethnographic dimension (see below), and 
I had to invoke characterisations of  sociology that I personally did not subscribe to in 
order to facilitate the conversation. In cases where my questions enacted traditional 
dualisms (e.g. natural vs. social sciences, quantitative vs. qualitative methods) I presumed 
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that my informants would challenge or correct me if  they felt that my way of  setting up 
the problem was inaccurate or contextually inappropriate (Murchinson 2010: 91). My 
choice of  method and interviewing strategy, therefore, worked with an implicit model of  
what my informants would be like – active and confrontational, rather than passive and 
accommodating. Given that my informants were senior to me and professional 
researchers and educators with considerable experience in carrying out academic projects, 
I believe that my choice was justified.  
Ethical Issues 
This project received ethical approval from the Lancaster University Research Ethics 
Committee in July 2012. Interviewees were asked to sign a consent form, informed about 
the uses to which the data will be put and given an accurate description of  the project 
and its aims. The interviews were recorded and kept on an encrypted external hard drive. 
All recordings were anonymised, and all participants were given a pseudonym. However, 
as I have already mentioned, the sociological community in Latvia is quite small. This 
means that a possible issue (partially confirmed in informal conversations) might be that 
it will be relatively easy for the informants to identify themselves and, more importantly, 
others in the final version of  the thesis. That is to say, the use of  pseudonyms might 
prevent outsiders from identifying a sociologist, but this will not necessarily preclude 
insiders from identifying their colleagues (Platt 1976). In an attempt to prevent this I (i) 
refrained from using quotes or information that could identify specific sociologists and 
(ii) used gender-neutral pseudonyms. 
Reflections on Possible Limitations 
Jennifer Platt argues that a significant feature of  interviewing other sociologists (or one's 
peers in general) is the existence of  a common stock of  background knowledge and 
shared understandings that shape the interaction (Platt 1976; 1981). Some of  the 
difficulties I encountered during my research, however, derive from the opposite 
problem. Prior to my research visit in July 2012 my knowledge of  Latvian sociology was 
limited to reading an introduction by Pēteris Laķis (2005), analytical commentaries by 
Tālis Tisenkopfs (2010b) and Aivars Tabūns (1998; 2010), and examination of  theses and 
journal articles written by Latvian sociologists. Therefore, while I had a general 
understanding of  the literature published in Latvia, I was not well versed in the academic 
culture characteristic of  Latvian sociology. This, I believe, goes some way towards 
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explaining why my first interview went worse than I had anticipated and why I was forced 
to rephrase most of  the questions during the interview and rewrite them for the purposes 
of  all subsequent interviews. Some of  this was undoubtedly due to my limited experience 
as an interviewer. I found that I kept revising the interview outline as I went along and 
tried to come up with examples for the questions my interviewees found most confusing. 
What is more, my initial encounters made me acutely aware of  the specificities of  my 
own academic upbringing and a number of  taken for granted assumptions (see previous 
section) which necessitated fundamental revisions to both my questions and the language 
I used when raising objections. For example, I dropped references to performative 
approaches to ontology, refrained from discussing the persuasiveness of  academic 
publications in Latourian (Latour 1983; 1993b) terms and offered tentative definitions of  
what I meant by the predicate objective. Additional confusion may have been the result 
of  my asking questions that may have appeared naïve (e.g. What is the object of  
sociological inquiry?). 
I would suggest that there are at least three possible reasons for this. Firstly, it could be an 
indicator of  just how deeply ingrained and foregone these questions are for an 
experienced sociologist. Secondly, the confusion may have been caused by their assuming 
that I was trained in sociology and, therefore, well aware of  the answers they could and 
would give. That is to say, the questions appeared odd, because the answers were obvious. 
This suspicion was confirmed on a number of  occasions when my informants 
distinguished between answers they would give to academics and those they would offer 
to curious outsiders. In other words, my informants assumed that they were talking to a 
fellow practitioner and could take certain things for granted (Pfadenhauer 2009: 85; Platt 
1981). Thirdly, as I indicated before, sociology in Latvia is primarily applied in nature, 
which means that theoretical debates are not a common practice in sociology. 
Consequently, my informants may simply not have been used to discussing these sorts of  
questions and unsure about the pertinence of  these aspects of  sociological work to an 
understanding of  sociology in Latvia. Finally, my identity as an outsider exploring 
questions that were uncommon in the Latvian sociological landscape may have created 
additional suspicion. I did, however, try to address this by (i) not hiding my ignorance and 
(ii) encouraging my informants to correct me if  they felt I focused on aspects that they 
believed to be unimportant for understanding sociology in Latvia; this, coincidentally, is 
why I prefer to use the word informant (rather than respondent) when referring to the 
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people I interviewed. Nonetheless, bafflement persisted no matter how explicit I tried to 
be about the naïve nature of  the questions.  
As my fieldwork progressed I realised that the informants found my questions baffling 
for slightly more complex reasons, some of  which had a clear impact on our interactions 
during the interview.  
Firstly, while I tried to describe my project (both in the email I sent them and 
information sheet I provided with the consent form) as clearly as I could without giving 
away everything I was interested in, some seemed to be under the impression that I was 
interviewing them as experts on Latvian society in general and sociology in Latvia in 
particular, rather than people who just happen to be members of  a particular professional 
group. This manifested itself  in raised eyebrows and astonishment in response to 
questions from the first section of  my interview guide, e.g. 
How does the work of  a professional surgeon differ from, say, the work of  amateurs in 
villages where old ladies want to cure something? 
Dagr 
 
This question is... peculiar. 
Isyllus 
Sociologists felt that I would be better off  consulting introductory textbooks and course 
notes intended for first-year students. This was also evident in their refusing to speculate 
about topics on which they felt they did not possess sufficient information. In cases 
where they did speculate, they felt the need to let me know that they were in fact 
speculating. While this was quite evident in the first interviews, it gradually disappeared. I 
would argue that this was the result of  me stressing the fact that I was not interviewing 
them as experts but as people who are involved in a particular activity. I also included this 
disclaimer in the second wave of  emails because I thought that this might assuage the 
doubts of  sociologists who felt that they had nothing concrete to contribute on the 
topics I was interested in.  
Secondly, a further reason may have been role reversal. With the exception of  one 
interviewee who had left her doctoral studies due to professional commitments, all of  my 
informants held a doctorate, had at least some teaching experience and considerable 
research experience. In the context of  the interview, however, they were the ones who 
had to answer exam-like questions with an inexperienced student posing follow-up 
questions and urging them to elaborate and unpack their answers. I feel it is necessary to 
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mention that role reversal may have had an equally strange effect on me. I was fully 
conscious of  the irregular nature of  the situation and painfully aware that I was 
interviewing someone who was higher up in the academic hierarchy (Platt 1976; 1981), 
which resulted in sporadic spells of  anxiety and inability to pose my questions clearly. 
Thirdly, there was a discrepancy between my informants' conceptions of  sociology and 
mine. The background assumptions on the nature of  sociology and sociological 
knowledge listed above contrasted sharply with the beliefs implicit (and sometimes made 
explicit) in the responses provided by Latvian sociologists who treated sociology as a 
profession and in general did not seem concerned with the issues I discussed in the 
previous chapters. I would, for example, hazard a guess that they would have found it 
more sensible to study sociology as a profession and institution, rather than an academic 
discipline. In other words, there is a sense in which my project may have missed the mark, 
at least as far as my informants were concerned, and worked with a peculiar 
understanding of  what was relevant (Pfadenhauer 2009: 85), though this may have had 
something to do with the unclear relationship between science studies and sociology. 
Sociology and Science Studies: An Awkward Encounter 
I am approaching sociology in Latvia from a science studies perspective and using the 
former to illustrate possible solutions to, and explanations for, the problems and frictions 
I discussed in the preceding chapters. A potential objection, however, might be that this 
project is an instance of  a discipline examining itself  with its own analytical apparatus – a 
sociology of  sociology. One way to counter this argument would be to point out well-
known examples within the sociological tradition that have attempted to study the 
discipline on a much broader scale (e.g. Cole and Zuckermann 1975; Friedrichs 1970; 
Gouldner 1970; 1973; Mullins 1973). This would leave the problems of  self-reference and 
recursivity unaddressed, although this is characteristic of  most projects in the sociology 
of  scientific knowledge (Ashmore 1989). A more productive approach, I believe, is to 
reframe the relationship between science studies and sociology (Law 2008) and so reflect 
on how the problem of  reflexivity applies to this particular project.  
My point of  departure is that science studies uses methods, insights and background 
assumptions from sociology, but it borrows equally from anthropology, philosophy, 
feminism and cultural studies (Fuller 2006b). In other words, it would be problematic to 
deny the link between sociology and science studies, but it would be equally tricky to 
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define the role of  science studies in relation to sociology. This project proceeds on the 
assumption that, while one could make the case that science studies is related to 
sociology, the theoretical repertoire that I draw upon in this thesis is hybrid in nature. 
This is not just a question of  boundary-drawing (Gieryn 1983) and relates directly to the 
explanatory approaches discernible in the science studies' accounts that I employ.  
The specificity of  sociology, however, complicates the distinction between subject and 
object. While there is a long tradition of  the social sciences and humanities using 
concepts borrowed from the natural sciences in a figurative way (Fuller 2006; Mirowski 
1989; Stengers 1997), the perceived difference between these two ways of  knowing has 
made it de facto acceptable for science studies to examine the natural sciences (at least as 
far as science studies scholars are concerned). The social sciences (as objects of  study) 
have been more problematic. There have been attempts to approach the social sciences 
from within a broadly constructivist framework (Latour 2005; 2010; Law 2004; 2009; Law 
et al. 2011). I would argue, however, that these efforts are different from traditional 
sociology of  knowledge as they do not try to provide a distinctly sociological explanation 
of  trends within sociology. I would suggest that this is, at least partly, because the latter 
have been obsessed with their own status as sciences (Fuller 1991; Law 2008), but of  
equal importance are the vast number of  publications dealing with the social and 
philosophical genesis of  sociology (e.g. Gouldner 1970; 1973; Halsey 2004; McCarthy 
2003; Turner 1999; Zeitlin 1968), and the issues raised in the last section of  Chapter 4. In 
other words, sociologists have (i) often taken a historical and meta perspective on their 
activities (Ritzer 2011) and (ii) been conscious of  the status of  sociology as a form of  
knowledge that is simultaneously in and about the world (Fuller and Collier 2003).   
The conceptual ambiguities alluded to above, and the relationship between science 
studies and sociology they illustrate, have a geographic dimension to them. That is to say, 
the link between these two fields varies greatly depending on context. For example, in the 
United Kingdom there is overlap between sociology and science studies: there is an 
official study group in the British Sociological Association, as well as a number of  
university departments where science studies has a significant presence (e.g. Lancaster, 
Edinburgh, Cardiff). I do not mean to imply that either of  these fields is well defined - 
only to suggest that there is communication and exchange between the two.  
This is not so in Latvia where the only academic unit that could be classified as belonging 
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to science studies used to be located at the Latvian Academy of  Sciences39. Indeed, the 
distant and evasive relationship between sociology and science studies is exemplified by a 
doctoral thesis submitted in 2013. The thesis was about the perception of  environmental 
risks in Latvia, and it also addressed the socialisation of  nature (Briška 2013). The 
theoretical framework for this study, however, was based on the work of  Niklas 
Luhmann, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens – it made no reference to science studies 
(or science and technology studies). This, I believe, goes some way towards illuminating 
some of  the issues that I faced during my interviews. My informants were expecting a 
conversation with a sociologist, and some of  the friction generated during the interviews 
may have been due to the fact that we were operating with diverging interpretations of  
what was pertinent for an account of  sociology in Latvia, or sociology in general. That is 
to say, the interview situation itself  exemplified the unclear relationship and divergence 
between sociology (represented by my informants) and a particular branch of  science 
studies (represented by me), and illustrated an issue and limitation specific to interviews 
with practitioners of  the social sciences and humanities. That is to say, 
[i]nterviewing sociologists about matters germane to their own discipline is a highly 
rewarding experience. [...] But sociologists, being constantly aware of  values, social 
relationships, ideological distortions, etc., tend to give answers which are more than 
mere statements of  fact. This is a strength and a weakness of  my material at the same 
time because the answers are almost invariably as much statements of  fact as 
interpretations of  these facts in the light of  the respondents' own theories. 
 (Faludi 1978: 104) 
Conclusions 
The specificities of  sociology in Latvia are a source of  potentially interesting insights for, 
and challenges to, the science studies literature that this project draws upon. Some of  this 
has to do with the history and structure of  the sociological profession in Latvia. In 
particular, its emphasis on applied, externally funded research serves as a useful platform 
for a contrast between the theories of  Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, and the 
interplay between autonomy and heteronomy more generally. However, the 
distinctiveness of  sociology and sociologists as objects, and the peculiar relationship 
between sociology and science studies that my conversations with Latvian sociologists 
illustrated are of  equal importance. My contention is that such awkward encounters 
between cognate fields of  inquiry, while subject to a series of  difficulties and limitations, 
are conducive to a more detailed understanding of  how different disciplines position 
                                                 
39 http://ww3.lza.lv/csts/csts_main.htm, accessed on 28/05/2014. 
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themselves in relation to their objects and their responsibility for the knowledge they 
provide. Furthermore, the idiosyncrasies of  sociology are useful points of  reference 
when articulating and challenging the background assumptions of  a constructivist theory 
of  science. It is with this mindset that I approach the interviews with sociologists 





6. Conversations with Latvian Sociologists, Part II: 
Sociology as Science, Sociology as Profession 
Scientific education as we know it today has precisely this aim. It simplifies “science” by 
simplifying its participants: first, a domain of  research is defined. The domain is 
separated from the rest of  history […] and given a “logic” of  its own. A thorough 
training in such a “logic” then conditions those working in the domain; it makes their 
actions more uniform and freezes large parts of  the historical process as well. 
(Feyerabend 2010: 3) 
 
In the sciences, as I shall suggest below, it is often better to do one's best with the tools 
at hand than to pause for contemplation of  divergent approaches. 
(Kuhn 1977: 225) 
 
The above quotes hint at something peculiar about science and science education in 
particular. It proceeds by isolating a part of  reality about which you, as a member of  a 
particular discipline, are qualified to speak and whose nature and intricacies you are 
expected to explain. For Paul Feyerabend, however, this comes at a regrettable price – 
uniformity and rigidity. These characteristics, he believes, are antithetical to the inquisitive 
spirit animating science – it needs diversity to foster methodological creativity and 
conceptual divergence. To a certain extent, therefore, conflict is what drives science, 
whereas norms stifle it and repress its vitality.  
Even a cursory examination of  the natural sciences would reveal that there is never 
perfect consensus and theoretical disputes have a constant presence (e.g. phyletic 
gradualism vs. punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary biology). What is more, even in 
cases where scientists seem to be in agreement over the feasibility of  a particular 
theoretical approach, a closer inspection might reveal that surface similarities obscure 
highly divergent interpretations and practical applications of  the same theory (Fuller 
1986; 2002: ch. 9). However, I would argue that this issue is much more pronounced in 
the case of  sociology. There is rampant disagreement as to the nature of  the object of  
sociological inquiry, the proper way to study it and the normative implications of  the 
resulting knowledge (e.g. critical theory). The consequence is a myriad of  different 
approaches that do not always get along and reinterpret their opponent's turf  with their 
own concepts and metaphysics (Abbott 2001a). Furthermore, as I tried to show in 
Chapters 3 and 4, there is internal friction as to what ends sociology should serve and a 
perpetual reinterpretation of  its own history and heritage in view of  this. What I am 
suggesting, therefore, is that, while there is diversity and theoretical conflict in the natural 
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sciences, it is rather more pronounced in the case of  sociology. Furthermore, such 
disputes are an integral part of  the discipline – sociology is openly heterogeneous as 
regards both methodological and axiological questions. This, however, is antithetical to 
Kuhnian normal science, since diversity leads to different factions competing with one 
another, which in turn means that a lot of  energy and resources are expended on 
theoretical altercations. I would argue that such internal heterogeneity is at least partially 
responsible for the epistemically ambiguous status of  sociology, which is illustrated well 
by sociologists working in Latvia.  
The basis of  this chapter are the answers to the first section of  my interview guide, 
which mainly dealt with the nature of  sociology as a science and the specificity of  the 
experience and expertise possessed by sociologists (as opposed to the lay public). In this 
chapter I illustrate (i) the perceived complexities that are involved in positioning 
sociology as a science and (ii) the various argumentative strategies employed by 
sociologists to articulate their position. 
What is Sociology? 
In 1996 the sociology cathedra at the University of  Latvia published a sociology textbook 
aimed at high-school students (Zepa and Zobena 1996)40. This was supplemented by a 
dictionary that was made available the following year (Zepa and Zobena 1997)41. 
Ostensibly the aim of  these two books was to give students an overview of  the topics 
and issues that they would have a chance to explore should they choose to study 
sociology at university. However, in conjunction with a more advanced introductory 
course published by Pēteris Laķis (2005)42 they can also serve as a point of  departure 
when trying to ascertain how sociologists in Latvia construct their own discipline.  
All three books provide a definition of  sociology, but what is striking is that both Humans 
and Life and Introduction to Sociology proceed by explicitly discussing the difficulties inherent 
in defining sociology. For example, in the introductory chapter to Introduction to Sociology 
Pēteris Laķis makes the following claim: 
In trying to outline the specificity of  the sociological outlook on society it is important 
to bear in mind that the object of  this form of  knowledge is the relatively broad, though 
not always conceptually delineated, self- awareness of  human culture. […] In a situation 
                                                 
40 Hereafter – Humans and Life 
41 Hereafter – Dictionary  
42 Hereafter – Introduction to Sociology 
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when the conceptual apparatus of  sociology is still in the process of  hierarchical 
arrangement, yet the empirical focus becomes ever broader, the specificity of  this field 
of  knowledge is defined in a rather general – even abstract – manner.  
(Laķis 2005: 7) 
Something similar, though in a more muted form, is present in the books edited by 
Brigita Zepa and Aija Zobena. The books provide long and detailed definitions of  
sociology that situate it in relation to economics, philosophy, political science and 
anthropology, which in the case of  Humans and Life is supplemented by a two-page 
discussion of  the historical difficulties that sociology has faced in trying to establish itself  
and define its area of  expertise. An awareness of  this complexity was also evident in 
some of  my interviews. 
This is a very difficult question... The more you know, the harder it becomes to explain 
it in simple terms... I've tried it in my capacity as director of  undergraduate studies... in 




I've always had a problem with these... What is the object, what is the focus... Gosh, I'm 
ashamed when I remember how many years I've been teaching students, and I try to 
avoid these questions. 
Fulla 
However, the overall framing of  sociology reveals a striking detail inherent in the rather 
mundane descriptions of  sociology. For example, Humans and Life starts with an 
ambitious claim. 
We need sociology if  we wish to understand our world. It is a science that provides a 
spiritual model of  its time. Contrary to most other sciences that gives us insight into the 
world, sociology is reflexive: it is a mirror in which society can see itself. Even though 
sociology thinks in theoretical and abstract terms, it is always in dialogue with society. 
(Zepa and Zobena 1996: 5) 
Straight away sociology is defined as a form of  knowledge whose relationship to its 
object is interactive. This sentiment is echoed in Introduction to Sociology. 
The task of  sociology is not only to explain social reality in theoretical terms and predict 
possible trends and alternatives for future development. It has other more practical 
functions as well. Sociological knowledge can serve as the foundation for expert 
assessment at all levels of  public policy.  
(Laķis 2005: 3) 
This complicates things somewhat. While both books seem be implying a bidirectional 
feedback loop between sociology and its object (society), they seem to be equally aware 
of  the remarkably diffuse and nebulous nature of  sociology. For example, the Dictionary 
starts its definition by saying that sociology is 'the scientific study of  society' (Zepa and 
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Zobena 1997: 10). This is followed by a rather broad account of  sociological inquiry. In 
and of  itself  this seems unproblematic. Viewed in conjunction with Humans and Life, 
however, both the nature of  sociology and its object are revealed to be categories that 
have been, and still are, subject to revision and historical change. This also extends to 
society, which all three books posit as the object of  sociology. 
Let us compare two definitions of  society. 
Society is a more or less organised unit of  individuals, social groups and forms of  
organisation. These relationships manifest themselves both vertically and horizontally. 
The vertical dimension is expressed through the workings of  power, whereas the 
horizontal is expressed through forms of  competition and cooperation. Both 
dimensions form the existential basis of  social organisations, institutions and forms of  
sociality, while at the same time determining the social existence of  the individual. 
(Laķis 2005: 8) 
 
Society is a territorially bound social system that contains within itself  both individuals 
and social groups. It is believed that members of  a particular society share a common 
culture, more or less universally accepted norms, values, social roles and institutions. By 
the way, some proponents of  symbolic interactionism argue that there is no such thing 
as society; it is just a term we use when we talk about things with which we are not well 
acquainted.  
(Zepa and Zobena 1997: 15) 
These definitions are comparable and, lip service to symbolic interactionism aside, imply 
remarkably similar ontological assumptions as to the nature of  society. Society is 
constituted both by its members and the relations that exist between them. This is echoed 
in the responses of  the sociologists I interviewed.  
Society is an aggregate of  individuals who live by both written and unwritten norms 
in some sort of  system... how this system works, how it is maintained, and what 




Society consists of  people and relations of  communication that have been 
institutionalised... these relationships have been institutionalised, reproduced etc. It's 
society as a system. 
Dagr 
 
There are many levels. One... the easiest way would be to say that society consists of  its 
members...both at the national and maybe global level, but in this case we also have 
different... structures and structural units that contain within themselves various social 
forms. For example, organisations and different social groups. 
Nanna 
However, when asked to give an explanation as to what constituted the object of  
sociological inquiry, not everyone opted for society; some even questioned whether such 
a thing as society actually existed.  
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Society... that's a complicated notion. First of  all, there is no such thing as society. It's 
convenient for us to talk about it. It's convenient to be able to use some sort of  blanket 
term... but there is a way of  looking at people as a society. 
Mimir 
 
It  [sociology] defines itself  as a science that studies... action... to put it simply. It studies 
groups – both big and small – within society, because... the notion of  society is an 
abstraction, wouldn't you agree? 
Saga 
On the whole, however, there was a palpable sense of  uncertainty and reticence about the 
way the questions were answered. There was little consensus as to what exactly 
constituted the aspect of  reality of  which sociologists were qualified to speak and which 
they were qualified to study, though society and the elements that constitute it was a 
prominent theme. This is hardly surprising given that most sociologists do not regularly 
concern themselves with questions pertaining directly to the foundations of  their 
discipline. What is more, this is even less remarkable in view of  the fact that in Latvia 
practitioners treat sociology as an applied discipline. Consequently, it is quite reasonable 
that a number of  my respondents focused on smaller questions. 
You see, on the one hand there's the analytical approach  –  ways of  differentiating 
sociology from the natural sciences. That's one question. The other question is about 
research. Studies always focus on particular issues and only focus on one aspect... only 
one aspect. As regards society as such... there is no sociological study that, how shall I 
say, had as its objective the study of  society as a system. 
Dagr 
In and of  itself  this is hardly noteworthy. It is likely that practitioners of  other disciplines 
would be equally fazed when prompted to explain what the object of  their discipline was. 
There is little reason to assume that natural scientists would readily produce an articulate 
and precise account of  which aspects of  reality they are trying to understand. 
Furthermore, it is not a given that these responses would give us a straightforward 
picture. However, in the case of  sociology this uncertainty goes deeper, because, as the 
quotes below indicate, my respondents generally opted for responses that resisted 
simplification and obvious rhetorical potency. 
Latvian sociologists had issues defining the epistemological and ontological parameters in 
which sociology operates. For example, the responses showed considerable variety as 
regards the nature of  sociology. A number of  my respondents freely acknowledged the 
epistemic hybridity of  sociology and were explicit about the thematic overlaps with 
philosophy, political science and anthropology.  
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Sociology is a hybrid. Something from political science, something from mathematics, 
bits from philosophy... and it all sums up. I think... sociology is interdisciplinary at its 
core, but it's given itself  a frame. 
Eir 
 
If  we look at how the sciences are classified... There is a considerable amount of  
overlap. It is probably greater than people acknowledge.  
Delling 
This is amplified by the peculiar and historically emergent nature of  its object. For 
example, in Introduction to Sociology Pēteris Laķis argues that the emergence of  sociology 
was contingent upon a group of  individuals recognising itself  as a unit with complex 
internal dynamics (Laķis 2005: 5-6). As a result of  the clash and discrepancy between 
ideas of  human progress and unity, and the glaring social problems and countervailing 
tendencies, people became aware of  the fact that there was something about social 
groups that was not reducible to their constituent elements. This required systematic 
exploration, so questions pertaining to the nature of  the bonds that bind people together 
became part of  science. However, as Zepa and Zobena note, the force exerted upon, and 
the compulsion experienced by, individuals has always been a tricky issue in sociology 
(Zepa and Zobena 1996: 6-7). My interviews illustrated that Latvian sociologists were 
painfully aware of  this. For example, in cases where this issue was brought up, most of  
the respondents believed that societies have particular inertias and internal logics which 
are specific to them and allow these societies to reproduce themselves. However, they 
were reticent and evasive when it came to discussing the problem of  the structural 
determination of  agency. 
It's the old dialectic, right?  
Narvi 
In some cases a balance was sought – structure and agency were integrated and worked 
side by side. For example, it was argued that the internal dynamics of  a social system are 
'the result of  a clash between different forces', which, in turn, is the result of  a 'plurality 
of  causes'. The dominant trend, however, was to emphasise the subtle nature of  social 
determination. But even if  the respondent emphasised the socially patterned nature of  
practices, some reference was made to the creative and agential capacities of  individuals. 
Some respondents emphasised the role of  structure. Others were more optimistic about 
the power of  agency, but both versions implied some sort of  dialectical relationship. 
There was no mention of  society as an inherently deterministic system (though there was 
talk of  systems – see above) or an entity sui generis. At best, societies were regarded as 
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systems of  norms and ideas that (i) are reproduced through practices and (ii) exist in the 
form of  these practices and the ideas/norms that govern them. This suggests that a 
certain amount of  ambiguity vis-à-vis its object is fairly explicit and the practitioners 
themselves seem to be aware of  this. This becomes even more apparent when we look at 
their opinions on natural science. 
Identity and Difference 
The juxtaposition of  sociology and the natural sciences is a fairly traditional one, and 
Latvian sociologists employed different strategies to deal with this question. One was to 
emphasise that the sociology did not command great respect in the eyes of  the general 
public, but this did not make sociology less scientific. 
There is, of  course, a stereotype that the social sciences are easier than the natural 
sciences, but... In my opinion that is only an assumption, because, like I said, if  you wish 
to be knowledgeable in any scientific field, it makes no difference whether it's the 
natural sciences or the social sciences. Maybe the question is... the person... what he 
likes. Some people might prefer working in a laboratory... alone. Others might prefer 
communicating with people.  
Borr 
It was acknowledged, however, that sociology is more interpretive and the research 
process is fraught with uncertainty. 
Sociology differs from the natural sciences in that humans are determined socially as 
well as subjectively and psychologically. What is more, all this changes as time goes on. 
Kvasir 
 
The natural sciences appear to be more precise. The laws they posit cannot be disputed 




In the social sciences... the fact that we're studying people means that there will be 
problems with replicability... Of  course we can't conduct experiments... This makes the 
knowledge... it is much more subject to various contingencies... and this makes them 
more interpretable...  
Weth 
A related view (that often overlapped with the first one) pointed to the dynamic and fluid 
nature of  social forms. This had two consequences. The first has to do with nature of  the 
research process itself  – it is subject to various contingencies that the researcher cannot 
fully control for and eliminate. The respondents generally believed that this was not 
caused by the methodological immaturity of  sociology. Rather, it was the peculiarity and 
complexity of  its object that defied a clear articulation of  it.  
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God damn! If  your object was this complex... you'd screw up as well. 
Delling 
The second was that the natural sciences were much better at controlling and predicting 
the behaviours of  their respective objects.  
The complexity of  the mechanisms means that the knowledge becomes increasingly 
more probabilistic in nature. 
Var 
On the whole, however, my respondents did not agree that sociology or the social 
sciences in general were less scientific. By far the most popular strategy was to challenge 
the distinction by pointing to the increase in uncertainty in the natural sciences and 
intimating that the differences in scope, rigour and explanatory power were more 
apparent than real. They recognised that, in terms of  reputation at least, the social 
sciences were a distant second to their cousins in the natural sciences. Forms of  
knowledge with a more pronounced quantitative dimension enjoy higher public esteem, 
but a number of  sociologists indicated that these were simply better at concealing the 
interpretive and contingent elements. This does not make them more scientific.  
The differences seem fairly apparent at first, because it is easier for the natural sciences 
to identify their object and it is assumed that in the natural sciences the object isn't as 
changeable […] as society […]. I did a course as an undergraduate. It was 
called...philosophy... physics... philosophical issues in physics […], and the impression I 
got was that the differences are much less pronounced than we are inclined to think. 
Fulla 
This suggests that something peculiar is going on. Sociologists freely acknowledged that 
the exact nature of  their research object was somewhat ambiguous and the research 
process reflected this. They were also fully aware of  the disparity in terms of  reputation 
between the natural sciences and their own field. What they refused to accept, however, 
was that this is somehow due to the feebleness of  sociology. There are differences, of  
course, but these are not qualitative differences that would make it justifiable to assign the 
social sciences to a lesser epistemic order. How, then, to explain this disparity in 
reputation?  
I think that the social sciences are... are finding it more difficult to be scientific... It is 
easier for the natural sciences, because the way it is set up. You know, ideas about what it 
means to be useful... It is deeply rooted in the minds of  individuals and society in 
general, but... Well, the social sciences … There is a great variety of  opinions and 
debates, and this makes people... Well, they don't find it convincing and they don't see 
of  what use it is. 
Nanna 
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A seemingly pertinent point of  reference in this context would be my respondents' views 
on whether sociological knowledge can claim objectivity, but this, again, turned out to be 
more complicated than it would appear at first.  
The question of  objectivity in the social sciences has a long and illustrious history, but a 
prominent theme in my interviews was that this dichotomy (subjective/objective) was not 
a useful one.  
In my opinion this distinction adds very little to our... understanding. It is more 
appropriate to talk about... well... classical.... procedural norms. And to say that this 
makes it objective... I don't know. 
Delling 
 
Questions about objectivity are fundamentally naïve – these are questions about the 
researcher. 
Tyr 
A possible explanation for this is that this dichotomy is polysemous, which means that 
the predicates subjective and objective imply slightly different things depending on the 
context in which they are placed. My respondents were fully aware of  this and either 
asked me to clarify what I meant or provided a definition themselves. 
You have all these methods... that, well, help to... I don't know. Objective in relation to 
what? The methods we use allow us to understand to what extent and what opinion... 
well, which opinion is being represented with the methods we are employing. You know, 
what the sample is and how representative the data are... That's what we can say. 
Nanna 
However, as with the previous questions, the overall situation was messy. For every 
response that hinted at the possibility of  objectivity there was a counter-position that 
challenged this belief  on those very same grounds. For example, some sociologists 
located the source of  objectivity in the proper use of  methods (see above). But there 
were others who were quick to point out that this is not as straightforward, because 
someone has to interpret the data.  
Now, while there were instances where interpretative work was treated as a potentially 
contaminating factor, interpretation itself  was considered a key part of  the process. I 
pursued this issue further by discussing the differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research. The responses were tentative because a number of  my respondents 
said that they were proficient in the use of  either qualitative or quantitative methods but 
not both. Consequently, even though a number of  the sociologists I interviewed 
preferred mixed methods research, I suspect that they would claim expertise of  only one 
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set of  methods. 
A prominent theme in the responses was the reticence to claim that quantitative studies 
were superior to qualitative studies. For the purposes of  clarity I defined objectivity in 
terms of  observer-neutrality. That is to say, I asked my respondents whether quantitative 
methods were better at limiting the effect that the researcher had on the research process. 
The responses were varied. Some believed that quantitative studies, if  done correctly, 
were more objective than qualitative studies.  
It is very easy to slide into subjectivity when you are using qualitative methodology. 
Freya 
 
Qualitative methods give you greater interpretive flexibility and a range of  different 
paths you can follow. Quantitative methods arrange everything in an orderly fashion, but 
I think that quantitative studies become more interesting when they can show us what's 
behind this order. 
Var 
As the second quote suggests, however, this did not necessarily result in the studies being 
of  higher academic value, because the importance was still placed on the interpretive 
skills of  the sociologist. The interpretive dimension was also prominent among those 
who felt that quantitative methods were simply better at hiding the subtle ways and 
methodological choices with which the sociologist affects the course of  the research 
process.  
Again, this is where qualitative research differs from quantitative research. 
Where...where you have quantitative methods and mathematical methods you can hope 
for a quantitative... well, a more objective use of  methods and results, but... but... I like 
this one idea that I've heard in a different discipline, unrelated to sociology, is that... For 
example, how we assess the risk involved in particular projects etc. - qualitatively and 
quantitatively. But the quantitative is also based on human evaluations. 
Narvi 
 
I don't think that quantitative methods are a sign of  objectivity, because your choice of  
method has an impact on what the results are going to be... definitely. 
Kvasir 
 
Theoretically there is a decrease in subjectivity, but... you can still influence the data and 
there is a certain amount of  interpretability. On the one hand... The results themselves... 
they represent something, they are somewhat objective. The question is – how are they 
interpreted? 
Borr 
This, however, became relevant when considering public perception of  sociology.  
Quantitative methodology has chosen the broad application of  mathematical statistics as 
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the criterion of  objectivity for the realisation of  the ever important scientific principle. 
Formalisation and quantification are characteristics that must guarantee the successful 
functioning of  this methodology in the development of  sociology by building a 
knowledge-foundation appropriate for the tradition of  scientism. 
(Laķis 2005: 14) 
As the above quote suggests, there is nothing surprising about the rhetorical force of  
quantitative studies, not least because they can draw on the authority possessed by the 
natural sciences. The family resemblance that exists between quantitative sociology and 
the natural sciences means that it is easier for quantitative studies to pass as science, 
because, as one respondent puts, 'the rules are much clearer' (Delling). In other words, it 
is easier for quantitative studies to appear scientific, because they have the trappings of  
what people take to be science (e.g. hypotheses and numerical data). This, of  course, 
impacts on the efficacy of  sociological data. 
If  we approach them with qualitative ideas... there is no understanding or 
comprehension. However, if  we go with... in 70% of  the cases... Well, then... there is a 
greater chance of  success, there is greater impact. But personally... I trust qualitative 
data. 
Narvi 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, while still an acceptable form of  gathering 
knowledge are more complicated to evaluate. What is more, this is not a problem that is 
specific to outsiders who only have vague notions of  natural science as points of  
reference when relating to a qualitative study.  
Students often choose qualitative studies, because they think it will be easier. But that's 
not true. It is not easier. Not in the least bit. It is more complicated. 
Freya 
 
The classic definition of  objectivity... Most qualitative studies would not fall under it, 
however... to say that they are not objective... Well, you clearly need a different word for 
it. Everyone who's done qualitative research has reached the point of  saturation, where 
the data start repeating themselves, where certain patterns emerge and you can say with 
certainty 'Yes, that's the way things are'... And you would say that it isn't objective simply 
because you can't quantify it? All patterns are interpretable, but so is quantitative data 
Fulla 
 
It is clear that qualitative researchers can never rid themselves of... well, she can try to do 
it and she, in fact, tries to do it, but it remains in some form. 
 
The researcher must do her best to limit subjectivism and evaluative statements, […] 
otherwise it wouldn't be science. The question is – where do you draw the line? 
Weth 
This raises an important question. Remember that, according to Kuhn, an integral part of  
a paradigm is consensus. This allows scientific work to proceed smoothly with little 
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attention and resources diverted to disputing the finer theoretical points of  the 
disciplinary engine. In the case of  sociology, however, such disputes and uncertainties are 
not played down – they are integral to the way sociologists understand sociology. That is 
to say, sociologists constantly reflect upon their analytical categories and the methods 
they use. 
To a certain extent this is unsurprising. Steven Shapin (2008a) has said that academic 
disciplines that have not quite managed to persuade the public of  their validity as 
scientific endeavours spend a great deal of  time exploring and interrogating the nature of  
the scientific method. This is very true of  sociology (Law 2008) which encourages its 
practitioners to be reflexive about the methodological choices they make. This has 
currency in the academic world, but, I would argue, is also a contributing factor to the 
ambiguity surrounding sociological knowledge. That is to say, sociology is a form of  
knowledge that does not consciously seek to eradicate self-deconstruction and 
equivocation. 
From a constructivist point of  view this is a highly precarious strategy. While 
constructivists have tried to show that stability and consensus is an achievement 
facilitated by intricate forms of  collaboration between human and non-human agents, 
these very same qualities are used as proxies for success. Furthermore, special attention is 
paid to attempts to divert attention from the artificiality of  the networks that guarantee it 
(i.e. purification). This strategy may be more pronounced in the case of  Bruno Latour, 
but it is equally apparent in the work of  Pierre Bourdieu. For example, even though 
Bourdieu was adamant that politics should not be used as an analogy for the logic 
governing good science (quite the opposite – the logic of  science should be a template 
for politics), his approach highlighted the importance of  a robust disciplinary identity. 
This allowed sociology to impose its own descriptions on certain aspects of  common 
reality and so assert the relevance of  the discipline. My conversations with Latvian 
sociologists, on the other hand, seem to suggest that sociology has a molten, rather than 
solid, core. What is more, this does not seem to bother them – not in the abstract at least. 
What is Good Sociology? 
Constructivist science studies proceed from the position that knowledge is constituted 
through a process of  contestation, negotiation and interaction between various 
perspectives and heterogeneous agents. For example, the quality of  a piece of  research  is 
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collectively established and should not be treated as if  it were something that was 
intrinsic to it – the reality of  its quality is procedurally constituted (Latour and Woolgar 
1986; Law 2004). This project proceeds on the assumption that the above applies equally 
well to sociology as a discipline, whose very nature, purpose and integrity is subject to 
negotiations and dispute. My interviews with Latvian sociologists, however, suggest that, 
at the discursive level at least, disputes as to what determines quality are not present 
within the discipline. 
After the first couple of  interviews I realised that my informants and I were working with 
very different background assumptions as to what constituted good quality academic 
work. I included a question about the quality of  research output after I noticed that my 
respondents used words such as “cogent”, “persuasive”, “compelling” and “sound” as if  
it were self-evident what they meant in relation to an academic or any other research 
publication. In other words, it seemed to me that my respondents were working with the 
assumption that (i) the distinction between a good piece of  research and a bad one was 
easy to draw and (ii) the criteria and considerations they used were utterly uncontentious. 
By addressing this issue explicitly, however, a more complicated picture arose.  
This seems broadly consonant with the findings of  Michèle Lamont who studied how 
quality is defined by members of  grant panels (Lamont 2009; Lamont et al. 2004). She 
suggests that it would be more appropriate to treat quality and excellence as polymorphic 
qualities that emerge from emotionally and epistemologically charged interactions 
between scholars with conflicting views. A stabilising element in these interactions is 
what she calls “disciplinary cultures” that largely determine what members of  a particular 
academic field take to be signs of  quality and excellence. According to Lamont, 
[h]umanists often define interpretative skills as quintessential for the production of  
high-quality scholarship. Social scientists, especially those who champion empiricism, 
more often deride interpretation as a corrupting force in the production of  truth. 
(Lamont 2009: 61) 
What needs to be borne in mind is that Lamont is referring to the more interpretive 
branches of  social science, because, as she herself  puts it, she  
was unable to gain access to the more scientific social science panels, such as those of  
the National Science Foundation. 
(Lamont 2009: 56) 
Now, a number of  my respondents expressed sentiments that seemed to support 
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Lamont's conclusions. What is more, this was not a belief  that was unique to sociologists 
who generally favoured the more quantitative side of  sociology. A few sociologists who 
use qualitative methods (e.g. interviews and critical discourse analysis) were equally 
committed to the belief  that a clear separation between data and interpretation is a 
prerequisite of  a good research report. 
I have also made this mistake. I wanted to pass my interpretation as...data, yes. 
Sif 
 
If  we are doing statistical analysis, that is objective. Our interpretations will be 
subjective, but the results are objective. 
Nerthus 
 
It is normal that the results match. It would be strange if  they didn't. Then we'd have 
reason to suspect that there was a problem at one end.  We'd have to start thinking 
about who has imposed his interpretation on the data. 
Snotra 
The main reason for this, I believe, is that, as both Tabūns (2010) and Tisenkopfs (2010) 
mention, sociologists in Latvia are mainly engaged in applied research, and there have 
been few theoretical developments. In other words, theoretical reflection does not 
constitute a significant part of  sociological work. One of  the respondents explicitly 
references this as a problem and claims that Latvian sociologists need to start developing 
their own theoretical traditions and stop adapting Western theories. 
You see, if  we keep talking about it like this...like we have to adapt anything that comes 
from the West without our own... suggestions or innovations, we will always be in a 
dependent position. We should, I think, change our attitude. We have to stop simply 
borrowing from the West and try to adapt it to our circumstances. We should... these 
questions... We should critically, reflexively.... at least start talking about these issues. 
Dagr 
This is also addressed in Humans and Life, in which the authors claim that, in addition to 
familiarising themselves with Western theories, Latvian sociologists should develop 
theories that reflect the idiosyncrasies and sociohistorical trajectory of  Latvian society 
(Zepa and Zobena 1996: 9). The distribution of  funds among the sciences, however, has 
created a situation where researchers devote most of  their time to applied research. 
Sociologists in Latvia... what they mostly do is applied research. 
Hoenir 
A direct result of  this is that none of  the people I interviewed expressed an attachment 
to a particular theoretical framework, even though some certainly had their preferences. 
Most claimed that (i) their theoretical choices were determined by the aims of  the 
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research and (ii) they would have no problem mixing theories and methods if  the 
situation called for it. This lack of  attachment to particular theoretical traditions has 
created a situation where the quality of  a piece of  research is generally believed to be 
located at the methodological level, because the theoretical content of  most sociological 
research is fairly limited.  
The fact that such consensus exists as to the determinants of  quality is slightly puzzling 
in the context of  Lamont's claim that agreement on what constitutes quality and 
excellence is usually indicative of  consensus and uniformity in the field in general. For 
example, the arguments used by economists and political scientists reflected similar ideas 
and academic values, whereas fields such as English literature and anthropology exhibited 
greater diversity of  opinion and even dissensus (Lamont 2009: ch. 3). Now, while the 
responses to the first few questions did not exactly suggest dissensus, they did manifest 
signs of  internal heterogeneity (molten core). Furthermore, Lamont suggests that the 
fields that had achieved a generalised homogeneity had done so through either theoretical 
consolidation (political science) or a commitment to mathematical formalism 
(economics). Neither of  these strategies are reminiscent of  Latvian sociology, as there 
was little faith in abstract mathematical models or the value of  a particular theoretical 
framework. In fact, the closest discipline to Latvian sociology seems to be history in 
which 'a relatively strong consensus is based on a shared sense of  craftsmanship' (Lamont 
2009: 4). While the materials that the craft-oriented sociologist has at her disposal are 
certainly different, questions pertaining to quality were mostly answered with reference to 
the skills necessary to provide a competent account of  the research process.  
A competent use of  method in relation to... yes... in relation to the theoretical 
foundation on which the researcher is standing. The data process, of  course. How the 
data was gathered, how the researcher has... let's say... connected the data... how the 
relationships within the data have been explained. 
Forseti 
 
You have to clearly define the problem, the perspective and the method. You have to 
show how... your contribution and how your results support your claims. 
Kvasir 
 
When I'm reading an article I look at how transparent the section on methodology is. 
The principles underlying the study, the selection of  participants and the sample. So... 
the description of  the methodology and the process, after which... after reading which I 
can... make a decision. 
Fulla 
As with the historians that Lamont interviewed, the emphasis on methods proved to be 
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the common ground for practitioners with different theoretical outlooks. However, this 
very same attachment to a competent use and deployment of  methods is what seemed to 
be central to sociologists' attempts to draw a boundary between themselves and amateurs, 
or even charlatans. 
Experts or Professionals? 
Michèle Lamont mentions that when discussing questions pertaining to quality and 
excellence some of  her respondents referred to ineffable qualities (Lamont 2009: ch. 5). 
While this was not particularly pronounced in the case of  Latvian sociologists, there was 
the occasional reference to uncodified professional standards or the experience and 
competence of  the researcher that did not derive exclusively from the professional 
training she had received. This seems relatively uncontentious at first. 
James Scott (1999) has argued that modern state-building technologies have relied 
excessively on the importance of  abstract criteria and principles, which, in most cases, are 
characterised by (i) a certain rigidity that does not allow them to attend to the specificities 
of  the locality and (ii) a disregard for the unwritten rules that allow a particular social 
arrangement to function. Such tools, as Scott notes, are extremely powerful and 
productive, but a heavy-handed application of  these can have devastating consequences 
because they tend to ignore the importance of  seemingly irrelevant or coincidental 
aspects of  a situation which are in fact crucial to its proper functioning. He contrasts this 
to the experience gained via practice (e.g. an experienced doctor or ship captain). An 
individual with such experience not only knows the rules, but also knows how and when 
to bend and adjust them if  the situation calls for it. This would seem to be the kind of  
experience that could serve as a proxy for quality.  
A similar approach to expertise in the social sciences is provided by Bent Flyvbyerg 
(2001). Drawing on the work of  Aristotle and Hubert Dreyfus he argues that a social 
scientist is someone whose rendering of  the situation can and usually will be different 
from that of  the participants. According to Dreyfus, an expert is someone who is no 
longer bound by the rules and instructions that guide the actions of  a beginner or even a 
competent user. An expert is someone who has an intuitive grasp of  the situation. 
Following explicit rules is not characteristic of  human experts and, therefore, a formal 
description and justification of  the process that lead to a particular conclusion is often 
retrospective. Experts come up with a justification, which is, in fact, not representative of  
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how and why they chose to do things a certain way. It is merely a rationalised 
reconstruction that makes the process appear congruent with the official framework – 
the rules beginners have to learn. A good social scientist is just such an expert. The 
experience she has acquired by practising her craft allows her to make intuitive leaps. 
Sociologists are not by definition more competent than non-experts. They are simply 
more dogged in their pursuit of  answers and through practice have refined their 
techniques for doing this. 
It's because they have been trained to consider these kinds of  things... and... If  they 
don't think about these kinds of  things, they analyse statistical data... interviews... This 
intuition comes as a bonus... as an understanding. 
Narvi 
 
Sociologists simply are simply more focused. They work on, and think about, these 
questions. It is their job. 
Sif 
Even though sometimes preceded by self-directed irony e.g. 
A theoretical framework, a conceptual approach [laughs], systematic... claims based on 
systematic data analysis. 
Fulla 
this kind of  sentiment was echoed in a number of  responses that located the source of  
the sociologist's expertise in her professional competence. 
A professional knows that things must be done a certain way, because there are laws. It 
is the same with sociology. There are people who are naturally gifted at posing the right 
questions...  and obtaining the necessary information, but he cannot really explain why 
that is. Why was this the right question to ask? He probably had an intuition. These 
people who have not studied...they... they would probably be unable to offer an 
explanation if  they were asked for one. 
Borr 
 
The knowledge is more reliable... because they have been obtained [telephone rings in 
the background – distracts us both]. Well, induction, deduction... Ultimately, what is... If  
we approach this sociologically. We observe facts and make generalisations. The 
question is how we chose these facts and how valid are the generalisations. […]. The 
sociologist should be someone who can explain why his generalisation is reliable. 
Weth 
 
This requires special skills and techniques. It requires a trained mentality and... 
communication skills, the ability to solve problems and the methods for doing so and 
skills etc.  
Kvasir 
The sociologist was also believed to possess the ability to contextualise data and 
arguments, and attempt to transcend, or at least not ignore, her own inherent 
situatedness.  
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Sociologists can step back from the way they look at the world... create a new way of  
looking at things... and see... and provide a take on the situation that can maybe let you 
compare ten different perspectives or the one that is most important. 
Tyr 
 
As first-order observers we cannot always be objective, but there has to be this... ability... 
tendency... to broaden our gaze and incorporate many different opinions. 
Saga 
 
That is the ability to see that I, as a member of  society, am not the whole of  society. 
That my social position differs fundamentally... that the other person is different from 
me not only because his psychological qualities and temperament, but also due to his 
social status and social experience... 
Freya 
Occasionally sociological expertise was related to professional experience alluded to 
above. As in – the more experience a sociologist has, the better she is at her job. An 
experienced sociologist can often ignore the official guidelines, because his/her 
experience, and the refined form of  intuition that comes with it, is better suited to 
dealing with complex issues.  
When we as sociologists look at society we need a sociological imagination, because we 
cannot approach things mechanically and try to describe something. The precision of  








Of  course, if  we are talking about an inexperienced sociologist, a novice... Well, then 
anything can happen – even differences in interpretation. This would seem to imply that 
quantitative studies are more objective, because you have all these numbers...  But even 
numbers cannot protect you from  making blunders. In qualitative studies it has more 
to do with the researcher's life experiences and her experience with methods. It is a 
question of  practice. 
Snotra 
In many cases, however, my respondents were unsure as to what distinguished them from 
people who had not gone through rigorous academic training. More often than not their 
responses were a combination of  the following: 
(i) both groups have the same knowledge, but from different perspectives; 
(ii) sociologists have a much more systematic and conceptual form of  this knowledge; 
(iii) sociologists have access to different perspectives, which makes them realise that 
problems are seldom as simple as they seem to ordinary people; 
(iv) sociologists have an imagination that can render explicit the codes and beliefs 
implicit in social practices; 
(v) sociological knowledge is susceptible to falsification and responsive to recalcitrant 
evidence (because sociology is a science). 
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In other words, while expertise, as understood by Scott and Flyvbjerg, was invoked, a 
parallel strategy was to emphasise the importance of  formal training that located the 
source of  expertise in the methods, theories and research practices that constitute 
sociology. I realised the importance of  the second strategy when it became clear that 
questions of  quality and competence were integral components in a broader issue 
pertaining to boundary-work (Gieryn 1983; Lamont and Molnar 2002). In other words, 
depending on whether sociologists had to define themselves in relation to lay people or 
other professionals encroaching upon their territory, they emphasised different attributes 
of  the sociological identity. For example, formal qualifications were more important 
when sociologists were trying to differentiate themselves from other professionals, 
whereas experience was prominent when talking about the lay public. 
The emergence and institutionalisation of  disciplinary formations has attracted a fair 
amount of  scholarly attention, and sociology has not been immune to this trend (Abbott 
2001a; Gouldner 1970; 1973; Wagner et al. 1991; Wagner 2001). The issues that my 
respondents raised, however, pertained to the appropriation of  sociological methods by 
outsiders. This question was addressed by Pierre Bourdieu who discussed it as a struggle 
over intellectual turf  (see also Abbott 2001a) and stressed the importance of  asserting 
sociological authority over other forms of  knowledge attempting to explain the social. A 
similar approach is evident in Latour's work on Louis Pasteur and his laboratory (Latour 
1983; 1993). According to Latour, Pasteur redefined reality by weaving another thread 
into its fabric and positioning itself  between it (the anthrax bacillus) and the actors whose 
lives it affected. He mobilised a set of  instruments and acquired a monopoly on an aspect 
of  reality about and for which he could speak.  
In the case of  Latvian sociology, however, the competitors are not other disciplines. The 
specificity of  Latvian sociology (mostly applied research) means that its territorial 
disputes are with people who have no training in sociology but still use similar tools of  
mobilisation (sociological methods – surveys in particular) to strengthen their claims. 
Such anxieties are certainly not unique to sociology, but I would like to propose that the 
meaning of  these disputes for sociologists is at least twofold. 
Method and Credibility 
Firstly, sociology was often juxtaposed with the knowledge possessed, and forms of  
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sociology practised, by marketing research43 companies. The people working there had 
read books and possessed a rudimentary understanding of  the methods they used, but 
the quality of  their research was considered dreadful and laughable. For example, one 
sociologist caricatured the head researcher of  a well-known social research company: 
“See, I'm so successful as a sociologist, because I am an engineer”, which, in my 
opinion, is hooey. 
Freya 
These very same marketing research companies were also mentioned as having a 
damaging effect on public perception of  sociology. Consequently, a number of  my 
informants said they would not be averse to introducing some form of  professional 
certification that would authorise holders of  said certificate to practice social research 
and employ the sociologist's arsenal of  methods, though most expressed some concern 
about the prevalence of  such pseudosociology. 
Secondly, they were concerned about effect this had on the credibility of  sociology, and 
some of  the people I interviewed expressed their dislike for what they considered a 
simplistic understanding of  sociology both by the general public and politicians. In the 
case of  the latter the problem was fairly obvious – they simply did not know what 
sociology could offer. This, of  course, resulted in very limited demand for professionally 
designed and implemented research but did not necessarily have a damaging effect on 
public perception of  sociology. The main problem was associated with the general 
ignorance of  the nature of  sociology and the methodological rigour involved in carrying 
out sound sociological research. 
Most people have no understanding about what happens in qualitative research and 
what it allows you to find out. There have even been instances where... someone has 
commissioned research on a particular topic. You give him a qualitative study... He just 
doesn't get it. He wants numbers and percentages. […] He wants a survey, so that it is 
clear... this is the way things are. Because then it is indisputable – you can't argue with 
numbers. Whereas a focus group... Well, they met up and had a chat... what of  it? 
Freya 
 
There is a widespread opinion that sociology is something primitive. People think that 
they can put a survey with three questions on the website of  their fitness club... What do 
you think will be the favourite sport of  the young prince? And then I can publish the 
results that 23 people said... I don't know... basketball, and then I can declare that 
Latvians think that the prince will play basketball. Something along those lines. 
Forseti 
The sociological expert was believed to be someone who can be evaluated by other 
                                                 
43 My informants used pejorative terms for which I am struggling to find an English analogue. 
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competent sociologists and practitioners of  cognate academic fields, because, even 
though indicators of  quality are external, lay people lack the requisite expertise to 
distinguish between good sociology and pseudosociology. In most cases they can be no 
more than competent users of  research that has already been certified by the sociological 
establishment. I do not mean to suggest that my respondents subscribed to a kind of  
intellectual elitism. They rightfully acknowledged that amateurs can show remarkable 
sociological insight that should be taken into account. There are plenty of  highly 
perceptive lay sociologists, but the intuitive, methodologically undisciplined and 
empirically dubious nature of  such exercises in lay sociology makes them ill-suited for 
professional research. Professional sociologists, on the other hand, have a systematic and 
rigorous approach to the issues they study, which gives their pronouncements greater 
epistemic weight and credibility.  
Sociology and Fiction 
The above statement hints at something special about sociology. It is presumed that 
professional sociology is somehow different from the intuitive leaps made by lay 
sociologists. To address this issue in more detail I decided to include questions about the 
differences between sociological theory and literature that borders on fiction or a kind of  
investigative journalism. In my conversations with Latvian sociologists I tried to 
determine what they thought were the differences between sociology and, as I referred to 
them, literary-sociological allegories. When asked for examples of  what I meant, I 
mentioned dystopian literature and a number of  prominent authors in contemporary 
social theory (e.g. Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek and Zygmunt Bauman). Furthermore, I 
also asked them whether these are academically acceptable contributions to sociological 
discourse (e.g. would they allow their students to reference these authors in their 
assignments). The responses were manifold and contradictory. On the one hand, it was 
believed that such writings had a place in sociology. Indeed, a number of  my respondents 
were confident that such literature is of  paramount importance to sociology, because it 
alters the way we approach social life and provides food for thought. In other words, it is 
a source of  hitherto unexplored options and perspectives on social phenomena.  
I consider it social philosophy, but I think that...for highly abstract discussions... they are 
appropriate. They are provocative and interesting for intellectual... intellectual exercises. 




If  these theorists had not done what they did, who began to study quality of  life with 
new conceptual resources, I don't know with what frameworks we'd study them today. It 
was necessary. 
Nerthus 
In addition, it is a great way to package sociological ideas in a form that is more appealing 
to a wider audience. Yes, it may be lacking in academic rigour, but it can get the point 
across more easily and effectively. 
The positive thing about all this is that, if  we disregard the speculative nature of  such 
writings... Well, it is a kind of  PR move. If  you're not speculative, people will... Well... 
The ability to successfully communicate knowledge and your perspective... it requires... a 
less, less rigid approach to methodology, which, in most cases, is shockingly boring. 
Mimir 
However, there were a number of  reservations about such an approach. First of  all, this 
concerned the relationship between theory and data. One could certainly look to such 
texts for inspiration, but when it came to sociological research theoretical musings should 
not eclipse the role of  data.  
You've let theory take over the data, but this is not acceptable, because data... Theories 
exist only to help us identify potential links and connections. Data is primary, because if  
you let theory run amok... why the hell did you need the data in the first place? 
Tyr 
This point can be developed further by homing in on one of  the more prominent 
differences between such texts. Namely, academic texts have to be written in a certain 
way, whereas fiction and journalism have more diffuse literary requirements. When it 
comes to sociology, the Latvian version tends to be fairly traditional in its commitment to 
a literary technology in the vein of  aperspectival objectivity (Daston 1992). There are 
marked formal differences between academic texts and language, and colloquial uses of  
language and tropes in everyday situations. It would be easy to dismiss this as a kind of  
formalism, but, in conjunction with the concern regarding the dominance of  theory over 
data, it is more accurately viewed as an attempt to maintain the integrity of  sociological 
discourse. That is to say, theoretical speculation and frivolous use of  language are 
dangerous allies to a form of  sociology that is committed to professionalism, because the 
former blurs the boundary between proper sociology and ill-disciplined lay sociology. 
Conclusions 
At the end of  Chapter 4 I suggested that sociology may be self-undermining. The reason 
for this was that sociology had routinely done to itself  exactly what science studies tried 
to do to other disciplines, and such excessive self-consciousness had a destabilising effect 
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vis-à-vis a convergent disciplinary identity. I believe that the responses of  Latvian 
sociologists provide an illustration of  a different expression of  this tendency. This group 
of  people can certainly point to examples of  sociological work. They can provide 
tentative definitions of  what their discipline is about and a general outline of  the 
complexities involved in studying it. In some cases these answers are concise, but what is 
striking is the ambiguity and the multiple directions that their answers take you. The 
research object is multifaceted and ontologically ambiguous, and sociologists are acutely 
aware of  this. This is reflected in their answers, which are reflexive and opt for 
complexity rather than rhetorical punch. There is little in the way of  authoritative 
statements. What is more, a measured and thorough approach to questions is believed to 
be key to conscientious and diligent sociological work. However, this comes at a cost – a 
variety of  research styles co-exist side by side. The further away we go from classical 
sociology the less widely-recognised exemplars you have. This, by extension, suggests that 
sociology is characterised by the pluralism that Feyerabend was fond of, rather than the 
convergent thinking of  Kuhnian normal science44. This is not to say that sociology in 
Latvia is a sprawling mess. There is a kind of  family resemblance about the way Latvian 
sociologists characterise their discipline, and their commitment to methodological 
competence is something that unifies an otherwise decentred discipline. However, rather 
than stating that sociology has not yet reached scientific maturity (in the Kuhnian sense) 
or successfully autonomised its discourse and tools of  mobilisation (in the Latourian 
sense), I believe it is useful to consider the possibility that its diffuse and epistemically 
heterogeneous nature may be key to its health. This would bring us back full circle to the 
issues I discussed in the introduction. Paul Feyerabend, who is often regarded as an 
enemy of  science, should, I believe, more accurately be treated as an enemy of  
ossification and institutionalisation, whereas Thomas Kuhn was more comfortable with 
institutionalised science (Fuller 2003; 2006b). This is a conflict between two competing 
normative positions within the philosophy of  science, but a similar tension is very much 
in evidence in the responses recounted above. In other words, a dispute in the philosophy 
of  science is an equally central issue for sociology as a discipline. It is believed that, if  the 
issues were to be resolved, sociology would become a more respected academic 
discipline. However, what is good for sociology as an institution is not necessarily good 
for sociology as a form of  knowledge (and vice versa). From a constructivist standpoint 
                                                 
44 Indeed, it has been suggested that sociology is a multiple paradigm science (Ritzer 2001). 
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this is a highly complicated situation. On the one hand, constructivists focus on the need 
for stability and a monopoly over certain aspects of  reality. On the other hand, their 
normative inclinations (e.g. ontological politics, situated knowledges) are accompanied by 
an acknowledgement of  partiality and contingency – an impulse that seems to be 
conducive to the proliferation of  different perspectives. However, it is not always possible 
to practice science in this way, and this is what I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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7. Conversations with Latvian Sociologists, Part III: 
Knowledge, Communication and Politics 
 
In his book A Sociology of  Sociology Robert Friedrichs (1970) argues that, unlike the natural 
sciences, theories in the social sciences operate at two distinct levels. The first level 
consists of  the specific theory of  society that the particular author wants of  propose and 
argue for, and the second level involves a theory of  sociology and the role of  the 
sociologist. In other words, Friedrichs wants to suggest that a social theory comes 
bundled with a certain self-image of  both sociology and its practitioners. My sketch of  
Soviet interpretations of  Marxism is one example. The sociologist is not a detached 
researcher but a fully committed and politically conscientious social engineer. Gouldner's 
(1970) indictment of  structural-functionalism as a politically innocuous academic 
tradition is another.  
It could be argued that Friedrichs overlooks the extent to which a researcher's self-
understanding has been important in the natural sciences. This point has been made by 
McLaughlin (1972), and it can be backed up by looking at the work of  Steven Shapin, 
who has shown that, historically speaking, discussions of  science have come bundled 
with arguments regarding the character of  those who choose to practice it (Shapin 1991; 
1994; 2008b). For example, I argued in Chapter I that in 17th century England gentility 
was regarded as a powerful instrument in the disputes pertaining to the recognition and 
protection of  truth (Shapin 1994: 42). The gentleman was presumed to be a virtuous and 
honourable being, and this imbued his claims with integrity and truthfulness. A similar 
emphasis on the moral character of  scientists is evident in Shapin's analysis of  modern 
science and the scientific entrepreneur (Shapin 2008b). Shapin argues that the figure of  
the natural scientist as a virtuous human being was prevalent in early modernity (Shapin 
2008b: ch. 2). However, towards the beginning of  the 20th century this claim was called 
into question, and scientists were reimagined as morally equivalent to other people, 
though certainly constrained by an institution that values objectivity and integrity (e.g. 
Merton 1968). Nonetheless, a belief  in the special moral qualities of  the scientist 
persisted. For example, Shapin contends that the role of  the expert witness was a 
complex mix of  the professionalisation of  scientific culture and a belief  in the 
virtuousness of  scientists (Shapin 2008b: 45).  
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However, while the personal characteristics and convictions of  its practitioners had a 
bearing on the perception of  the natural sciences in early modernity, there does not seem 
to be a necessary link between scientific theories and social roles such as the one between 
Marxism and a politically active stance, for example. Sociology in Latvia is interesting in 
this regard because, as I argued in Chapter 6, it is mainly applied, theories have been 
reduced to a kind of  secondary, supplementary role and no particular theoretical tradition 
has claimed dominance in Latvian sociology. Moreover, my conversations with 
sociologists working in Latvia revealed signs of  internal heterogeneity. These, however, 
were offset by an emphasis on professional competence as a key component of  a 
sociologist's identity.  
At this point Shapin's analysis becomes relevant once more. Curiously enough, one of  
the main aspects that gradually altered the way scientists were perceived was the 
professionalisation of  the scientific trade. That is to say, if  the scientist of  early 
modernity was also a gentleman, the new generation of  scientists were simply a group of  
professionals who did science for money. This created a number of  discourses that even 
went so far as to state that the inutility of  the scientist's findings was the mark of  a pure 
scientist (Shapin 2008b: 58); there was a sense that money and industry were the causes 
of  ethical erosion. In the last three chapters of  his book The Scientific Life Shapin explores 
moral uncertainty in the context of  choices that scientists make regarding their careers. 
He discusses the issues that arise for scientists working within a capitalist research culture 
and emphasises the importance of  the moral authority and charisma of  individuals in the 
absence of  clear guidelines and institutional homogeneity. Among the questions he 
explores is how practising scientists negotiate and compromise between the freedom to 
pursue different lines of  enquiry and the financial constraints of  working in an institution 
that does science for money. In other words, Shapin focuses on the importance of  
personal integrity and fit with the institutional goals and requirements, and individual 
strategies for coping with the institutional arrangements of  which she is a part.  
Concerns such as the ones discussed above also have a presence in the sociological 
literature (Burawoy 2005a; Gouldner 1970; 1973; McClung Lee 1976) and were touched 
upon in Chapter 3.  In this chapter I will explore whether and how these commitments 
mesh with the complex and ever-present tension between (a) the sociologist as a provider 
of  knowledge about society and social trends and (b) the normative confusion 
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surrounding the import and nature of  such knowledge, and the attendant responsibilities 
of  the sociologist. 
Revisiting Weber and the Royal Society 
A key characteristic of  the ideal gentleman-scholar was his ability to restrain the urge to 
speculate on ultimate causes and stick to matters of  fact. Matters of  fact were the solid 
ground upon which discourse could be built and conflict and dissent kept at bay. 
Theories and hypotheses could be revised and discarded, but matters of  fact were 
permanent (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 23). The former were matters of  philosophical 
opinion, whereas the latter were not. A similar duality was at work in Weber's discussion 
regarding objectivity in the social sciences (Weber 1949). The findings of  a study were in 
the realm of  facts and scientific inquiry. Facts were susceptible to empirical confutation, 
and scientific disputes could, in principle, be resolved by way of  data and argument. 
Values were more complicated. They were not cognitive, and conflicts between different 
positions could not be resolved by way of  argument, no matter how persuasive. As Alvin 
Gouldner's reading of  Weber suggested, however, the injunction against value 
judgements in social research was prescriptive in nature. It was an ideal that researchers 
should strive for, even though it was elusive in practice (Gouldner 1973: 3-26; Burawoy 
2012), and it is a testament to Weber's influence that value-neutrality has become a 
prominent way to figure the relationship between sociologists and their work. 
The complexity of  this issue is equally apparent in the case of  Latvian sociology. The 
responses illustrate a range of  possible alternatives to dealing with the relationship 
between the descriptive and the evaluative dimensions of  their work. There was, for 
example, a group who were adamant that it is of  utmost importance to keep them 
separate and refrain from using loaded language. Such arguments were related to 
professionalism, and the ability to keep one's personal views in check was treated as a 
hallmark of  skill, quality and commitment to the scientific way of  life. 
If  a person is very knowledgeable and, say, they acquire a vast amount of  
information about it all, and carefully assess... [what] the actual facts [are], then 
subjectivity is reduced. 
Borr 
 




Researchers have to make an effort to free themselves from subjectivism and value 




I still think it depends [highly] on one's professionalism. 
Freya 
Even when the above link was not made explicit, others argued that one should try to 
separate and clearly distinguish between the arguments derived from the data and the 
researcher's own personal evaluations.  
Sometimes it helps with studying something in depth and looking for evidence, … but I 
have this instinct – so it wouldn't be too big of  a sham, or just some sort of  demagogy 
– I try to keep track of  what it is based on. 
Var 
 
Neutrality can be maintained through data. Neutrality is assured by the scientific quality 
and nature of  – of  the researcher's focus on what he's interested in as an object of  
study... more than, say, various other influences... 
If  you're aware of  your likes, your dislikes...your...doubts. At the same time, it allows you 
to be more neutral. 
Forseti 
 
Value judgements have to be made, but only at the very end. They can't be made at the 
beginning, when theories are chosen. It shouldn't influence our verification of  
hypotheses. Well, perhaps later on when you see it coming together... Well, then you 
make value judgements. You shouldn't be afraid. Things have changed since Max 
Weber's time. 
Delling 
Or, if  not possible, at least make the reader aware of  your position so as to give her the 
opportunity to judge for herself. This link was often made in the context of  a thorough 
description of  the methodology. 
The more extensive and more detailed my description of  something, well... the more I 
let my reader judge for herself. I'm not... trying to declare that something is right, that 
something is good, rather... with all that I've done, how I've described it...Well, I make 
it...Well, I don't know... more transparent, more understandable, so that they can see my 
line of  thinking. 
 Nanna 
 
Well, you have to make an effort on some level, but... it's impossible, yet you have to 
think about it. Meaning... this... you have to reflect on the impact of  the researcher's 
values on a specific topic. What are his prejudices and ideas, that can influence... you 
have to think about it.  
Sif 
 
Perhaps it would be more honest to show yourself  completely, instead of  hiding 
behind...well... behind statements about trying to ignore something. Just admit that 
you're aware of  it. 
Tyr 
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The responses suggest a mingling of  different aspects of  the professional stance – it was 
framed as a virtue, as well as an indicator of  the integrity of  the final product. Most of  
my informants, however, chose to challenge the question and expressed scepticism as to 
the possibility of  clearly distinguishing between the descriptive and the evaluative 
dimensions of  a piece of  sociological research. This was due to the fact that most 
sociological work in Latvia is applied, which means that the research goals are specified 
for the researchers. In practice this often requires that researchers produce project 
reports that must include a list of  recommendations in the form of  suggestions for 
future research and advice for particular courses of  action. This, however, does not result 
in tension with Weber's call for value-neutrality in sociological research. As you may 
recall, Weber was perfectly comfortable with sociology and researchers in general being 
tasked to consult an interested party and providing technical solutions to a problem.  The 
state of  affairs in Latvia means that questions pertaining to value-neutrality are often 
simply circumvented, because the value relevance of  a piece of  research is externally 
defined, as are the ends to which researchers are tasked with finding the means.  
Research projects always have a source of  funding, certain goals and certain interests. 
Freya 
 
Initially, research is neutral, of  course...in a way. Of  course, you have to follow the rules. 
You have to send recommendations to the European Commission, and to the local 
government, but the rules are clear, aren't they, and the recommendations aren't 
politically motivated, they come out of  the research. 
Kvasir 
This, of  course, suggests that sociologists themselves are not creatively involved in the 
co-construction of  the normative context and must content themselves with being placed 
in a technical or advisory capacity. In other words, while Weber was concerned with 
keeping politics and research separate, Latvian sociologists construe themselves as actors 
in an environment where research is done in the context of  political action. Latour would 
probably concur and highlight the importance of  building alliances and emphasising 
one's value to a successful and well founded decision. That is to say, for Latour there 
would be little reason to lament the role that sociology has acquired. This, however, 
illustrates a point of  disagreement between Bourdieu and Latour – namely, the former 
thought that sociology should be fussy about whose ends it serves. 
A Camera, not a Photographer 
In the previous chapter I suggested that sociological textbooks argued for a kind of  back-
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and-forth movement between sociology and the society in question. Interestingly enough, 
sociology was figured as a mirror, and this very same metaphor was invoked on a number 
of  occasions.  
Well, you'll probably hear the same thing from Aivars Tabūns. That's what he taught me 
when he was my professor – that the best thing we could become was a mirror to 
society – to show our little faces and let us see what we look like. 
Hoenir 
The choice to go with a mirror is a peculiar one, not least because of  the connotations 
that come with it. The above quote suggests that the mirror metaphor is meant to convey 
the idea that sociological work shows us what we as a society actually look like. Read this 
way, mirroring inevitably leads to questions of  representation, an implicit representational 
theory of  knowledge and friction with the constructivist framework explored in this 
thesis. It also portrays sociologists as passive. A more active role was suggested by one of  
my informants who compared sociologists to photographers. 
I'll tell you what a student of  mine told me. I like this metaphor very much. We're 
photographers at a wedding, right? Sociologists, right? A metaphor. You're not really 
part of  it. Well, perhaps you drink a bit, but... you're the photographer, right? And the 
photos you take also depend on... if  you take a picture of  the best man with his mouth 




Or you've captured something that says a bit more about these people... I don't know, if  
you have the eye for it, because such photographers are... 
Saga 
As the above quote suggests, sociology is a profession that requires skill, but it also 
involves choices as to what to focus on and emphasise. Constructivist literature within 
science studies has argued that this is also a profoundly political question because  
research involves a decision as to what can be made absent and so rendered inessential 
(Law 2004); this has also been cast in terms of  scientific representation being a form of  
political representation (Latour 2004a; 2005). Thus, while at first glance the photographer 
is simply an extension of  the mirror metaphor, it reveals the political, or even partisan, 
dimension of  sociological work and opens up the relationship between knowledge, 
politics, and gives the sociologist a more active role in enacting her object 
We reveal some sort of  position in every word, in every sentence – like, the way we look 
at a certain issue. There are many aspects to every issue, and the aspect we choose to 
emphasise, without even expressing our opinion, already creates a certain perspective... 
Eir 
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This has interesting implications for the question of  objectivity. Daston and Gallison 
(2007) suggest that our understanding of  objectivity has undergone significant changes in 
the last two centuries alone. What is most striking about Daston and Galison's analysis is 
the claim that objectivity has historically contained an ethical dimension. In order to 
achieve objectivity of  the requisite sort the scientist had to discipline himself  and 
cultivate a certain kind of  self  (Daston and Galison 2007: 40). Furthermore, the authors 
show in great detail that an important question in relation to objectivity was not just 
distortion in the form of  prejudice or bias – the role of  trained judgement was equally 
prominent. In the 18th century the skill of  the experienced scientist was valued because it 
enabled him to see past surface diversity of  appearance and grasp the essence of  his 
object. This conception of  objectivity was gradually supplanted by a more exacting 
interpretation – mechanical objectivity. The latter replaced the emphasis on skill with an 
ethical disposition towards the restraint of  the self  and its proclivities for discrimination 
and idealisation. The idiosyncrasies of  the scientist were supposed be kept in check and 
prevented from influencing her work. In the 20th century, however, the role of  experience 
was reintroduced in the form of  trained judgement. It was believed that 19th century 
objectivity was inadequate for scientific work. Indeed, the return of  trained judgement in 
the 20th century suggests the possibility that objectivity may not be the most important of  
epistemic virtues because, as Daston (1992) suggests, aperspectival objectivity may, in 
fact, produce an impoverished account of  an object or phenomenon. 
However, not all of  my informants felt this way, and a more restrained version of  
objectivity (more camera than photographer) was prevalent. You may recall that earlier I 
argued that Latvian sociologists were cognisant of  the complexities of  disentangling 
evaluative statements from purely descriptive ones. This very same confusion manifested 
itself  in relation to objectivity. On the one hand, you had people who emphasised the 
importance of  objectivity.  
Well, you see, if  the scientist herself, the sociologist, wants to obtain objective facts, if  
she has the will, and the resources, to conduct an honest study, then and only then a 
sociologist's [..] work can claim to be objective. 
 Dagr 




I've never thought about this. It has always seemed self-evident that... my goal is to be 
objective. But, of  course... to say that the way I see society is 100% objective... well, I 
don't think I can. It's what I aim for. Objectivity – it's a goal. 
 Vali 
 
Objectivity should be seen as an ideal-type – as in – it is something we strive for. 
Eir 
Objectivity was seen as a characteristic of  good sociological work, but it was made clear 
that it is something that we can only hope to achieve because our perspectives are limited. 
Similarly to Daston and Galison (2007), discussions of  objectivity had axiological 
overtones. That is to say, objectivity was figured as a value, rather than a clearly 
identifiable characteristic that sociological research can exhibit. Similar sentiments were 
equally apparent in the responses of  those sociologists who did not believe that 
objectivity was, in fact, possible in sociology. 
Well, sociologists try, they do try to strive for objectivity, but... in fact they understand 
that absolute objectivity is impossible, yes. 
Sif 
 
There can be many theoretical approaches, so long as they don't become dogmatic and 
aren't applied dogmatically, so it doesn't become a bother. There is a certain objectivity 
to it, yes. You understand, don't you, that the framework... You don't just put the 
material in a framework and then try to force it in. 
Var 
If  objectivity was unobtainable, other techniques were invoked to restrain subjectivism 
and situate the perspectives of  sociologists. Thus, even though the way we chose to frame 
and phrase our research (even inadvertently) hampers our quest for objectivity, we can try 
to limit this. The link between objectivity and neutrality, however, was tenuous. 
Objectivity pertained to the quality of  the research output, whereas neutrality pertained 
to politics. e.g. 
I don't know if  objectivity is a burden to...the public or critical function of  sociology. 
Rather it pertains to methodology and academic integrity...in research. It's like the ABCs 
of  research... You can't be tendentious, you have to consider all the facts, look for 
contradictions... it's part of  the inventory of  sociological work. That is, if  somebody 
ignores it, it's a violation of  academic ethics. 
 Fulla 
The situation was more complicated than it appears at first, however, and the question of  
political neutrality proved to be a tricky one to pose and discuss. This was not due to my 
informants' commitment to value-neutrality or a lingering preference for descriptive 
sociology. Rather, it may have been because of  the negative connotations that partyness 
has in Latvia.  
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In Chapter 3 I argued that Soviet sociology had aligned itself  (or was forced to align 
itself) with the needs of  the Party and defined objectivity in terms of  partyness (i.e. a 
partiality towards the interests of  the party). Furthermore, this was one the few things 
that did not emerge from Western commentary on Soviet sociology but was actually an 
explicitly stated goal of  the journal Sociological Research. In view of  this, some of  my 
respondents expressed concerns that derived from a specific take on scientific integrity 
and the role of  sociological knowledge in political matters. Sociologists study the world. 
They have no business trying attempting to alter it. Indeed, this was even framed as one 
of  the preconditions for being able to give critical feedback.    
A scientist mostly sticks to inquiry...It's the others that have to change the world. 
Freya 
 
Sociology has to stand on its own two feet, right in the middle. Not only should 
sociology distance itself  from...from various interests – it's definitely a matter of  
interest, because sociology should be a mirror in which society can see itself. It means 
that sociology should be a trustworthy ally in studying the current situation, not in 
manipulating people's opinions and forcing them to change something, or to incline 
them towards something...That would be a sin. 
Nerthus 
 
Well, then...we can sit back and take a critical look at what's happened because we're not 
involved in any of  their...group fights, fights between parties. I don't care who'll make it 
to the next round, because I have no idea who's applying. I don't know which way the 
vote will go. If  you look at it this way, we can easily tell them: Look, looks like you've 
made a mistake here. Something isn't right. Society doesn't understand you. All right, 
you did something, but you failed. I have no problem telling them that, but I always do 
it behind closed doors. Never in public. […] For me, it's much easier to provide 
feedback if  I'm not seen as the opposition. 
Delling 
However, when I qualified my question by saying that I did not mean preferences as 
regards political parties, the responses indicated a situation that was similar to the 
relationship between descriptive and evaluative statements, and it was acknowledged that 
sociological work exhibits certain political preferences.  
All research is partial towards some political agenda, and even if  you're not interested in 
politics, politics is interested in you. 
Saga 
 
No, it isn't neutral. It isn't ideologically neutral either. A researcher has her political 
position or...her idealogical position which she also expresses, yes, in her research. 
Sif 
This opinion, however, was not dominant, and the discussion concerning neutrality 
elicited a series of  ambivalent responses. For example, some acknowledged that 
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sociological knowledge has this peculiar characteristic of  being able to change how we 
perceive certain phenomena. Furthermore, these aspects of  social life are usually value-
laden, which means that sociological research is situated in the midst of  normative 
struggles. This comes back to the issue of  responsibility because such research can be 
used for myriad different purposes. Thus, the question “for whom” becomes very 
important, and this was acknowledged by my respondents.  
Who would use this information? Let's say we're finally able to understand how a certain 
group thinks, and how to alter their way of  thinking... And who do you think will use 
this information? Those self-same members of  society, or some sort of  corporate 
faction...or an ideological group? Who will be the first to use it? 




Like in any science. There is no... difference, except the responsibility is greater perhaps.  
[..] There's no room for delusion. In a way, it's very easy... to delude society... and I've 
had to deal with certain politicians who wanted me to provide them with favourable 
results which were not... real. 
Vali 
Bourdieu contended that, while sociology is a science, it produces knowledge that is  
socially relevant and potentially subversive. Furthermore, sociologists should not allow 
themselves to be assimilated to just any political project. The above introduces a similar 
point of  friction between different conceptions of  neutrality. On the one hand, neutrality 
is a positive quality because it is a cornerstone of  scientific integrity. On the other hand, it 
can start to work against the goals of  sociology. Some clarification is in order, however. 
Studying the Object 
Some of  my informants had difficulty articulating their opinion as to the functions of  
sociology. To clarify the purpose of  my questions I reworked the arguments of  Michael 
Burawoy. In his 2004 ASA Presidential Address and a number of  subsequent articles 
Burawoy suggested that one can distinguish between four types of  sociology that are, 
nonetheless, intimately and necessarily connected (Burawoy 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 
2005d). These are: professional sociology, policy sociology, public sociology and critical 
sociology.  
Professional sociology designates forms of  sociological activity whose intended audience 
is other academics – an example would be an academic publication. For the purposes of  
avoiding confusion I referred to this as academic sociology, since I believed that this 
better captured what Burawoy meant and clearly differentiated between academic and 
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applied sociology – a distinction of  great importance in the Latvian context. It was quite 
clear that Latvian sociologists had doubts that academic sociology was a vital component 
of  Latvian sociology. This point was made both indirectly (e.g. references to their own 
work) and explicitly. The reasons for this would appear to be simple. In Chapter 5 I 
mentioned that the vast majority of  work done by Latvian sociologists consists of  
various kinds of  reports, rather than academic publications. There were publications that 
would be of  mainly academic interest, but it was made clear to me that these articles or 
books were published sporadically and, in their opinion, were generally of  low quality. 
Furthermore, there was pervasive scepticism as to whether the situation would improve 
significantly in the near future. Consequently, while my respondents believed that 
academic work is of  great value and a desirable form of  existence for sociology, the 
prospects for Latvian sociology were rather grim. 
Pure sociology... in the sense that it contains discussion or reflection – there's very little 
of  that. 
Hoenir 
 
The critical function is very weak, yes. In my opinion. Rather, there is this technical... 
public function? What else was there? Academic... well, it's rather weak, but at least 
something is being done, yes. 
Sif 
The scarcity of  academic output has consequences for what Burawoy calls critical 
sociology (not to be confused with critical social science [e.g. critical theory]). According 
to Burawoy, critical sociology grows out of  a disaffection with dominant trends and 
assumptions in professional sociology. The main forms of  expression of  critical 
sociology are arguments that call into question the conventional wisdom in academic 
circles and reflect on the broader implications of  practising sociology in a certain way. Its 
object of  critique is academic sociology, rather than civil society or popular culture. C. 
Wright Mills (1943; 2000) and Alvin Gouldner (1970; 1973) are both prominent examples 
of  this tradition. As I mentioned earlier, however, the academic dimension of  
sociological work is fairly muted in Latvian sociology, which means that critical sociology 
in Burawoy's sense is actually non-existent in Latvia. That is to say, any discussion of  
critical sociology is moot largely because there is nothing resembling academic consensus 
in the Latvian context – or so it would seem. In spite of  the fact that sociology is an 
underfunded and misunderstood (more on that later) form of  knowledge that has little in 
the way of  concrete research programmes, there were glimmerings of  critical sociology in 
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the responses of  Latvian sociologists.  
Those so-called government commissioned studies degrade the sociological market – 
they crash it. We'll give money to him, but we won't fund him etc. 
 Delling 
 
If  we imagine a flat field of  knowledge... Everyone studying something, everyone 
fighting for themselves. But if  I'm … stronger I can push my findings higher up. They 
become more visible. They attract more attention. But a research of  equal scientific... 
quality, of  equally good results, or... a good research that lacks funding is less visible. 
Weth 
The quotes address practices that have been brought about by the way sociological 
research is funded and what kind of  sociological research is funded, and suggest an 
implicit distinction between quality and the ability to attract funding and make your 
opinion heard. Furthermore, this also affects how well sociologists can perform the 
critical function. 
If  we were somewhat independent financially – to the extent that we could choose our 
own research topics and be... well... If  we could, in a sense, survey what's going on in 
society, then I think that... that it would be... the critical function would be stronger. At 
the moment... at the moment we're largely dependent on our funding, on the ministries 
which have very specific goals. And we have to answer very specific questions. 
Narvi 
The above quotes hint at a kind of  internal tension within sociology whereby there are 
perceived differences between the goals and interests of  those funding research and the 
interests of  sociologists and sociology. This, according to Burawoy, is a common 
characteristic of  critical sociology. In particular he refers to a speech given by Alfred 
McClung Lee (1976) in which the latter raised two questions that are fundamental to 
critical sociology: Sociology for Whom? and Sociology for What?. The former concerns 
the perceived audience of  sociological publications and the fears associated with 
sociology becoming and inward-looking and overly technical discipline with little to offer 
to the non-specialist. “Sociology for What?” relates to the goals of  sociological inquiry. 
For example, are we as researchers content to simply fulfil our obligations to our 
employers and/or clients? Should we be mindful of  the wider consequences of  our 
research and the uses to which it is put and the realities it enables? 
To address the first question in more detail I decided to enquire as to why my informants 
thought sociological knowledge was valuable. In addition to the expected answers 
invoking the instrumental value of  social information in the context of  policy-making 
(more on that later), there was a strong sense that the knowledge that sociologists could 
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provide and the insights they could potentially offer to non-sociologists had value in their 
own right. Some of  this derived from the opportunity to satisfy one's own curiosity and 
explore issues that have aroused one's interest. This was sometimes related to 
conceptions of  knowledge as valuable for its own sake, though occasionally it was simply 
a matter of  sating one's personal interest. 
I'm interested in how society functions. I am interested. 
 Hoenir 
 
I think sometimes knowledge has value in itself.. even if  you can't use it right away, 
because I think... it's this understanding that governs our actions. 
Fulla  
 
I think sociology has value in and of  itself  – as a form of  knowledge, a specific form of  
knowledge. 
Weth 
However, it was also argued that such intellectual exercises were worth our time because 
they broadened people's horizons and allowed us to get a fuller understanding of  the 
situation we were in. This would hopefully translate into people being better equipped to 
make informed and competent choices about future courses of  action. In a sense, this 
was also about stimulating the possibilities for individual freedom. 
By not knowing, we are likely to cause more damage and harm 
Mimir 
 
New values emerge. Not just in an instrumental sense, but... at the level of  how we view 
of  the world, you know. 
Dagr 
 
On the whole, I want to know what the point is – of  what I'm doing. Regardless of  
what I do. And I sense that, say, independence is very, very important in order to see this 
point, and it's knowledge that increases freedom.  
Forseti 
 
At a certain point a person who has considered the views of  100-200 interested parties 
can provide a more...multifaceted vision of  the issue. And that... on the one hand, it's 
sociological ingenuity that's passed on. On the other hand, it's... a variety of  
perspectives. A variety of  viewpoints that allow us to show, in a more well-grounded 
manner, how these viewpoints cluster and come into contact, and then – to present an 
argument... a common direction of  development, for everyone's benefit. 
Tyr 
This would seem to suggest that, in answer to Alfred McClung Lee's questions about the 
intended audience of  sociological knowledge, Latvian sociologists refused to locate its 
value squarely in the academic realm or even in relation to policy-making and the 
preferences of  individuals populating the respective institutions. 
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Studying the Object or Expediting Politics? 
In Burawoy's division of  sociological labour policy sociology is a form of  instrumental 
knowledge that refers to sociological research that has been carried out for a client. He 
discusses the use of  sociological research in the context of  policy-making, and it is quite 
clear that what he means is government policy. In the interviews, however, I broadened 
this category and also included research for non-governmental organisations, 
municipalities and banks. The overall view was that sociological knowledge should, 
indeed, play a role in policy-making and any kind of  decision-making that concerns large 
groups of  people. The reasons for this were uncontroversial and mostly derived from my 
informants' belief  that political decision-making and policies would simply have a greater 
chance of  success if  they were based on sound information.  
Sociology is very valuable in that it captures what is happening – which is very 
important for decision-making. 
 Mimir 
 
Sociology is necessary '[t]o take a broader view of  the problem and its many aspects, 
than provided by politicians and their limited experience.' 
Nanna 
 
There are probably two roles. One is actually providing data... Well, sound, to-the-point 
data. The other is helping us understand, because a politician charged with making 
decisions might not have a lot of  theoretical... Well, a sociologist has her knowledge of  
society and that... And all those theories and everything is fresh in her mind, unlike a 
politician who's making decisions...Well, the ability to explain the consequences that will 
follow this or that decision etc. 
Snotra 
In other words, rather than assuming that they know best, managers and bureaucrats 
would be wise to consult experts with potentially useful suggestions and solutions. The 
responses were, therefore, in line with Burawoy's thesis that policy sociology is an 
instrumental form of  knowledge. However, even though my informants believed that 
sociological knowledge should play a part in decision-making, they were cautious and 
sceptical as to whether it has any actual impact on the decisions and policies that 
politicians or government bureaucrats implement. Some of  this relates to the 
professional experience of  my informants. For example, those who were working or had 
worked for research centres with a history of  being commissioned by the state 
chancellery or ministries were generally quite optimistic. This brings up an important 
issue that was raised by my respondents on a number of  occasions – namely, credibility 
and competence are tied to specific individuals, rather than the discipline as a whole.  
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Even those of  my informants who had professional experience working for the state 
chancellery or government institutions acknowledged that not all of  their research had 
the desired effect. Sometimes this was because the findings conflicted with the current 
political climate or the simple fact that there was a change of  staff  at the institution in 
question. Indeed, this was not unlike the story put forward by Flyvbyerg (1998). 
Knowledge could exert itself  only sporadically, at opportune moments. Furthermore, 
impact may be limited simply because researchers do not have the time and resources to 
devote to explaining their findings to the relevant audiences and bring the important 
issues and insights to the attention of  policy-makers. In other words, impact is limited by 
time constraints which hampers the ability of  sociologists to build alliances and achieve 
tangible results.  
Researchers work in this...this [constant] cycle of  preparing, carrying out and delivering 
reports, while also preparing for their next project. 
Kvasir 
 
I think there's a point to it only if  a sociologist is part of  an actual group in charge of  
establishing the normative framework. Then, if  it changes, she can take part in it, 
discuss it regularly over an extended period of  time and actually do something,  
influence things. But when you're studying something and working on the 
recommendations, then suddenly the research is over and you're looking for money to 
survive the next few months. In the current situation, you have to work so hard that you 
don't have time to follow up on the results of  your previous research – on a purely 
idealistic impulse. 
Fulla 
Not all of  my informants raised this issue, but Jennifer Platt's study (Platt 1976) suggests 
that this is a common problem that is not particular to sociologists working in Latvia. In 
spite of  these complications there was a definite belief  that sociology is, and should be, 
part of  the decision-making process. Its involvement, however, was framed in 
instrumental, means-to-an-end terms, which is somewhat at odds with the reflexive and 
horizon-expanding narrative that I encountered when talking about the value of  
sociological knowledge. This may simply be a matter of  genre. That is to say, policy 
sociology is different in kind to public sociology and critical sociology. The latter are 
reflexive about the needs sociology serves and the realities it enables, whereas policy 
sociology is not. I want to suggest an alternative explanation, however, that has to do 
with the financial situation of  Latvian sociology.  
While the lack of  funding certainly affects the production of  academic sociology (e.g. 
books and articles in peer reviewed journals), it also hampers the possibility of  critique. 
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Most research in Latvia is contract-based, which means that sociologists are generally in a 
position were they are providing a service to a client. Furthermore, their livelihood 
depends upon them maintaining a good working relationship with their clients. In 
practice this means avoiding direct criticism. Financial insecurity is what drastically 
hampers the freedom of  the sociologist to voice dissenting opinions without fear of  
long-term financial repercussions. In response to this my informants argued that a 
prerequisite of  sociological critique was financial independence. 
If  we could establish, say, an independent intellectual... tradition in Latvia, of  course, 
always... If  it's independent, it'll be critical as well. 
Dagr 
 
To maintain this critical function, one has to attain... well...independence...from clients 
and funding... Probably yes, but in a practical sense it's quite difficult to accomplish... 
especially in the current market situation. 
 Freya 
This should not be construed as a matter of  political censorship. Sociologists are free to 
express disapproval with policies, produce and report politically inexpedient findings or 
challenge the way a particular issue is framed, but such moves are subject to careful 
management and professional constraints. Indeed, it was even argued that neutrality and 
professional restraint were a prerequisite for successfully articulating a critical response. 
Nonetheless, the relationship that my informants seemed to be suggesting was based on 
the belief  that their clients want instrumental, rather than reflexive knowledge. A similar 
point has been made by Anda Laķe (2012) who looked at evaluation research as an 
example of  the research-policy nexus. She argued that communication between 
researchers, bureaucrats and politicians is often hampered by different conceptions of  the 
value of  research and discrepant forms of  rationality guiding their actions. Thus, while 
sociologists themselves might see the value of  their work in terms of  the insights it 
provides, their clients are more interested in strategically deploying the simple fact that 
research was, in fact, carried out. Their interest is instrumental, rather than reflexive. 
Credibility and Communication 
As I indicated in the previous paragraph, not all the ills of  sociology can be traced back 
to a lack of  financial resources allocated to sociological research. For example, some of  
my informants were sceptical about whether sociology plays a significant role in policy-
making. Sociological research it commissioned and carried out, but it may simply be a 
matter of  ticking a box and satisfying official requirements.  
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During the “Fat years”45, there was more demand for sociological studies – mostly for 
keeping up appearances, I think, and also to get those graphs and percentages, right. 
Once I was even told: “Gosh, can I even show any of  this at the seminar in Brussels.” 
Freya 
 
Public administrators have long since understood that they have a need for some sort of  
research. Sometimes I think they commission research just for the sake of  
commissioning something, […] to justify the decisions they've made. 
Weth 
In other words, research was treated as a formality – done only to keep up appearances. 
This means that there are certainly research projects, but they fail to make much in the 
way of  difference. The reasons for this were numerous. Some pertained to a lack of  
respect and insight into what sociology can offer. 
I'm going to be honest. I'm not...I'm not used to this sort of  question, and 
mostly...these questions are mostly asked by... the people who...who do not want to 
hear the answer, and the answer is... what Mr. Kalvītis46 already said, that we don't 
need political scientists and sociologists. And I can't justify it to these people, I can't 
tell them why we need sociologists, or what is it that sociologists do, because they're 
not interested in my answer. 
Hoenir 
 
If  there were no EU funding, I think we'd have gone on, not knowing what it is. Of  




Politicians think that they're smart, that they don't need sociologists, that they'll handle it 
on their own. If  they need to research something, they'll pay a company to do it for 
them. It's not a question of  quality, they don't care about it. 
Nerthus 
This suggests a peculiar situation that can be understood with the help of  Pierre 
Bourdieu. In his book Pascalian Meditations Bourdieu claimed that the authority of  the 
Prince derives in part from the perceived autonomy that his legitimators (e.g. poets, 
jurists) enjoy (Bourdieu 2000: 105). It could be argued that sociology in Latvia is in a 
similar position. It is financially dependent on outside sources, yet carries little credibility 
among them. However, the perceived status of  sociology as an independent source of  
knowledge and expertise (however ambivalent the opinions of  it) confers credibility upon 
its client. In other words, it is good to be seen as soliciting expert advice, but there is no 
desire to actually act upon this advice. Why this discrepancy? 
A common explanation for this state of  affairs involved invoking ignorance (see above). 
                                                 
45 An informal term denoting a period a rapid economic growth in Latvian economy (2006-2008). 
46 Ex-Prime Minister 
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Politicians did not have an adequate appreciation for what sociology could offer and the 
insights it could generate. In particular, this was a problem plaguing qualitative studies 
and their possible application. This relates to a point I made in the previous chapter. I 
argued that ignorance was regarded a problem from a professional standpoint. It was 
believed that both the general public and bureaucrats had a rather tenuous grasp of  what 
could count as sociology. There was, however, one instance of  sociologists taking a stand 
on this issue.  
In 2010, as part of  the pre-election campaign, the political party Unity commissioned the 
market research company Gfk Group to carry out a poll. The poll was about people's 
preferences as to the future prime minister. The choice was between the candidate put 
forward by Unity (Valdis Dombrovskis) and the candidate put forward by their 
(presumed) main rivals Harmony Centre (Jānis Urbanovičš). The Latvian Sociological 
Association (i) challenged the validity and reliability of  the poll, (ii) accused Gfk of  
committing numerous methodological mistakes and (iii) argued that the poll was a form 
of  political technology, rather than a sociological survey. The attempt was to disassociate 
the activities of  Gfk from what actual sociologists do. 
They renamed it. Now it is a simple poll. That's it. Without the word “sociological”. At 
least that much we could get across – don't go about putting on our “coat”. Anyone can 
do a poll. A journalist can do a poll, a street sweeper can do a poll, but... don't go about 
discrediting our “coat”. 
Delling 
Nonetheless, this dispute had to be appropriately managed so as to prevent blowback that 
would actually be damaging to sociology. 
Over there, nobody's thinking about GFK, nobody knows that it's [mainly] economists... 
managers. Everyone will think it's sociologists... again... forging data. You know, making 
a muck of  it. They'll never make the distinction. 
Delling 
This belief  was echoed in a number of, though not all, interviews. My informants claimed 
that the general public has a poor grasp of  sociology. While they never claimed ignorance 
was the cause of  this, my informants believed that this was complemented by scepticism 
as regards the value of  sociological knowledge. This attitude was, however, not specific to 
sociology, but concerned all forms of  knowledge and expertise (Ostrovska 2009). As a 
consequence, my informants believed that political decision-making was generally of  low 
quality, because bureaucrats did not use, or had little experience in using, the expertise 
provided by sociologists. However, not all the blame was placed on politicians or the 
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incompetence of  civil servants – sociologists were believed to be equally at fault. 
Communication Breakdown 
Knowledge is one thing, but sociologists who go about doing things with this 
knowledge is another matter, and I think this is more important. What's currently 
happening is that they have this knowledge but, in practice, they don't really use it all 
that much. 
Fulla 
In Chapter 4 I suggested that Bourdieu's theory of  sociology placed an undue emphasis 
on the nature of  sociological knowledge and paid scant attention to its public 
representation. Latour, however, suggested that the fourth loop (public representation) 'is 
all the more important because the three others largely depend on it' (Latour 1999: 106). 
Fuller's analysis of  the ills plaguing sociology indicated that the discipline has a bad track 
record of  drawing attention away from its hybrid nature – something that the natural 
sciences do well.  
The interviews illustrate a related yet different problem that sociologists have – 
communication with the public, and my informants considered the communicative 
dimension of  sociology to be a sore spot. On the one hand, it was widely acknowledged 
that the media played a big role in exposing the public to what counts as sociological 
knowledge. On the other hand, journalists were said to have a poor handle of  what to 
expect from sociologists and sociology more generally. A common complaint was that 
sociology was equated with questionnaires and public opinion polls and nothing else 
besides that. Such perceptions complicated communication with journalists, because the 
result would usually be an article that summarised a sociologist’s comment in a simplistic 
manner.  
I had a conversation with a journalist once. And I had the feeling that she didn't 
understand any of  it. That she needed some sort of... Yes, that's it, right. That she had 
no use for it. Of  course she didn't. “It's very complicated. On the one hand, on the 
other hand”. All right, it wasn't even like that, but... there's no single interpretation. Of  
course. Even in the exact sciences the age of  mechanical... classical physics has come to 
an end. All the more so in society. Yes, there might be a tendency, but... 
 
Me: You have to consider this and that... 
 
Yes, exactly. No, but she needed some sort of... unequivocal sensation. 
Var 
 
Thus, my informants were worried that journalists would simplify complex matters and 
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pay scant attention to the qualifications that accompany most comments. This was a 
particular point of  concern since journalists were generally educated just a few doors 
down the hall (at the Department of  Communication Science).  
Further still, it was argued that communication with the public is hampered by the fact 
that there is simply too little in the way of  interest about what sociologists get up to. The 
media were only interested if  the findings have something shocking about them, whereas 
the more mundane research attracts little attention.  
Almost every month I get idiotic emails from the media... Yesterday, the princess' baby 
was born, has there been a survey on public interest about the princess' baby... 
Something along those lines. Science is perceived as... as some sort... well, at least that's 
the way I see it – it's perceived simplistically, as a source of  sensational news. 
Forseti 
The role of  the media in representing sociology to the wider public, however, was 
believed to be key. This was a matter of  interviewing the same people again and again, 
because their credibility was tied to them as individuals – they were not interviewed 
because they represented a particular profession. Consequently, it was acknowledged that 
journalists and reporters are simply drawn to people whose way of  expressing themselves 
was appropriate for their needs, but an equally important factor influencing their decision 
was how well the comments of  the sociologist in questions meshed with the political 
orientation of  the newspaper or the broader political climate. 




Well, I guess you could say that, hypothetically, mass media don't really understand,  they 
don't appreciate what a sociologist can provide. But that's the case... On both sides... 
Meaning, how we present ourselves, what we say about ourselves, what we can and can't 
do. And vice versa – what those at the receiving end are prepared to receive. 
Narvi 
 
It's hard talking to sociologists. Usually the journalists, the media have their own idea of  
how things should be. Who's to blame etc. And if  the opinions don't match, well, they're 
not comfortable. 
Vali 
This was complemented by a rather dismissive attitude from the public. It was sometimes 
argued that, even if  sociologists took their time to organise public events, people would 
simply not turn up (a similar comment was made by a historian about a series of  lectures 
he organised). Time and money were in scarce supply, so a prominent theme running 
through my interviews was the lack resources to inform the public and engage them in 
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discussions. This was also framed in a less self-sympathetic manner. That is to say, the 
blame was placed on a lack of  initiative – sociologists themselves were at fault for not 
engaging with the public on a regular basis.  
The community is such that... they do a lot of  work among themselves, and there's no 
outward communication. People from the outside have no idea what this community is 
up to. It's too insular. 
Borr 
 
I think that, in a way, it's our own fault because we don't do enough educating. 
Snotra 
 
Up until now, the sociological community has lacked the... strength, the capacity, the 
motivation... the ability to go... to go out in public and explain what sociology is. 
Sif 
It was quickly acknowledged, however, that this was complicated to do. It may be true 
that sociologists lack the time, resources and initiative, but there was also the recognition 
that communicating sociological knowledge to the public is exceedingly complicated. 
This echoes an issue I raised in the previous chapter. I argued that, while Latvian 
sociologists were positively disposed towards figurative sociology, their enthusiasm was 
tempered by a recognition that the public was not always receptive to ideas presented in 
this form. Of  course, the problem was not peculiar to more figurative modes of  
sociological expression. Dry and technical styles of  communicating information and 
viewpoints were just as problematic. 
They need juicy phrases that sound radical. The sort... the sort of  handy generalisation 
that you can pick up for yourself  and use in a quote. 
Mimir 
Unclear Identity 
These different forms of  expression, however, come back to the question of  identity. 
There was a distinct belief  that sociologists should communicate with the public directly 
and not rely on the executive and legislative branches of  government, or municipal 
governments putting sociological knowledge in action. The question of  the form such 
communication should take, however, was characterised by considerable variety. I have 
alluded to some of  the difficulties above, but an equally important facet of  this 
dimension of  sociological work relates to the personal characteristics of  individual 
sociologists, rather than how well they exemplify a sociologist. This is neatly captured in 
the quote below. 
There is no sociology as such. There are just specific people with...with their 
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understanding of  what to do and how to do it and...we're very different. If  we were 
united, then... then... we would... act differently in public. 
Delling 
The quote hints at something quite similar to the issues discussed in the previous chapter 
– namely, the internal heterogeneity of  sociology as a field. I argued that this was not 
regarded as detrimental to sociology as a form knowledge. In terms of  addressing the 
public, however, a few reservations started creeping in that had to do with the fact that 
many sociologists did not have a clear sense of  identity and belonging. 
I don't know if  I am a sociologist, but I call myself  a sociologist. 
Tyr 
 
I don't know if  the other... respondents have also said this, but we... sociologists... we are 
not united. We don't have a real community. I don't feel like I were a member of  a 
sociological community in Latvia. That's not how I feel. 
Narvi 
This may, of  course, have to do with the specific institutional trajectories and 
professional experiences of  my informants. That is to say, while there are only two 
universities that grant doctorates in sociology, my informants simply work for different 
research collectives and build professional ties with researchers working on similar topics, 
rather than those with whom they share a disciplinary background. Indeed, this was one 
of  the issues I identified in Chapter 5. There are a number of  researchers whose 
disciplinary identity is unclear – either they received their undergraduate or postgraduate 
training in sociology but did their advanced degrees in a different field (e.g. Aija Lulle and 
Laura Sūna), or they have a doctorate in, for example, philosophy, but mostly work with 
sociologists (e.g. Anna Stepčenko, Taņa Lāce). However, it also suggests a lack of  a 
clearly defined institutional identity. In and of  itself  such a state of  affairs would be 
unremarkable. However, the disunity of  the sociological community in Latvia is 
significant mainly because their collective identity is defined in terms of  professional 
standards, rather than institutional affiliation, political preferences or theoretical outlooks. 
Indeed, they are professionals with their own personal views and concerns that have to 
be modulated to insure that they can perform their duties. In other words, addressing the 
public in the name of  a community is problematic because there is no clearly defined 
community to speak for. 
Conclusions 
While some of  the dichotomies I chose to deploy were simplistic (for reasons outlined in 
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Chapter 5), they captured a peculiar fact about Latvian sociology. It was widely 
acknowledged that distinguishing between the descriptive dimension of  sociological work 
and the evaluations, value-judgements and implicit normative orientations was 
complicated. This would seem to open the door to charges concerning the politicisation 
of  sociological research; indeed, some authors have gone down this route (e.g. Horowitz 
1993). However, due to the fact that most sociological work in Latvia is applied, this was 
not perceived as a pressing practical issue by the sociologists themselves. The simple fact 
that the impulse to study a particular topic was defined with specific needs and interests 
in mind meant that sociologists did not have to concern themselves too much with 
questions pertaining to value-neutrality. In a way this was similar to a thought expressed 
by one of  the anthropologists I interviewed who argued that value judgements were not a 
significant problem, because of  the relativism implicit in the anthropological stance. In 
good Weberian fashion sociologists can content themselves with dutifully carrying out a 
research project. Value-relevance would be defined for them and so would the ultimate 
ends. However, an autonomous form of  sociological discourse was constrained for those 
very same reasons, and this was freely acknowledged. This is where complications started 
to arise. While their professional commitments placed them in an advisory capacity, it was 
quite clear that my informants' responses indicated ambivalence and ambiguity as to the 
effect this has on sociology and the interests and publics it serves. Thus, similar to Steven 
Shapin's analysis of  natural scientists working outside academia, there was a sense in 
which my informants where unsure about the effect that applied sociology would have on 
the long-term development of  sociology in Latvia. However, unlike the natural scientists, 
my informants' responses also addressed the axiological dimension of  sociological work 
by hinting at a perceived tension between sociology as a form of  knowledge and 
sociology as a profession. This should not be construed as a simple juxtaposition of  
theory and practice, the ideal and the actual, and is, I would argue, best understood as a 
species of  ambivalence that is inherent to debates as to the nature of  sociology that are 
similar in spirit to recent developments in constructivist literature on science.
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 8. Rethinking Weakness and Ambivalence 
 
In Chapters 6 and 7 I tried to show that the responses of  Latvian sociologists illustrated 
the ambiguities of  internal heterogeneity and the way professional commitments and 
access to funding affect the quality of, and limits the audience for, sociological work. 
These themes resonate with the arguments I explored in my discussion of  science 
studies. The field provides analyses of  science that mesh discussions of  politics, 
economics and epistemology and endeavours to turn philosophical questions into topics 
that could be researched empirically. The views of  Latvian sociologists, however, painted 
a picture that was at odds with the one provided by constructivist branches of  science 
studies in general and actor-network theory in particular. The latter emphasised the 
autonomisation and stability of  the disciplinary apparatus, whereas the former brought 
up considerations that figured internal divergence as a source of  novel insights. There 
was a distinct desire to carve out a niche for sociology and define it in opposition to 
generic and low quality social research, but it was also apparent that instituting clear-cut 
criteria of  acceptance into sociology was complicated and could actually be harmful to 
sociology as a form of  knowledge in the long-term. Likewise, while actor-network theory 
emphasised the importance of  building alliances, my informants expressed ambivalent 
sentiments about the fact that sociological research can be used to expedite political 
decisions that do not necessarily serve the needs of  the public(s) it affects. 
A possible explanation for the discrepancy between actor-network theory and the 
responses of  Latvian sociologists is that the former has posited an ambiguous link 
between the qualities that characterise good research practices (i.e. criteria applied to 
science studies scholars) and the strategies that guaranteed the success of  the examples 
of  recognised science described in case studies (i.e. criteria applied to the protagonists of  
case studies). In this chapter I wish to explore this tension and highlight similarities 
between sociology and science studies. I begin by looking at the discussion ignited by 
Michael Burawoy's call for public sociology. I then move on to a discussion of  the 
relationship that actor-network theory posits between the way science is practised and the 
way constructivists should practice their craft. I conclude by suggesting that sociology 
serves as an example of  what happens when a discipline internalises the tension between 
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political representation and scientific representation present in recent methodological 
contributions to actor-network theory. 
The Ethos of  Sociology 
Feyerabend’s attitude toward science was closer to a Protestant’s than an atheist’s toward 
Christianity. Unfortunately, in our blinkered times, to be against the scientific 
establishment is to be against science itself. 
(Fuller 2003: 110) 
Paul Feyerabend is often described as a philosopher of  science with a certain dislike 
towards science. However, as I tried to suggest in Chapter 1, his attitude is best 
characterised as ambivalent. Some of  his publications can be accurately described as 
attempts to foster a critical and sometimes even dismissive attitude towards science (e.g. 
Feyerabend 1978), but it is very important to note that his arguments are not directed at 
science  but the authority that science commands and the parochial and condescending 
attitude towards alternative traditions of  knowledge that the scientific establishment 
fosters. Feyerabend considers science to be only one among many ways of  relating to, 
and interacting with, the material world and other people, but this in itself  is not a 
problem for him. In fact, he has argued that, even if  schools were to expose children to 
many different forms of  knowledge, science would have little trouble recruiting its fair 
share of  bright minds (Feyerabend 1978; 1999). Furthermore, he believed that science 
has been a liberating force in the Western world. The problem, as he saw it, was that the 
current role of  science is less clear. 
Any ideology that breaks the hold a comprehensive system of  thought has on the minds 
of  men [sic] contributes to the liberation of  man [sic]. Any ideology that makes man 
[sic] question inherited beliefs is an aid to enlightenment. A truth that reigns without 
checks and balances is a tyrant who must be overthrown, and any falsehood that can aid 
us in the overthrow of  this tyrant is to be welcomed.  It follows that seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century science indeed was an instrument of  liberation and enlightenment. It 
does not follow that science is bound to remain such an instrument. There is nothing 
inherent in science or in any other ideology that makes it essentially liberating. 
(Feyerabend 1999: 181-182) 
Feyerabend was, therefore, sceptical as to whether science was still a vehicle for 
emancipatory ideas. It may well have been a liberating force in the 19th century, but it did 
not follow that science would continue to be such a force, especially in view of  its gradual 
institutionalisation and ossification. His narrative is, consequently, somewhat at odds with 
the view of  sociology Michael Burawoy provided in his ASA Presidential address 
(Burawoy 2005a). In it Burawoy argued that the emergence of  sociology was tied to (i) 
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attempts at social reform and amelioration and (ii) the fostering of  connections with 
different public(s) in civil society. His call for sociology to become more public and true 
to its historical roots suggests that, unlike Feyerabend, Burawoy believed that there was 
something about sociology that made it essentially liberating. The debate that Burawoy's 
speech ignited, however, showed that other sociologists were not so sure. 
Public Sociology and its Shortcomings 
Burawoy's speech and subsequent articulations as to the future of  public sociology 
(Burawoy 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d) provoked a wide range of  responses. This is 
not surprising, because the scope and ambition of  Burawoy's project is astounding. In 
different versions of  the same constellation of  arguments he attempts to (i) provide a 
stripped-down version of  the historical development of  sociology, (ii) discern a kind of  
disciplinary ethos and (ii) theorise on how sociological labour should be divided. Due to 
fact that very little time is devoted to each of  these tasks, not all the necessary 
qualifications can be made, which leaves the door open for ambiguity and 
misunderstandings. There are, however, more specific issues with Burawoy's 
interpretation. These have to do mainly with his take on the history of  sociology and the 
sociological ethos he seeks to derive from it.  
While Burawoy is fully aware that he is speaking about American sociology, he seems to 
ignore a number of  issues that would complicate his historical narrative. For example, 
Evans (2009) argues that American sociology did have its roots amidst social and 
religious reform and, by consequence, developed a close and direct relationship with 
various publics in civil society (Ross 1991). However, this was quickly followed by an 
attempt to solidify its institutional presence and credibility, and distance the activities of  
professional sociologists from the work done by social activists (Ross 1991; Halliday and 
Janowitz 1992). Now, there is no obvious tension between what Burawoy is saying and 
the argument put forward by Evans, but it does illustrate the extent to which Burawoy 
downplays the importance of  events that complicate his narrative.  
Burawoy addresses the emergence of  professional sociology and the attendant shift from 
engaging publics to working with the government and various foundations. However, he 
believes that it is no mere accident of  birth that sociology emerged the way it did. Indeed, 
when Burawoy claims that sociology has its roots in civil society, it should not be 
understood as a simple statement of  fact but as something akin to an image of  what 
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sociology should be like. Furthermore, this special relationship should be nurtured 
because the fate of  sociology is entwined with the vibrancy of  civil society. 
When civil society flourishes – Perestroika Russia or late Apartheid South Africa – so 
does sociology.  
(Burawoy 2005a: 24) 
One of  the ways that the erosion of  civil society manifests itself, according to Burawoy, is 
in terms of  what kind of  sociological knowledge is valued. The less vital civil society 
becomes, the less reflexive knowledge is required – instrumental knowledge (policy and 
professional sociology) will do just fine (Burawoy 2005a: 21). In view of  this, a number 
of  sociologists have argued that Burawoy has an overly idealised view of  civil society and, 
by extension, sociology (Calhoun 2005; Christensen 2013; Holmwood 2007). For 
example, Tony Christensen remarked upon a peculiar implication of  Burawoy's views: 
[i]n framing sociology as the defender of  humanity, the sociological ethos is 
commensurate with the ethos of  civil society. Thus, only the publics that reflect this 
ethos need be engaged. By doing this, the nature of  the dialogue between sociologists 
and their publics poses minimal threat to the values of  sociologists themselves. 
(Christensen 2013: 38) 
In other words, there seems to be something very convenient about Burawoy's 
idealisation of  civil society. Seeing as how Burawoy believes that the fate of  civil society 
and sociology go hand in hand, this move also has clear implications for how he narrates 
the history of  sociology and how and why Burawoy attributes significance to individual 
turning points in the history of  sociology. His discussion of  critical sociology illustrates 
this quite well.  
If  you recall, critical sociology is a type of  sociology that calls into question and 
challenges dominant assumptions within the field. It is a form of  reflexive knowledge 
whose intended audience is other academics. Burawoy argues that critical sociology was a 
response to professional sociology and mentions a number authors who exemplify this 
approach (e.g. C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner). In one way or another, the target of  
these thinkers was structural functionalism and the dominance it had achieved in 
American sociology (Gouldner 1970; Friedrichs 1970). However, the aftermath of  this 
“attack” is more complicated to comprehend and analyse. While Burawoy praises the 
work of  Alvin Gouldner, many authors have expressed a  more pessimistic view of  the 
turning point in sociology associated with his work. A prominent example of  this is 
Irving Louis Horowitz (1993), who argues that sociology has become overly politicised 
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and so suffered as a form of  scientific knowledge. Burawoy himself, on the other hand, 
represents the converse view and believes that sociologists should not shy away from 
political matters and express political opinions. Indeed, his “scissors movement” makes 
this quite clear: 
Over the last half  century the political center of  gravity of  sociology has moved in a 
critical direction while the world it studies has moved in the opposite direction.  
(Burawoy 2005a: 6) 
As a description of  the political commitments of  numerous sociologists it may well be 
accurate, but his phrasing betrays a semantic ambiguity. Accounts of  social statistics 
illustrate the ambiguity associated with the word normal whereby its meaning oscillated 
from normal as typical, standard or average to normal as an evaluative term (Hacking 
1990: ch. 19). Something similar is going on in Burawoy's work. That is to say, while many 
or even most sociologists may share Burawoy's political views, it is not clear that there is a 
necessary connection between this branch of  social science and left-wing politics.  
Burawoy's intimations provoked a series of  different responses. There were those who 
approved of  Burawoy's call, while at the same time elaborating on his arguments, sharing 
their experiences of  what it was like to be a sociologist and to engage different publics, 
and making suggestions as to how sociology could become truly public (Aronowitz 2005; 
Baiocchi 2005; Calhoun 2005; Etzioni 2005; Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005; Scott 2005; Stacey 
2004; Turner 2007b). On the other hand, there were also sociologists who were not 
convinced that Burawoy's attempt to inject politics into sociology should be encouraged 
and thought that it could, in fact, backfire (Brady 2004; Holmwood 2007; Deflem 2005; 
2013; Nielsen 2004; Tittle 2004). In particular, there was a belief  that politics should be 
kept out of  sociological practice so as not to undermine the credibility of  sociology and 
affect the quality of  sociological work. Furthermore, there was concern that Burawoy's 
call for public sociology would foster a culture whereby scholars with political opinions 
that were at odds with the sociological mainstream would be marginalised (Christensen 
2013; Deflem 2005; 2013). In other words, the argument that public sociology was (i) a 
desirable form of  expression for sociologists as professionals and (ii) an expression of  an 
underlying sociological ethos was problematised. 
It is important to note that there was variety in both camps. Those who where critical 
also expressed sympathy and admiration and vice versa. Nonetheless, most discussants 
were more cautious than Burawoy about the potential of  public sociology and what it 
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would mean in practice. Moreover, the questions addressed by the participants of  this 
discussion oscillated between (i) whether Burawoy's diagnosis of  contemporary sociology 
was accurate and (ii) whether his vision of  the future was appropriate and desirable. In 
other words, the topics straddled the line between descriptive and normative views as to 
the future of  sociology as a form of  knowledge.  
Meshing Axiology and Methodology 
Normative debate about the kind of  sociology we would like to see in the future is an 
essential component of  a healthy discipline. 
(McLaughlin and Turcotte 2007: 814) 
In 1994 an issue of  Sociological Forum was dedicated to the question: What's wrong with 
sociology? A number of  prominent American sociologists offered their opinions. Among 
the problems discussed were (i) internal fragmentation (Rule 1994; Stinchcombe 1994), 
(ii) the inability to impose restrictions on what passes as sociology (Davis 1994), (iii) the 
lack of  a unified theoretical core (Cole 1994), (iv) the lack of  a genealogy of  research 
techniques that consigned sociologists to endless debates and conflicts between divergent 
theoretical positions (Collins 1994), and (v) the politicisation of  the discipline (Lipset 
1994). All this sounds familiar, and it is not surprising that Thomas Kuhn was mentioned 
several times. In a subsequent issue, however, there was a response from a collective of  
feminist scholars who argued that most of  the weaknesses of  sociology could just as 
easily be regarded as its strengths (Fitzgerald et al. 1995; Bleiberg Seperson 1995). 
Our contention is that what some suggest is the downfall of  sociology is actually one of  
its strengths. The benefits to be derived from contributions of  marginalized perspectives 
far outweigh any short-term advantages that may arise from clinging uncritically to 
traditional explanations of  the social world. Feminism, postmodernism, queer theories, 
and race and ethnic studies offer sociology the tools and the impetus to look critically at 
the core, to ask meaningful questions, and to obtain valuable insights.  
(Fitzgerald et al. 1995: 496) 
What is more, upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that not everyone in the 
previous issue thought that the weaknesses they listed where actually bad for sociology.   
My own belief  is that this disintegrated state of  sociology represents the optimum state 
of  affairs, both for the advance of  knowledge and for the expansion of  mind of  
undergraduates.  
 (Stinchcombe 1994: 290) 
In view of  the aforementioned, the argument I want to put forward is that sociology is a 
form of  knowledge in which discussions of  methodology do not proceed in isolation 
from axiological concerns and broader reflections on the value-relevance and 
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consequences attached to the content of  sociological research, and the responsibilities of  
the practitioners themselves. I would like to clarify, however, that this is not meant to 
challenge the thesis of  value-neutrality, nor am I trying to suggest that value judgements 
cannot be eliminated from sociological discourse. There have been numerous attempts to 
sever the link between sociology as a form of  descriptive knowledge and the evaluative 
and prescriptive tendencies characteristic of  the work that sociologists produce. These 
are questions whose scope necessarily exceeds the ambitions of  my thesis. Nonetheless, 
what I am trying to argue for is that even cursory examinations of  debates among 
scholars as to the nature and, more importantly, goals of  sociology suggest that such 
exchanges are fraught with uncertainty and confusion, and mesh discussions of  sociology 
as (i) an empirical and (ii) a moral project. The response to Soviet sociology, my 
discussions with Latvian sociologists and the debate ignited by Michael Burawoy's ASA 
presidential address point to a similar issue. These exchanges illustrate an entanglement 
between knowledge and its purpose, and an awareness of  the consequences attendant to 
different ways of  practising sociology. Furthermore, this is supplemented by reflections 
on what can count as sociology, the kind of  sources that sociologists can draw upon and 
the implications of  what this has on the knowledge that is used by clients and audiences.  
In other words, there is no great divide in sociology – facts and values, knowledge and 
politics are mutually responsive and co-constitutive. Theoretical reflection and empirical 
investigation are subject to push-and-pull mechanisms that are irreducible to either 
cognitive norms or ideology and unchecked or factually unresponsive value judgements. 
This is reminiscent of  Latour's discussion of  hybridity, which regarded science as a blend 
of  politics, material practices and knowledge. However, the peculiar thing about 
sociology, as I will argue, is that it is a hybrid of  a very different sort. 
(Re) Describing Science 
I would argue that actor-network theory, much like the Strong Programme before it, has 
succeeded in challenging and repudiating the purity characteristic of  popular notions of  
Western scientific projects. It has illustrated the different ways in which scientific 
practices have been patterned by factors and influences that were traditionally believed to 
be alien to sound scientific conduct.  Crucially, the notion of  hybridity Latour put 
forward was an outsider's take on science that attempted to rectify a malady characteristic 
of  Western thought (Latour 1991; 1993b; 2004a). Latour explored the ambiguity of  
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representation and merged two modes of  representation that were traditionally believed 
to be distinct – political representation and scientific representation.  
The word “representation” is the same, but the controversy between Hobbes and Boyle 
renders any likeness between the two senses of  the word unthinkable. Today, now that 
we are no longer entirely modern, these two senses are moving closer together again. 
(Latour 1993b: 27) 
Both involve an actor speaking on behalf  of  another, and each is a matter of  delegation. 
Politicians speak for their constituents, and scientists speak for microbes, whales, 
chimpanzees etc. The homology that Latour posits, however, manifests a difference 
between his take on science and more conventional ones. Traditionally speaking, political 
representation involves a delegation of  authority, but it also entails a measure of  
accountability to those in whose name a politician speaks (Brown 2009: 179). Scientific 
representation, on the other hand, is a question of  accuracy and approximation, and 
pertains to how well a subject or object is reproduced in another medium. For example, a 
statistical sample can stand in for a population (scientific representation). The quality of  
the sampling strategy and the persuasiveness of  the interpretation can be disputed by 
other researchers, but neither the statistician nor the sample are held accountable to the 
population they claim to represent (political representation). 
Bruno Latour and science studies more generally would challenge this distinction and 
argue that the sample defines a collective and its constituents whilst claiming only to 
render visible certain trends in an ostensibly predefined group (e.g. Law 2009). That is to 
say, the sample does not represent a pre-existing collective but gives it a definite shape by 
acting as its representative. This is precisely the point of  hybridity – political 
representation and scientific representations are not insulated from each other. They are 
entwined in a symbiotic relationship of  co-production.  
This leads us to the connection between hybridity and sociology. Hybridity may not be a 
category that individual sociologists would use to describe their own work, but, I would 
argue, that it is equally plausible that they would recognise that discussions as to the 
hybrid nature of  their work are characteristic of  sociology as a field. In other words, 
sociologists themselves would recognise that their work exists at the intersection between 
political representation and scientific representation. The issue, of  course, is that 
sociologists are not the only ones who recognise this. 
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Insiders and Outsiders 
In Chapter 4 I argued that sociology was peculiar in that it has been curious about its 
own history and, consequently, produced narratives that (i) locate the development of  the 
discipline in specific historical circumstances and (ii) portray it as a form of  knowledge 
simultaneously in and about the world. Unlike the natural sciences, therefore, the history 
of  sociology is not written in a carefully edited and cumulative manner. Textbooks may, 
of  course, share some structural similarities (Lynch and Bogen 1997; Manza, Sauder and 
Wright 2010), but a significant portion of  scholarship within sociology is devoted to a 
thorough understanding of  the historical circumstances and political climates that have 
shaped sociology both as an academic discipline and a form of  knowledge. This, I argued 
in Chapter 3, goes some way towards explaining why early forms of  science studies 
focused on the natural sciences and biomedicine. Indeed, Guggenheim and Nowotny 
(2003) hypothesise that the development of  science studies unconsciously mimics the 
topical trajectory of  social anthropology in that it first studies others. This, however, has 
made the relationship with cognate disciplines somewhat complicated.  
The books of  John Law (2004) and Bruno Latour (2005) are two influential examples of  
slightly different yet fundamentally compatible versions of  contemporary developments 
in actor-network theory. Both are akin to methodological treatises for the social sciences 
that attempt to reinvigorate extant approaches with insights obtained from science 
studies.  
We know too well that, even in ‘hard’ sciences, authors clumsily try to write texts about 
difficult matters of  concern. There is no plausible reason why our texts would be more 
transparent and unmediated than the reports coming out of  their laboratories. 
(Latour 2005: 124) 
 
In both cases, however, the lessons they take from science, and the theories of  science 
they operate with, produce a slightly ambiguous result. Both authors fully appreciate and 
accept the fact that the power of  science lies, at least in part, in its ability to actively 
engage with and rework the materiality of  the world. Science constructs – it does not 
merely represent.  
Enactments and the realities that they produce do not automatically stay in place. 
Instead they are made, and remade. This means that they can, at least in principle, be 
remade in other ways. 
(Law 2004: 143) 
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Law and Latour are keen to learn from this and make a number of  suggestions how these 
insights could be used to benefit the social sciences. However, they do not want the social 
sciences to become mere copies of  their more established cousins in the natural sciences. 
Their concern is not credibility but a desire to produce enactments of  reality that are 
sufficiently attuned to the complexity and forms of  association between humans and 
non-humans. Furthermore, they are equally interested in being responsible for the 
enactments they produce and the collectives they enable.  
[T]his type of  science for that type of  social should be as slow as the multiplicity of  
objections and objects it has to register in its path; it should be as costly as it is necessary 
to establish connections among the many mediators it finds swarming at every step; and 
it should be as reflexive, articulated, and idiosyncratic as the actors cooperating in its 
elaboration. It has to be able to register differences, to absorb multiplicity, to be remade 
for each new case at hand.  
(Latour 2005: 121) 
 
If  politics is about better social (and now, we learn) non-social arrangements, and about 
the struggles to achieve these, then method assemblage and its products can also be 
judged politically. It does politics, and it is not innocent. In its different versions it 
operates to make certain (political) arrangements more probable, stronger, more real, 
whilst eroding others and making them less real.  
(Law 2004: 149)  
In other words, they illustrate Robert Friedrichs' point about the two levels at which 
social theories operate – the theory itself  and the role for the sociologist this theory 
entails. Friedrichs posited that this was one of  the main differences between sociology 
and the natural sciences, and is a point where ambiguity kicks in. Do Law and Latour 
believe that the conscious integration of  scientific representation and political 
representations in the case of  sociology is a significant enough difference to make a 
distinction between the likes of  anthropology and sociology on the one hand and the 
likes of  physics and chemistry on the other?  
As I suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, science studies aims to challenge dominant 
conceptions of  science, but this is not necessarily a matter of  challenging science. Such a 
reading, however, is not shared by scientists who have voiced their concerns on a number 
of  occasions. Some of  the more emphatic reactions were expressed during the so called 
Science Wars that erupted in the 1990s. A number of  scientists and philosophers of  
science took issue with the way post-modern theorists in general and science studies 
scholars in particular approached scientific inquiry and intellectual work. An infamous 
move in these exchanges was a paper published by Alan Sokal. Sokal submitted an article 
to the journal Social Text. The article was entitled Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a 
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Transformative Hermeneutics of  Quantum Gravity (Sokal 1996), and it was accepted for 
publication. After the paper was accepted, Sokal revealed that it was a hoax – an 
intentionally nonsensical compilation of  left-wing political correctness and quotes from 
popular post-modernists that pandered to the ideological position of  the editors. This 
was believed to illustrate the lax quality control of  Social Text and the pollution of  
scholarship by ideology. 
The Science Wars provoked a series of  responses from science studies scholars, and a 
number of  them argued in a way that fundamentally mimics the accusations levelled 
against science studies by the so called science warriors. That is to say, the response of  
the likes of  Sokal was framed in terms of  ignorance and a misunderstanding of  the 
import of  social studies of  science (e.g. Callon 1999; Franklin 1996; Haraway 1997a; 
Nelkin 1996). An excellent example of  a measured response of  this nature can be 
discerned in the work of  Ian Hacking (1999). In his book The Social Construction of  What? 
Hacking analyses a number of  approaches within constructivist science studies and 
argues that scientists opposed to science studies have confused two different things. 
According to Hacking, constructivism does not attempt to discredit or refute science but 
rather to supplement our understanding of  it, challenge traditional and oversimplified 
accounts of  scientific inquiry, and point out the social and political consequences of  
practising science in a certain way. I largely concur with Hacking's point. Indeed, the likes 
of  the Strong Programme and actor-network theory have attempted to justify the 
credibility of  their output by arguing that they exemplify the scientific approach. 
Hacking's reading of  the dispute, however, ignores an important dimension of  the 
debate.  
It may be true that the science warriors had misdirected their anger (Nelkin 1996), but it 
is plausible that they had, nonetheless, accurately diagnosed the problem. That is to say, 
even if  science studies scholars were not to blame for the decrease in funding and 
increase in suspicion towards science, their work foreshadowed a potential problem for 
science as an institution. For example, Steve Fuller has raised the point that the suspicions 
of  the science warriors, while based on an inadequate understanding of  science and how 
it works, are based on a fundamentally correct assumption as to the potential 
consequences of  the public accepting science studies' accounts of  science (Fuller 2006b; 
Fuller and Collier 2003). Science warriors do not seem to be as sanguine as Latour about 
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the public giving up on the idea of  science as a pure and disconnected form of  activity. 
Their concerns, I would argue, are caused at least in part from the ambiguity of  Latour's 
position. For example: 
The difference between Science and ideology, purity and pollution, even though it has 
occupied and continues to occupy a great number of  intellectuals, thus does not have 
the efficacity [sic] that one might suppose, considering the energy spent on it, as well as 
the size of  the police forces that patrol the border. 
(Latour 2004c: 100) 
The above quote contrasts with the argument put forward in We Have Never Been Modern 
where Latour suggested that the authority of  science was contingent upon it being 
regarded as separate from, and purified of, politics (Latour 1993b: 27). Science studies' 
accounts of  science, on the other hand, are perceived as doing the opposite – drawing 
attention to the seams that hold the science-society relationship together, and the 
resulting conflict with science warriors is over the ramifications of  accepting a 
disenchanted view of  science that highlights its embeddedness in, and formative 
influence upon, social and political life.  
Scientists' concerns are personified by the philosopher Paul Feyerabend (1978). As I have 
tried to argue above, he was not anti-science. However, the disenchanted view of  science 
he held led him to explicitly argue that science should no longer be given preferential 
treatment at the cost of  other ways of  studying and interacting with the world. Moreover, 
Fuller's argument has the curious implication that scientists are actually more perceptive 
than science studies scholars as to the attendant consequences of  the various case studies 
the field has produced. Scientists may act upon highly dubious assumptions as to how 
science operates and what makes it distinct, but their enchanted and primarily 
methodological vision of  science is remarkably productive. This relates back to Latour's 
point I introduced above. While non-representational forms of  constructivism want to 
suggest that the questions science tackles are hybrid in nature, the rhetorical potency of  
science comes from narrating a highly edited version of  its history and drawing people's 
attention away from its hybrid nature. The likes of  sociology and anthropology are 
different because both outsiders and insiders systematically bring up this issue in relation 
to them. Reflection on the goals and ends of  inquiry (axiology) is not an afterthought but 
an integral component of  debates pertaining to how it should be carried out 
(methodology). This is why John Law and Bruno Latour can openly learn from a 
disenchanted view of  science and integrate normative concerns with appeals to 
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descriptive adequacy. Robert Friedrichs was, therefore, only partially correct in his 
diagnosis of  the difference between sociology and the natural sciences. It may be true 
that social theories come bundled with an implicit understanding of  the sociologist's role 
and responsibility towards society, but the more pertinent difference is that the natural 
sciences have simply extricated themselves from the perception that their theories and 
practices are equally implicated in the formation of  both human and non-human 
collectivities and realities (Latour 1993b). Sociology, on the other hand, has been more 
receptive to this idea (though not necessarily about the role of  non-humans) and 
subjected this question to debate, though there have been attempts to learn from the 
natural sciences in a way that replicates their strategy of  maintaining institutional 
credibility (e.g. positivism). In Chapters 6 and 7 I tried to suggest that an awareness of  
disciplinary and institutional frailty was accompanied by ambivalence with regards to the 
best way to respond to it. Funding may be limited and public perception of  sociologists 
and sociological research may be somewhat simplistic, but this does not give way to 
consolidation, imposition of  rigid criteria of  quality and an indiscriminate forging of  
alliances 
The Sociological Self 
Science studies in general and actor-network in particular draw our attention to the ways 
in which our forms of  knowledge and our ways of  life are entangled. However, our 
awareness of  this does not discredit our attempts to understand and interact with the 
world. The insights provided by science studies raise the possibility that ethical dilemmas 
are not external to science and technology but frame and go hand in hand with seemingly 
technical solutions (see above). The issue is that the implications of  science studies 
accounts of  science for our understanding of  science have largely been dealt with 
implicitly and it is sometimes no longer clear why science should be our tradition of  
choice in view of  the evidence that it lacks the distinctiveness that traditional (e.g. 
philosophy of  science, sociology of  science) accounts attributed to it. By emphasising  
the importance of  purified and resilient socio-material networks actor-network theory 
tried to address this issue, but applying these principles to the discipline of  sociology 
proved difficult. As I have tried to show, sociology's diffuse and tentative nature seems 
like a clear example of  failure, but a closer inspection of  constructivist literature reveals a 
more complicated picture, beautifully illustrated by a quote at the end of  Dick Pels' book 
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Unhastening Science. 
Speaking in comparative terms across the spectrum of  social institutions, we could say 
that such craving for strength and certainty better fits the practices of  politics and 
business than the production of  scientific knowledge – a ‘strong Britain’ with a ‘strong 
economy’, shored up by a ‘strong pound’, as Blair and Brown would have it. In this 
constellation, weakness and uncertainty could be the typical contributions of  (social) 
science to the shape of  the world. It could say things that are interestingly feeble, shaky, 
risky, and weird. 
(Pels 2003: 219) 
Pels' characterisation of  the social sciences shares some similarities with the work of  
Isabelle Stengers, John Law and Bruno Latour, and points to the tension within 
constructivist science studies. Their accounts of  why a particular group of  scientists or 
technology was successful highlight strategies through which stability and order were 
achieved. That is to say, sciences work by (i) building a resilient network of  humans and 
non-humans and (ii) concealing the seams that hold the network together. Bourdieu's 
emphasis on clear standards and criteria of  quality betrayed a rigidity that stemmed, in 
part, from his attempt to model sociology on the other sciences. This was echoed in 
Bruno Latour's discussion of  autonomy and mobilisation whereby a science claims parts 
of  reality for itself  by developing methods and stabilising a specialist discourse to identify 
competent practitioners. My conversations with Latvian sociologists and discussion of  
Burawoy's call for public sociology, however, illustrated an ambivalence about the 
question of  determining what could legitimately be called sociology, and indicated a 
plurality of  views as to the political and scientific project of  sociology.  What to make of  
this? 
In his book The Chaos of  Disciplines Andrew Abbott suggests that a common characteristic 
of  sociology is that it is interstitial in character (Abbott 2001a: 6). It is a loosely 
structured discipline and lacks clear criteria according to which it can deny entry to a 
particular school of  thought or methodological approach. The response to this state of  
affairs, however, is varied and often takes the form of  fractal splintering. Curiously 
enough, Abbott suggests that such splintering is also evident in the constructivist wing of  
science studies (Abbott 2001a: ch. 3). The common enemy of  early science studies was 
the deferential attitude towards science exemplified by analytical philosophy of  science 
and Mertonian sociology of  science. The rejection of  these approaches was followed 
almost immediately by internal splintering. My discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 followed a 
similar narrative. The crucial point, however, is that there are important similarities 
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between sociology and constructivist science studies. Abbott's analysis focuses on the 
potential for internal divergence, but an equally interesting possibility to consider is that, 
much like sociology, contemporary constructivist science studies scholars (ANT/post-
ANT in particular) emphasise the need to reveal the contingency, open-endedness and 
fragility of  social and material realities.  
The question is: what does standard method assemblage silence? Which possible 
realities does it refuse to enact in its dominant insistence on that which is smooth? And 
how might it be crafted differently? 
(Law 2004: 144) 
Methodological treatises written from a constructivist perspective manifest a peculiar 
tension in that what works for others is not necessarily something that we as social 
scientists should emulate in our own research. We should learn lessons from how other 
scientists approach their objects, but the pursuit of  purity that is so characteristic of  the 
natural sciences is recast in a slightly different manner. In fact, Pels' invocation of  'feeble, 
shaky, risky and weird findings' seems to be more in line with what the likes of  John Law 
and Bruno Latour have in mind when they talk about the qualities that our research 
should exhibit. 
I will call such a description a risky account, meaning that it can easily fail—it does fail 
most of  the time—since it can put aside neither the complete artificiality of  the 
enterprise nor its claim to 
accuracy and truthfulness. 
(Latour 2005: 133) 
Furthermore, detachment and autonomy are not prominent features of  their accounts. 
This, as I argued in Chapter 4, is largely due to the fact that the responsiveness of  science 
to political and practical concerns is not figured in a negative light. Different voices 
should be allowed to voice their concerns and participate in the construction of  the 
common world.  
[T]he opposition between a detached, disinterested, objective science and an engaged, 
militant, passionate action becomes meaningless as soon as one considers the 
formidable collecting power of  any scientific discipline—and it makes no difference if  
it’s ‘natural’ or ‘social’. 
(Latour 2005: 253) 
In response to this, Steve Fuller has argued that actor-network theory in general and 
Latour in particular exemplify 'the Mode 2 conception of  policy-driven “postdisciplinary” 
research, which welcomes the university’s permeability to extramural concerns' (Fuller 
2000b: 9). Mode 2 refers to the way scientific knowledge has been produced in recent 
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times. The key characteristics of  this mode of  production is that teams of  researchers are 
brought together for short periods of  time (e.g. the duration of  a project) and are 
generally interdisciplinary in composition (Gibbons et al. 1994). This is contrasted with 
so-called Mode 1 knowledge production that focuses on fundamental, rather than 
applied, research and is generally organised around discrete disciplines.  As I mentioned 
earlier, Bjorn Wittrock (2003) has suggested that the distinction between Mode 1 and 
Mode 2 science does not lend itself  easily to an analysis of  the social sciences. This is 
mainly because the social sciences have never been in a position where they primarily 
generate fundamental research. On the contrary – applied research has been more 
prominent. However, this has historically been supplemented by an interrogation of  the 
interests that such research serves and the goals it furthers. This is why I claimed that the 
peculiarity of  sociology lies in a conscious integration of  methodological and axiological 
concerns. That is to say, sociological debates as regards how best to study the world do 
not proceed in isolation from the question of  why and for whom such knowledge could 
be useful. What is more, such questions are never answered definitively. Indeed, most 
definitive answers are challenged and deconstructed as a matter of  course. It could be 
argued, therefore, that the issues associated with Soviet sociology derive from the attempt 
to stabilise, impose closure upon, and give a conclusive answer to, the question of  whom 
sociology should serve and the form such knowledge can take. The uncertainties evident 
in my discussions with Latvian sociologists represent a converse strategy and, by 
extension, the conflicted nature of  integrating scientific representation and political 
representation, and an awareness of  one's own hybridity. 
Conclusions 
In Chapters 6 and 7 I analysed my conversations with sociologists working in Latvia and 
suggested that they painted a picture of  an internally diffuse and heterogeneous 
disciplinary unit whose members were unsure as to the best way to respond to the 
current state of  the discipline. The discussion initiated by Michael Burawoy's ASA 
Presidential address was a catalyst and platform for the expression of  similar 
uncertainties in various prominent sociology journals. A number of  commentators took 
issue with Burawoy's analysis of  sociology and his suggestions for the future 
development of  the discipline. Among the points raised against his version of  sociology 
was Burawoy's belief  in a necessary link between the sociological ethos, civil society and 
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left-wing politics. What is more, even though he himself  argued for the need to 
provincialise American sociology, and so recognise its specificity, his vision of  how roles 
and duties are distributed among the different types of  sociology betray his position as a 
sociologist speaking from within an American context (Baiocchi 2005; Urry 2005; 
McLaughlin and Turcotte 2007). Nonetheless, his attempts to ground public sociology in 
a sociological ethos sparked a lively debate and, more importantly, addressed the 
relationship that sociological knowledge has to its putative object (i.e. society).  
This resonated with my conversations with Latvian sociologists and analysis of  outside 
responses to Soviet sociology. They highlighted an intermingling of  methodological and 
axiological concerns that figured sociology as implicated in the worlds it attempts to 
describe. Contrary to the likes of  Michael Burawoy and Pierre Bourdieu, however, the 
debates I looked at showed signs of  suspicion about attributing a particular political 
stance to sociology. 
I continued by suggesting that such exchanges can be regarded as similar in spirit to 
science studies attempts to reframe our understanding of  science in a manner that 
reconnects ways of  knowing with ways of  being in the world.  The specificity of  
sociology, as compared to the other sciences, is that, in its own way, this approach to 
knowledge has traditionally been a part of  it, albeit in a highly dynamic and volatile form 
that is conducive to internal divergence and disagreement.  What is more, the peculiarity 
of  sociology and its disciplinary and institutional frailty serves as an illustration of  the 
ambiguity at the heart of  recent methodological developments in actor-network theory, as 
the characteristics that make sociology a weak discipline from a constructivist point of  
view are those that resonate most with the qualities that a constructivist study itself  









This thesis has been an attempt to understand the specificities of  sociology from the 
perspective of  constructivist science studies. However, my approach to this topic has also 
been motivated by an interest in the normative dimension of  science studies, or lack 
thereof. I commenced my discussion by introducing the work of  Robert K. Merton. In 
particular, I focused on his attempts to articulate a scientific ethos, as well as the debates 
that served as the impetus for his take on science. I continued by suggesting that science 
studies has challenged and often successfully repudiated the theories of  science provided 
by analytical philosophy of  science and early sociology of  science. The Strong 
Programme was emblematic of  this approach. By foregrounding the importance and 
impact of  external factors on the production and reach of  scientific knowledge the 
Strong Programme redefined the link between science and society in a way that gave a 
prominent role to political interests and the social context. Not coincidentally, this 
strategy was perceived as a threat to the philosophical tradition because it promoted a 
thoroughly socialised form of  scientific rationality and challenged the distinctiveness of  
the scientific tradition. This was seen by some as an attempt to argue for relativism and a 
sociological monopoly over the analysis of  science.  
In Chapter 1 I noted that the Strong Programme's way of  analysing and explaining 
particular episodes in the history of  science had been called into question from within 
science studies itself. This, as I suggested, was based on the concern that the Strong 
Programme assumed the stability of  social categories, such as power and interests, but 
encouraged researchers to see the plasticity and interpretive flexibility of  the theories, 
instruments and phenomena with which natural scientists worked. The recognition of  the 
abovementioned asymmetry and subsequent attempts to rectify it have given rise to a 
form of  analysis that explores the entanglements of  science and society in a way that 
seeks to curb the excesses of  scientific exceptionalism and technological determinism on 
the one hand, and sociological determinism on the other. Among the main proponents 
of  such an approach to the study of  science have been the authors working in the 
tradition of  actor-network theory.  
In Chapter 2 I argued that, contrary to the Strong Programme, actor-network theorists 
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did not assume that the social was robust enough to mould the content of  scientific 
theories and shape the course of  scientific debates. Instead the latter contended that the 
social was itself  a product sociomaterial networks and heterogeneous connections 
between humans and non-humans. The particular forms that such networks take, and the 
realities they enable, are certainly revealing and subject to contingency, but these are the 
result of  complex entanglements that combine heterogeneous materials, not a mere 
reflection of  a pre-existing context. Much like the Strong Programme, actor-network 
theory manifested a dislike for philosophical accounts of  the analytical tradition and 
endeavoured to illustrate the permeability of  the boundary between science and society. 
Unlike the Strong Programme, however, society was not given a privileged role, and focus 
was placed on the practices and processes through which particular renderings of  the 
science-society relationship took form. 
However, the fluid and artefactual nature of  the boundary between science and society, as 
well as the entanglement between science and politics, undermined the possibility of  
outlining a prescriptive approach to science or criticising particular pieces of  scientific 
research on epistemic or ontological grounds. To address this issue, I turned to the work 
of  Isabelle Stengers who aimed to explicate the difference between interesting and 
inquisitive articulations of  social and material realities, and flawed approaches that force 
their objects to conform to their way of  seeing it. Among other things, she did this by 
looking to ontology, rather than epistemology, and, while Bruno Latour has drawn on her 
work, the latter's relational approach was difficult to combine with Stengers' normative 
account. A side effect, I suggested, was that Latour's variant of  actor-network theory was 
ill-suited to identifying forms of  science that have been contaminated by cultural 
prejudice, political ideology or economic interests. 
I tried to illustrate this in Chapter 3 and looked at the debate that emerged in Western 
academic outlets over the nature, limits and idiosyncrasies of  the Soviet variant of  
sociology. The discussions were varied in tone and focus, but the common elements and 
points of  convergence concerned the fusion of  political commitments and scholarly 
pursuits and ambitions in general, and the dominance of  the former over the latter in 
particular. I tried to challenge the claim that this made Soviet sociology different from its 
Western counterpart, and I suggested that a close relationship between sociological 
research and government institutions was not unique to the Soviet Union. However, the 
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fusion that occurred in the Soviet Union between the disciplinary ethos of  sociology and 
a particular form of  ideology that imposed restrictions on sociological research and the 
repertoire of  sources and arguments it could draw upon was a more contentious issue. 
Nonetheless, to criticise this move is to assume that (i) practitioners of  a discipline should 
have autonomy and freedom as regards the scholarly resources they can use and (ii) the 
locus of  recognition and evaluation for scholarly contributions is and should be the 
scientific community. This combination of  privileges, as I tried to suggest, has been 
complicated to obtain for sociology. Furthermore, science studies literature has paid little 
attention to this. In an attempt to rectify this I contrasted the work of  Bruno Latour and 
the account of  sociology provided by Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu suggested that sociology was plagued by a number of  weaknesses that were less 
pronounced in the other sciences. In particular, the issues he discussed revolved around 
the difficulties associated with obtaining autonomy and developing criteria that would 
allow one to distinguish between good sociology and politically complicit sociology or 
folk sociology. In Latour's terminology, the problem with sociology was that it had not 
managed to develop methods of  mobilising the parts of  reality for which it aimed to 
speak, nor had it outlined principles according to which practitioners of  a discipline 
could identify and evaluate one another's contributions. I suggested that this may be so 
because, unlike the other sciences, sociology had been ambivalent about the alliances that 
had allowed the discipline to flourish. Bourdieu was equally sensitive to this characteristic 
of  sociology, but his emphasis on factors that derived from the politically subversive 
nature of  sociological knowledge disregarded the extent to which the potency and 
mobilising abilities of  sociology were diminished by the way it was perceived. This 
brought me back to a discussion of  Bruno Latour's work and his argument that public 
representation was a crucial component of  the flow of  scientific knowledge. The work 
of  Steve Fuller served as an illustration. He argued that sociology had experienced 
difficulty establishing itself  as a science partly because it had been open about its status as 
a form of  knowledge that was simultaneously in and about the world. I tried to explore 
this in more detail by looking at attempts to connect the development of  sociology to 
ambient conditions in the political landscape and academia. 
Overall, my explorations in Chapters 1-4 revealed a tension and parting of  the ways 
between the explanatory strategies favoured by constructivism and the normative project 
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exemplified by early sociology of  science and philosophy of  science. What is more, in 
Chapter 3 I made the case that the approach to science favoured by constructivist science 
studies is better suited to the study of  the natural sciences. This claim was explored 
further in my conversations with sociologists working in Latvia. They were practitioners 
of  a discipline whose primary output was, and still is, applied research, and their stories 
and comments suggested that the current state of  affairs is not conducive to a thriving 
form of  sociology. This, however, was not accompanied by a pervasive desire to establish 
forms of  professional certification that prevented non-sociologists from contributing to 
the stock of  sociological knowledge. There were concerns that this might harm the 
reputation of  sociology, but an openness to alternative perspectives and novel insights 
was believed to be invaluable to the long-term health of  the discipline. Similarly, unlike 
actor-network theory, which emphasises the importance of  building alliances, Latvian 
sociologists expressed ambivalent sentiments about sociological research being used to 
expedite political decisions that do not necessarily serve the needs of  the public(s) it 
affects. Most importantly, my conversations raised the possibility that actor-network 
accounts may fall short of  understanding sociology in a broad sense. This, however, was 
not due to some flaw in the descriptive apparatus of  constructivism or actor-network 
theory. Quite the contrary, constructivism is a useful framework for understanding the 
way that disciplines are established, claim parts of  reality for themselves and forge 
alliances with human and non-human actors. These accounts, however, are plagued by a 
bifurcated explanatory strategy. For example, actor-network theory focuses on and 
unpacks the processes through which networks are built, relationships are forged, and 
stability is achieved, but it is noted that the success of  particular scientists or technologies 
is accompanied by a concealment of  the seams that connect ways of  knowing and 
reworking the world with particular modes of  living in it. Indeed, Latour's claim that 
science is politics by other means (1993a: 229) can sometimes be taken to mean just that 
– the reconfiguration of  the political landscape with the tools afforded by science and 
technology. The efficacy of  such a strategy, however, is based on science and politics 
being kept apart. That is to say, science and its products are successful because they are 
perceived as disinterested. They are a reflection of  what the world is like, what it allows 
and what it will countenance. The aims and goals of  such exercises are seldom 
questioned. This, again, is different in the case of  sociology. Sometimes it is dismissed as 
an overly complicated and ornate way of  stating the obvious. Other times its integrity and 
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credibility is challenged by drawing attention to the partisan inclinations of  its 
practitioners. Furthermore, these are issues that continue to attract attention both within 
the discipline and from outside commentators. 
A prominent recent example is the debate initiated by Michael Burawoy's call for public 
sociology and his attempt to ground this project in a sociological ethos. Burawoy's 
arguments sparked a lively debate and, more importantly, tackled the relationship that 
sociological knowledge has to its putative object (i.e. society). In particular, he highlighted 
the intimate connection between different kinds of  sociology, the varied purposes which 
they served, and the realities they enabled. This inspired a range of  responses that 
illustrated a plurality of  views as regards the form that sociology should take, and the 
goals that it can – and should – serve. As I chose to put it in Chapter 8 – methodological 
discussions do not proceed in isolation from, and without regard for, axiological 
concerns. Furthermore, this suggested a number of  similarities between sociology and 
contemporary science studies that lead us to the problem of  reflexivity. 
In the Introduction I argued that the problem of  reflexivity has a special meaning for the 
arguments put forward in this thesis. Traditionally, the issues associated with reflexivity 
were raised on account of  sociology's presuming that it could identify the factors that 
influence the development of  scientific knowledge whilst itself  being exempt from the 
formative power of  context (understood broadly). Furthermore, a potential objection 
against this thesis might be that it is an instance of  a discipline examining itself. However, 
as I suggested earlier, the specificity of  sociology introduces a number of  complexities.  
First of  all, this thesis is different because it concerns a discipline that has played a 
significant part in the development of  science studies. Indeed, the simple fact that science 
studies is occasionally subsumed under the headings “the new sociology of  science” or 
“constructivist sociology of  science” betrays the intimacy of  the link. Secondly, my 
explorations suggested that a constructivist study of  sociology revealed a discrepancy 
between the perspectives of  the subject and the object. In itself  this is hardly surprising. 
In fact, the so-called Science Wars illustrated that natural scientists and their allies were 
concerned about the perceived threat that the social study of  science poses to the 
authority of  the scientific enterprise. Yet the consequences and implications of  science 
studies accounts for our understanding of, and attitude towards, science have been 
difficult to articulate clearly. This is neatly summarised in the quote below. 
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It is true that STS’ers are not out to debunk science in the trivial sense of  denouncing its 
results as false, or unsupported, nor would they dismiss its products as generally 
harmful. Many STS’ers fully appreciate the great benefits that mankind [sic] has reaped 
from the scientific institution. But it is equally true that they radically reconstrue the 
source of  its validity and authority. 
(Collin 2011: 202) 
In Chapter 2 I tried to make a very similar point – namely, that actor-network theory and 
constructivism more generally lack a clear account of  what constitutes good science, even 
though the analytical tools they afford can explain why particular examples of  scientific 
research were successful. Things are different in the case of  sociology, whose hold on the 
title of  science is, and has historically been, tenuous – in the eyes of  the public at least – 
and the fragility of  sociology makes it a complicated object for science studies in general 
and actor-network theory in particular. Sociologists' attempts at autonomisation are 
routinely re-evaluated and lead to internal splintering as to the best way to practice 
sociology and to study social groups. The alliances sociologists build with government 
institutions or interested publics are vigilantly examined so as not to allow ideological 
allegiances and partisan inclinations to interfere with sociological work. Indeed, the 
mobilising power that is so crucial to the success of  the natural sciences is elusive and 
unpredictable in the case of  sociology, which, from a Latourian point of  view, seems like 
an example of  failure. However, I have argued that this is not simply a matter of  
sociology being an immature science. Rather, as I have tried to suggest above, it is due to 
the fact that sociologists – occasionally to their own detriment – have shown a greater 
interest in what constitutes a science and a more pronounced concern as to the goals that 
such a science should aspire to. As such, sociology shares the science studies impulse to 
gain a richer understanding of  science, the source of  the prestige and authority it 
commands, and the realities in whose service it is deployed. Crucially, sociology is a 
useful illustration of  what happens when the intimate connection between political 
representation and scientific representation is not concealed, and hybridity is 
acknowledged.  
In conclusion, my analysis of  sociology shows that Latour may have been right in 
suggesting that purity is the result of  concealing the way politics and culture permeate 
knowledge, as sociology's inability to consistently purify itself  has been a source of  
difficulty. However, I have also tried to show that purity is not something that actor-
network accounts themselves strive for. This suggests that a lack of  purity or, indeed, a 
lack of  stability is not something that can be unequivocally regarded as a weakness or 
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fault, even though the disciplines that science studies generally looks at are better at 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
 
1. When and why did you develop an interest in sociology? 
2. What made you consider doing a Ph.D.? 
3. What would you say is the object of  study (of  sociology) if  you had to explain it 
to someone who knew nothing about sociology? 
4. What, if  anything, differentiates sociology from the natural sciences? 
5. Why is sociological knowledge (be it theory or applied research) valuable? 
6. Can sociology claim to be objective? 
7. Are quantitative methods better than qualitative methods at limiting the 
researcher's influence on how data is interpreted? 
8. What, in your opinion, are the idicators of  good quality research? 
9. What distinguishes the knowledge possessed by sociologists from lay sociological 
intuitions and the practical skills necessary to participate in everyday social rituals? 
10. What, if  any, are the difference between sociological theory and figurative social 
theories and allegories? Are they an academically acceptable addition to the 
sociological debate? 
11. Is it possible (and desirable) to distinguish between the descriptive and normative 
(e.g. value judgements) aspects of  sociological research? 
12. Is sociology a politically neutral discipline? Should it be? 
13. What, in your opinion, are the functions of  sociology? 
14. What, in your opinion, is the role of  sociology in the development and practical 
implementation of  public policy? 
15. What are the insights that sociologists could provide to policy makers? 
16. In your opinion, is there enough institutional and financial support for sociology 
to successfully participate in policy-making? 
17. Is the sociologist responsible for how her findings and interpretation are used? 
 
